Joint Convention on the Safety of Spent Fuel Management and on the Safety of Radioactive Waste Management : 6th Finnish National Report as referred to in Article 32 of the Convention by unknown
BSTUK-B 218 / OCTOBER 2017
Säteilyturvakeskus
Strålsäkerhetscentralen 
Radiation and Nuclear Safety Authority
Joint Convention on the Safety 
of Spent Fuel Management and 
on the Safety of Radioactive 
Waste Management 
6th Finnish National Report as referred to 
in Article 32 of the Convention
STUK • SÄTEILYTURVAKESKUS
STRÅLSÄKERHETSCENTRALEN
RADIATION AND NUCLEAR SAFETY AUTHORITY
Osoite/Address • Laippatie 4, 00880 Helsinki
Postiosoite / Postal address • PL / P.O.Box 14, FIN-00881 Helsinki, FINLAND
Puh./Tel. (09) 759 881, +358 9 759 881 • Fax (09) 759 88 500, +358 9 759 88 500 • www.stuk.fi
STUK-B 218 / OCTOBER 2017
Joint Convention on the Safety 
of Spent Fuel Management and
on the Safety of Radioactive 
Waste Management
6th Finnish National Report as referred to 
in Article 32 of the Convention
ISBN 978-952-309-390-4 (print) Erweko Oy, Helsinki 2017
ISBN 978-952-309-391-1 (pdf)
ISSN 0781-1713
STUK-B 218
3
Executive summary
Introduction
The Joint Convention on the Safety of Spent Fuel Management and on the Safety of 
Radioactive Waste Management was adopted on 29 September 1997 at the Vienna 
Diplomatic Conference. Finland signed the Convention on 2 October 1997 and deposited 
the tools of acceptance on 10 February 2000. The Convention entered into force on 18 
June 2001. This report is the 6th Finnish National Report under the Joint Convention in 
accordance with the provisions of Article 32. It will be subject to review in May 2018 in the 
sixth Review Meeting of the contracting parties in Vienna. The fulfilment of the obligations 
of the Convention and the development of waste management after the Fifth Review 
Meeting, during the reporting period 2014–2016, are assessed in this report.
There are currently two nuclear power plants operating in Finland: Loviisa and Olkiluoto 
plants. The Loviisa plant comprises two VVER-440 units (Russian type pressurised water 
reactors), operated by Fortum Power and Heat Oy (FPH). The Olkiluoto plant comprises 
two BWR units (boiling water reactors); operated by Teollisuuden Voima Oyj (TVO) and a 
third PWR (pressurized water reactor) unit is under construction. In addition, Fennovoima 
Oy (Fennovoima) has applied for a construction licence for one pressurised water reactor 
(AES-2006) at Pyhäjoki.
Spent fuel from the nuclear power plant units is stored in interim pool type storages at 
the power plant sites for tens of years until disposal. The interim spent fuel storages 
have already been in operation for about 30 years. The safety of the interim storages 
was enhanced during the reporting period. The spent nuclear fuel disposal project has 
progressed as planned. The construction licence for the encapsulation and disposal facility 
was granted by the Government to Posiva in November 2015 and the construction of the 
geological disposal facility started in Olkiluoto in December 2016. Fennovoima started the 
Environmental Impact Assessment (EIA) of its own spent nuclear fuel disposal in summer 
2016.
Geological disposal facilities for low and intermediate level waste have been in operation 
since the 1990s in Olkiluoto and Loviisa. In the future, the Olkiluoto facility is planned 
to be extended for operational waste from the OL3 unit and decommissioning waste 
from all reactor units in Olkiluoto. The disposal facility in Loviisa will be extended for 
decommissioning waste from the Loviisa NPP units. Fennovoima has planned to build a 
geological disposal facility for its low and intermediate level waste at the Pyhäjoki site.
Joint Convention on the Safety of Spent Fuel Management and on the Safety of Radioactive Waste 
Management. 6th Finnish National Report as referred to in Article 32 of the Convention. STUK-B 218. 
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Major developments in Finland since the 5th Review Meeting are as follows: there has 
been real progress in spent nuclear fuel disposal, as well as the enhancement of spent 
fuel interim storage safety, in addition improvements have been made in NPP’s LILW 
management and non-nuclear radioactive waste disposal, and there has been significant 
progress in the planning of the research reactor decommissioning. Furthermore, the 
legislative and regulatory framework has been enhanced, national competences for 
future needs have been evaluated and developed, and the IRRS follow-up mission (IAEA’s 
Integrated Regulatory Review Service) was carried out in Finland. Only the main 
achievements are presented in this summary section. More detailed information on the 
latest developments in the various topics of the Convention is provided in connection with 
the relevant articles. Section K summarises the main achievements from the reporting 
period and also presents Finland’s future challenges in nuclear and radioactive waste 
management.
Since the 5th Review Meeting
The 5th Review Meeting in 2015 identified challenges, and recorded some planned measures 
to improve the safety of nuclear waste management in Finland. On request of the Review 
Meeting these issues and the responsed are included in this 6th National Report of Finland. 
The issues are listed here, with the related references provided in brackets. A summary of 
how Finland has proceeded with the identified challenges during the reporting period is 
given in Section K.
Finland – Challenges
•	 Construction	and	oversight	of	the	spent	fuel	(SF)	disposal	
facility (Section H, Annexes L.2 and L.3)
•	 Decommissioning	and	waste	management	of	the	FiR	1	
research reactor (Article 9, Article 26, Annex L.5)
•	 Ensuring	adequate	resources	and	competence	in	tough	economic	situations	(utilities,	
waste management organizations, and Government) (Article 20, Article 22)
•	 Communication	with	public	and	stakeholders	to	maintain	confidence	in	
safe waste management and regulatory framework (Article 20)
•	 Disposal	of	a	few	High-Activity	Sealed	Sources	(HASS),	which	are	not	
suitable for disposal in existing LILW repositories (Section J).
Finland – Planned Measures to Improve Safety
•	 Licensing	of	the	encapsulation	plant	and	the	disposal	facility	for	
encapsulated spent fuel (Section H, Annexes L.2 and L.3)
•	 Implementation	of	recommendations	from	the	IRRS	review	(Article	20)
•	 Licensing	of	research	reactor	decommissioning	and	start	of	
dismantling activities (Article 9, Article 26, Annex L.5).
The legislative and regulatory system has been enhanced
The current Finnish nuclear legislation is based on the Nuclear Energy Act from 1987, 
together with a supporting Nuclear Energy Decree from 1988. The Nuclear Energy Act 
has been revised several times over the years. The revision of the Nuclear Energy Act in 
2015 enabled STUK to issue legally binding regulations. Based on the Nuclear Energy 
Act, STUK issued four regulations in 2016 to replace the earlier Government Decrees 
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on nuclear safety for nuclear power plants, the security in the use of nuclear energy, the 
emergency response arrangements at nuclear power plants, and the disposal of nuclear 
waste. In addition, one new regulation for the safety of uranium and thorium production 
was issued.
Development of national competences for future needs
STUK’s role and responsibilities were assessed in a peer review, as part of the IRRS 
mission (IAEA’s Integrated Regulatory Review Service), in October 2012. In the follow-
up mission in June 2015 the regulatory activities in Finland were reviewed based on the 
IAEA Safety Standards and international best practices. The main conclusion of the IRRS 
follow up mission was that STUK had made significant progress in most areas and many 
improvements had been implemented in accordance with the action plan.
The implementation of the recommendations from the “Nuclear Energy Research Strategy”-
report from 2013 is on-going by the Ministry of Economic Affairs and Employment (MEAE). 
The main aim is to ensure the availability of the competent resources for the safe use of 
nuclear energy. As an example of the on-going implementation of the recommendations, the 
Nuclear Energy Act was updated in 2015 to ensure the financing of the enhancement of the 
nuclear safety research infrastructure.
In addition to the basic training given for the nuclear sciences in universities in Espoo, 
Helsinki, and Lappeenranta, the availability of competent human resources has also been 
improved by the additional training of young experts in the nuclear safety field in different 
ways, e.g. through a networked doctoral programme (YTERA – Doctoral programme for 
Nuclear Engineering and Radiochemistry in 2012–2015) and through separately arranged 
national courses focusing on nuclear and waste management safety (YK and YJH Courses).
Due to the rearrangement of research funding instruments in Finland and additional 
budget cuts by the Government, STUK has partly terminated and also significantly 
reduced its radiation safety research. Instead of its own research programme, STUK 
has established a national radiation safety research programme in co-operation with all 
universities in Finland to ensure that radiation safety research will continue in Finland.
The spent nuclear fuel disposal project has progressed to the construction phase
The Finnish nuclear fuel cycle policy is based on the once-through principle. After removal 
from the reactor spent fuel is stored in interim pool type storages at the power plant sites. 
After a storage period lasting tens of years, the spent fuel will be disposed of deep in the 
Finnish bedrock.
Posiva submitted construction licence application and supporting safety documentation to 
the authorities at the end of 2012. STUK’s safety review and assessment was submitted 
to the Ministry of Economic Affairs and Employment (MEAE) in February 2015. The 
construction licence was granted by the Government to Posiva in November 2015. The 
construction of the disposal facility started in December 2016. Posiva is responsible for 
the preparations for and later on for the implementation of the disposal of spent fuel of its 
owners TVO and FPH. The disposal project and the granted licence cover spent fuel from 
five reactors: Loviisa 1 and 2, in addition to Olkiluoto 1, 2 and 3.
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In the Decision-in-Principle for Fennovoima’s new reactor unit, Fennovoima was required 
to define its plans for future spent nuclear fuel management and disposal by the end of 
June 2016. As required, in June 2016 Fennovoima submitted an Environmental Impact 
Assessment programme for its planned spent fuel disposal activities to the MEAE. 
Fennovoima and Posiva Solutions Oy (Posiva’s subsidiary that focuses on supplying 
services) have signed a co-operation agreement to ensure that the expertise of Posiva is 
available for Fennovoima’s spent nuclear fuel management activities. The co-operation 
started in 2016.
Spent fuel interim storage safety has been enhanced
The safety of the spent fuel storages was analysed as a part of the EU stress tests in 
relation to the Fukushima Dai-ichi accident. Hazards or deficiencies that would have 
required immediate action were not found, but areas where safety could be further 
enhanced were identified (e.g. reducing the dependency on nuclear power plant’s normal 
electricity supply and distribution systems as well as on the sea water cooled systems for 
residual heat removal of the reactor, containment and spent fuel storage pools, protection 
against external flooding, seismic resistance of spent fuel pools, and firefighting systems).
The spent fuel interim storage facility in Olkiluoto undergone numerous improvements 
during its capacity extension, which became operational in summer 2015. These included, 
e.g. protection against large airplane crashes and enabling a cooling water feed from 
outside the storage area. Based on the evaluation in relation to the Fukushima Dai-
ichi accident, water level and temperature monitoring functions have been improved for 
earthquake resistance and for the potential loss of the facility power supply.
Additionally, the Loviisa spent fuel storage has been improved after the Fukushima Dai-
ichi accident. The main changes are aimed at reducing the dependency on the plant’s 
normal electricity supply and distribution system, as well as on seawater cooled systems 
for residual heat removal from the reactor, containment and spent fuel pools. Furthermore, 
the flood protection of the NPP has been improved.
Operation in low and intermediate level waste management proceeded
The predisposal management of LILW was developed in Loviisa NPP during the reporting 
period as the solidification plant was authorized for full operation in 2016. Loviisa NPP has 
now been able to start the solidification of historical liquid wastes, which had been stored 
in tanks from the start of NPP’s operation in the late 1970s. The aim is to solidify and 
dispose of all existing liquid waste in the forthcoming years.
The disposal of non-nuclear radioactive waste has commenced
Non-nuclear radioactive wastes originating, e.g. from research, industry and hospitals has 
been stored in a cavern in the LILW disposal facility at Olkiluoto. The licence conditions 
of the Olkiluoto LILW disposal facility were revised in 2012. The revised license enabled 
the disposal of non-nuclear radioactive waste in the Olkiluoto LILW disposal facility. 
The disposal of non-nuclear radioactive waste started in 2016 and currently most waste 
accumulated over the years have been disposed of.
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Planning for decommissioning Finland’s first nuclear reactor has started
The research reactor FiR 1 (TRIGA Mark II, 250 kW) has been in operation since 1962. 
The operation of FiR 1 has been carried out by VTT Technical Research Centre of Finland 
Ltd. in Espoo since 1971. In 2012, VTT decided to shut down the research reactor due to 
insufficient funding for its continued operation. The Environmental Impact Assessment 
procedure for the decommissioning was conducted in 2013-2015. FiR 1 will be the first 
nuclear reactor to be decommissioned in Finland. VTT submitted an application to the 
Government for a decommissioning licence on June 20, 2017 (formally this is a new 
operating licence as the present Finnish legislation does not define a decommissioning 
licence). The dismantling is scheduled to start in early 2019 and to last about two years. 
The dismantling will be regulated by STUK concerning the radiation and nuclear safety 
aspects.
Challenges for future work in spent nuclear fuel and radioactive waste management
Finland has identified for itself challenges for the future work in spent nuclear fuel 
and radioactive waste management and these are summarized below. Progress in spent 
nuclear fuel disposal programme has been identified as a continuous challenge because 
the proceeding project requires the development of regulatory requirements. Moreover, 
regulatory oversight needs to be developed and adjusted for the different project phases. 
STUK has procedures in place to review and update plans and regulations as the 
disposal project proceeds to each new phase and the needs for development are identified. 
Furthermore, Posiva is well prepared for the construction phase of the disposal project and 
preparations are ongoing for the forthcoming operation phase.
In addition, the development of national competences and a regulatory framework are 
identified as a continuous challenge because the nuclear field in Finland is very active at 
the moment and compentent resources are required both for regulatory oversight as well 
as for licensees and license applicants.
Finland has identified following three main challenges for the future work:
•	 Improvement	of	the	national	plan	for	radioactive	waste	management 
Finland has a well-functioning system and technical solutions for the management of nuclear 
waste arising from NPPs and also for major part of non-nuclear radioactive wastes. However, 
as a consequence of 1) an incident at a sealed radioactive source in the storage facilities in 
Suomen Nukliditekniikka and its related clean-up work (for more detail information see 
Section J, article 28), 2) planning of the research reactor decommissioning waste storage 
and disposal and 3) unresolved challenges of disposal for a few HASS sources, it has been 
identified that the national radioactive waste management plan and licensing system 
needs to be evaluated and improved to ensure a national system with capabilities for all 
possible waste streams. MEAE has invited an ad-hoc expert group to address these issues. 
The group will also address recommendations made by the Finnish Safety Investigation 
Authority about the sealed source incident. This group will start its work in autumn 2017.
•	Developing	competences	and	a	regulatory	framework	for	decommissioning 
The research reactor, FiR 1, will be the first nuclear reactor to be decommissioned in 
Finland. As this is the first decommissioning project, Finland has limited experience in 
this area. VTT and STUK are both co-operating internationally gathering knowledge 
and experience about the implementation and regulation of decommissioning. The 
decommissioning project of the research reactor is also a very important learning process 
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for STUK as the experiences gained will be used in updating regulations and YVL guides 
and also later on in planning the regulatory oversight for the decommissioning of NPPs.
•	 Communication	to	improve	general	public’s	understanding	of	disposal	safety 
The Finnish public has a high degree of trust in the radiation and nuclear safety regulator, 
STUK, and there is a good degree of trust towards the safety of nuclear waste management 
and disposal. However, the interest of the general public towards disposal seems to 
be declining. Additionally, the latest poll results (conducted by e.g. Finnish Energy in 
2016) show indications of a slight decrease in trust towards thesafety of nuclear waste 
disposal. Developments of these trends need to be followed in forthcoming polls. The 
regulatory work and decisions made by the regulator have to be clear and understandable 
to the general public. The general public should also have the correct understanding of 
disposal safety and related risks. Due to these challenges, STUK, for its part, initiated 
a strategic communication development project in spring 2016 to address both the 
changing communication environment and the use of modern communication tools.
Candidate for good practice
Finland has identified that the granting of the construction licence for a spent fuel disposal 
facility is a candidate for good practice. Finland is the first country that has granted a 
construction licence for a final repository for spent fuel. Construction of the facility is on-
going. The development and evaluation of safe disposal has been a long-lasting systematic 
process involving conducted in good co-operation with the Government, ministries, 
regulators, Posiva, nuclear power companies as well as research organisations while 
acknowledging the roles and responsibilities of the different parties. The approach taken 
in Finland has enabled timely progress of the disposal project with political and public 
support and resulted in approval of the construction licencelicence application in 2015. 
This is a concrete step towards improving safety in a unique and proven manner.
Conclusion
In conclusion, based on the information presented in the report, Finland complies with 
the obligations and objectives of the Joint Convention. Challenges for the future have 
been recognized, regularly reviewed and addressed. The required efforts for continuous 
improvement have been made.
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Purpose and structure of the report
The Joint Convention on the Safety of Spent Fuel 
Management and on the Safety of Radioactive 
Waste Management was adopted on 29 September 
1997 at the Vienna Diplomatic Conference. Finland 
signed the Convention on 2 October 1997 and de-
posited the tools of acceptance on 10 February 
2000. The Convention entered into force on 18 
June 2001. This report is the 6th Finnish National 
Report under the Joint Convention on the Safety 
of Spent Fuel Management and on the Safety of 
Radioactive Waste Management. It will be subject 
to review in May 2018 in the sixth Review Meeting 
of the contracting parties in Vienna.
The fulfilment of the obligations of the Joint 
Convention and the developments during 2014–
2016 are assessed in this report. The self-assess-
ment is mainly based on Finnish legislation and 
regulations and on the status of the current and 
planned nuclear waste management activities 
in Finland. The plans for the decommissioning 
of nuclear facilities and also the regulation and 
management of radioactive waste generated out-
side the nuclear fuel cycle are discussed when 
required.
The structure of the report is in accordance with 
SECTION A Introduction
the Guidelines Regarding the Form and Structure 
of National Reports (INFCIRC 604/Rev 3). The 
report is a stand-alone document and does not 
require familiarity with the earlier reports. The 
fulfilment of the obligations is described in general 
in addition to the latest developments since the 
5th Review Meeting which are described in more 
detail. Table 1 provides a cross reference of the sec-
tions in this report and the specific reporting provi-
sions in the Joint Convention.
The main developments during the report-
ing period 2014–2016 are shortly summarised in 
Section A. The current status of the interim spent 
fuel storages is described in Section G. As Finnish 
legislation defines spent nuclear fuel as waste, 
the development of the disposal of spent nuclear 
fuel is presented in Section H. Section H also de-
scribes the developments in low and intermediate 
level waste management, as well as development 
of other than nuclear energy related radioactive 
waste management, and decommissioning. Section 
K summarises safety issues identified earlier and 
actions to address them. It also summarises the 
results from the 5th review meeting. The identified 
future challenges and planned improvements are 
also presented in Section K.
Table 1. The content of the national report sections.
National Report Section Joint Convention Section
Section A: Introduction
Section B: Policy and Practises Article 32, paragraph 1
Section C: Scope of Application Article 3
Section D: Inventories and Lists Article 32, paragraph 2
Section E: Legislative and Regulatory System Articles 18–20
Section F: Other General Safety Provisions Articles 21–26
Section G: Safety of Spent Fuel Management Articles 4–10
Section H: Safety of Radioactive Waste Management Articles 11–17
Section I: Transboundary Movement Article 27
Section J: Disused Sealed Sources Article 28
Section K: General Efforts to Improve Safety Multiple Articles
Section L: Annexes Multiple Articles
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More detailed information about currently 
ongoing projects is included in the appendices. 
Firstly, the legal background to nuclear waste 
management and radioactive waste management 
is described in Appendix L.1. Appendices L.2 and 
L.3 describe the Posiva spent nuclear fuel disposal 
project. L2 concentrates on the regulatory over-
sight of the project and L3 describes the current 
status of the disposal project. Nuclear waste man-
agement plans for the new NPP project Hanhikivi 
1 are described in Appendix L.4. The current status 
of the decommissioning of research reactor FiR 1 is 
summarized in Appendix L.5.
The nuclear energy sector is currently very ac-
tive in Finland. There are two nuclear power plants 
operating in Finland at the Loviisa and Olkiluoto 
sites. The Loviisa plant comprises two VVER-440 
units (Russian type pressurised water reactors), 
operated by Fortum Power and Heat Oy (FPH). 
The Olkiluoto plant comprises two BWR units 
(boiling water reactors) operated by Teollisuuden 
Voima Oyj (TVO) and a third PWR (pressurized 
water reactor) unit is planned to be commissioned 
at the end of 2018 at the Olkiluoto site. In addition, 
Fennovoima has applied for a construction licence 
for one pressurized water reactor (AES-2006) in 
Pyhäjoki (Figure 1). Finland also has a research 
reactor FiR 1 in Otaniemi, which is currently in an 
extended shutdown state and according to current 
plans it will be decommissioned in 2019–2021.
Geological disposal facilities for low and inter-
mediate level operating waste exist in Olkiluoto 
and Loviisa. They have been in operation since the 
1990s. Fennovoima aims to build its own disposal 
facility for low and intermediate level waste at 
Pyhäjoki in the 2030s.
The construction licence of the encapsulation 
plant and disposal facility for spent nuclear fuel 
(deep geological repository) was granted by the 
Government to Posiva in November 2015. The con-
struction of the disposal facility started in Olkiluoto 
in December 2016. Posiva is responsible for the 
preparations for and later implementation of spent 
fuel disposal for its owners Teollisuuden Voima 
Oyj (TVO) and Fortum Power and Heat Oy (FPH). 
The disposal project and granted construction li-
cence covers spent fuel from five reactor units: 
Loviisa 1 and 2, Olkiluoto 1, 2 and 3. In June 2016, 
Fennovoima submitted an Environmental Impact 
Assessment programme for a spent fuel disposal 
facility to the MEAE. At the same time, a co-opera-
tion agreement with Posiva Solutions Oy (Posiva’s 
subsidiary that focuses on supplying services) was 
signed to ensure that the expertise of Posiva is 
available for Fennovoima’s spent nuclear fuel man-
agement activities. Co-operation started in 2016.
SÄTEILYTURVAKESKUS • STRÅLSÄKERHETSCENTRALEN
RADIATION AND NUCLEAR SAFETY AUTHORITY
Nuclear power in Finland
Hanhikivi NPP (Fennovoima)
• Construction licence 
application for a new NPP, AFR 
storage
• Decision in Principle for a LILW 
repository
Loviisa NPP (Fortum)
• 2 operating units – VVERs 
496 MWe (‐77, ‐81), AFR storage, 
LILW repository
Olkiluoto NPP (TVO)
• 2 operating units – BWRs 
880 MWe (‐78, ‐80), AFR storage, 
LILW repository
• New reactor unit OL3 (EPR) under 
commission
• Construction licence granted for 
SNF Encapsulation and Disposal 
Facility
Figure 1. The nuclear power plants in Finland.
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SECTION B Policies and practices
Article 32 Reporting, paragraph 1
In accordance with the provisions of Article 30, each 
Contracting Party shall submit a national report to 
each review meeting of Contracting Parties. This re-
port shall address the measures taken to implement 
each of the obligations of the Convention. For each 
Contracting Party the report shall also address its:
(a) spent fuel management policy;
(b) spent fuel management practices;
(c) radioactive waste management policy;
(d) radioactive waste management practices;
(e) criteria used to define and categorize radioac-
tive waste.
Spent fuel and radioactive 
waste management policy
General
The first principles for nuclear waste man-
agement were originally set out in the Finnish 
Government’s policy decision of 1978. This first de-
cision defined the overall responsibilities for waste 
management, as well as financial responsibilities 
and the Finnish Government’s role in the oversight 
of the R&D work needed to implement the policy. 
The policy and strategy were further elaborated in 
a government decision in 1983 for TVO and later 
on in the decisions by the predecessors to MEAE. 
These decisions also set a long-term schedule for 
the implementation of nuclear waste management 
including site selection and the start of the op-
eration of the spent fuel disposal facility. Currently 
nuclear and radioactive waste management policy 
is defined in Finnish legislation. The most essen-
tial laws, decrees, safety regulations and guides 
are listed in Annex L.1.
Responsibilities
The Nuclear Energy Act (Section 9) prescribes that 
the generators of nuclear waste are responsible 
for all nuclear waste management measures and 
their appropriate preparation, and for their cost. 
The State has the secondary responsibility in case 
any producer of nuclear waste is incapable of ful-
filling its nuclear waste management obligations 
(Nuclear Energy Act, Sections 31 and 32). When 
the licensee’s waste management obligations have 
ceased because the disposal of the nuclear waste 
has been carried out in an approved manner, the 
ownership of the waste is transferred to the State, 
which shall be responsible thereafter for the nucle-
ar waste (the Nuclear Energy Act, Sections 32–34).
The Radiation Act (Section 50) provides that the 
organization engaged in a radiation practice shall 
take the measures necessary to render harmless 
any radioactive waste arising from its operations. 
Rendering radioactive waste harmless means any 
measure needed to treat, isolate, or dispose of 
the waste, or to restrict its use so that it does 
not endanger human health or the environment. 
Moreover, the responsible party utilizing natural 
resources containing radioactive substances must 
ensure that radioactive waste poses no hazard to 
health or to the environment neither during opera-
tions or at their conclusion. The State has the sec-
ondary responsibility in case a producer of radioac-
tive waste is incapable of fulfilling its management 
obligations (the Radiation Act, Section 51).
Political decision-making and 
public consultation
According to the Nuclear Energy Act (Section 11), 
the construction of a nuclear facility of consider-
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able general significance requires a Government’s 
Decision-in-Principle (DiP) to show that the con-
struction project is in accordance with the overall 
good of society. Such facilities include major nu-
clear waste management facilities. Before making 
the DiP referred to in Section 11, the Government 
must ascertain that the municipality where the nu-
clear facility is planned to be located, is in favour of 
the facility (Section 14 of the Nuclear Energy Act). 
The DiP approved by the Government must be for-
warded, without delay, for handling by Parliament. 
The Parliament may only reverse the DiP or may 
decide that it will remain in force (Section 15 of the 
Nuclear Energy Act).
The Nuclear Energy Decree (Section 24) pro-
vides that an application for a DiP must be append-
ed by an assessment report drawn up according 
to the Act on Environmental Impact Assessment 
Procedure and by a statement from the coordinat-
ing authority (the Ministry of Economic Affairs 
and Employment, MEAE). There must also be a de-
scription of the design criteria that will be observed 
by the applicant to avoid environmental damage 
and to restrict the burden on the environment. The 
Environmental Impact Assessment Procedure is a 
consultative and participative process facilitating 
public involvement and information transfer to 
the people affected as a part of good governance 
practice. It considers a wide scope of potential 
impacts, such as human health and comfort, the 
natural environment and biodiversity, municipal 
structures and the use of natural resources. The 
international hearing is conducted according to the 
Convention on Environmental Impact Assessment 
in a Transboundary Context (Espoo, 1991).
Spent fuel and nuclear waste 
management principles
Nuclear waste is defined in the Nuclear Energy 
Act (Section 3) as radioactive waste in the form of 
spent fuel or in some other form generated in con-
nection with or as a result of the use of nuclear en-
ergy, materials, objects and structures, which hav-
ing become radioactive in connection with or as a 
result of the use of nuclear energy and having been 
removed from use, require special measures be-
cause of the danger arising from their radioactivity.
According to the Nuclear Energy Act (Section 
27a) the amount of nuclear waste generated in the 
use of nuclear energy must be kept as low as is rea-
sonably achievable with practical measures, both 
regarding its volume and activity, without compro-
mising the general principles set forth in Sections 
5–7 of the Act.
According to the Nuclear Energy Act (Section 
6a), nuclear waste generated in Finland must be 
handled, stored, and permanently disposed of in 
Finland. Respectively, nuclear waste generated 
elsewhere than in Finland, shall not be handled, 
stored, or permanently disposed of in Finland. 
There are only minor exemptions to these princi-
ples, notably concerning the nuclear waste aris-
ing from the use of a research reactor in Finland 
(Section 6a of the Nuclear Energy Act). As stipu-
lated in Section 7b of the Nuclear Energy Decree, 
the spent fuel from a research reactor in Finland 
may be handled, stored, and disposed of outside 
Finland, if justified on grounds of safety or due to a 
significant economic or other cogent reason.
Management principles for non-
nuclear radioactive waste
Non-nuclear radioactive waste is regulated in 
Finnish legislation within the framework of the 
Radiation Act. According to the Radiation Act 
(Section 10), the term radioactive waste denotes 
radioactive substances, and various items that are 
of no further use and need to be rendered harm-
less due to their radioactivity. The definition also 
includes equipment, goods and materials that are 
contaminated by radioactive materials. Radioactive 
substances and radiation appliances containing ra-
dioactive substances are also be regarded as radio-
active waste in case the owner of the substances or 
the appliances cannot be found.
According to the Radiation Act (Section 31b), 
when requesting a safety licence for the use of 
a high-activity sealed source, the request must 
include a plan for rendering any disused sources 
harmless, including the arrangements for their re-
turn to the manufacturer or supplier, or their sur-
render to a recognised installation. The Radiation 
Decree (Section 24b) specifies that STUK shall dis-
charge the function of rendering radioactive waste 
harmless where there is no recognised facility of 
the kind referred to in the Radiation Act. STUK 
may agree with the custodian of the waste that 
custody of the waste will be permanently assigned 
to the Government in return for a non-recurrent 
compensation charge.
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Principles for decommissioning 
of nuclear facilities
The Nuclear Energy Act (Section 7g) requires that 
provisions for the decommissioning of a nuclear 
facility must be taken into account in its design. 
The decommissioning plan must be updated regu-
larly as prescribed in the Act (Section 28). After 
the permanent shut-down of the facility, it must 
be decommissioned in accordance with the plan 
approved by STUK. The dismantling of the facility 
and other actions related to decommissioning may 
not be unjustifiably postponed.
Safety principles and control
The Nuclear Energy Act (Section 7a) prescribes 
that the safety of the use of nuclear energy (includ-
ing waste management) must be as high as rea-
sonably achievable. To further enhance safety, all 
actions justified by operational experience, safety 
research, and the progress in science and tech-
nology shall be taken. Additionally, nuclear waste 
must be managed so that no radiation exposure 
will occur after disposal that would exceed the 
levels considered acceptable during the implemen-
tation of disposal. The disposal of nuclear waste in 
a manner intended as permanent must be planned 
giving priority to safety and so that ensuring its 
long-term safety does not require surveillance of 
the disposal site (Section 7h of the Nuclear Energy 
Act).
The Nuclear Energy Act (Section 55) designates 
STUK as the regulatory body for the control of 
the safe use of nuclear energy. STUK’s regula-
tory tasks include the oversight of safety, security, 
emergency preparedness and non-proliferation of 
nuclear materials. More specifically STUK’s tasks 
include participation in the licensing process (e.g. 
for the assessment of safety), issuance of general 
and detailed safety requirements, and the control 
of compliance with the safety requirements and 
licence conditions. Respectively, the Radiation Act 
(Section 6) states that compliance with the Act and 
with the provisions and regulations issued pursu-
ant thereto shall be supervised by STUK. The Act 
(Section 16) states that safety licences shall be 
granted by STUK upon application.
Costs and funding
The Nuclear Energy Act (Chapter 7) addresses the 
financial provision for nuclear waste management. 
According to the Nuclear Energy Act (Article 9), the 
nuclear waste producer is responsible for the costs 
of the nuclear waste management and decommis-
sioning and for the provisions of the future costs. A 
State Nuclear Waste Management Fund has been 
set up and funds are collected in advance annually 
as a provision to fulfil any pending nuclear waste 
management and decommissioning obligations and 
to ensure that funds are available in case any li-
cence holder is unable to fulfil its obligations. The 
NPP operators include the costs of waste manage-
ment, even those arising from the decommission-
ing of the NPPs, into the price of the electricity 
produced by the NPPs. Initially, the nuclear power 
companies had internal funds for that purpose, 
but by virtue of the entry into force of the Nuclear 
Energy Act, the State Nuclear Waste Management 
Fund was established under the former Ministry 
of Trade and Industry (now MEAE) in 1988. To en-
sure that financial liability is fully covered, every 
third year the nuclear power companies producing 
nuclear waste and the operator of the research 
reactor are obliged to present cost estimates for 
the future management of their nuclear waste and 
decommissioning of facilities and must take care 
that the required amount of money is set aside in 
the State Nuclear Waste Management Fund. In 
addition, they shall provide securities to the State 
for that part of their financial liability, which is not 
yet covered by the Fund (Article 45). Additionally, 
in the case of the research reactor, the operator is 
responsible for the planning and implementation 
of spent nuclear fuel and other nuclear waste man-
agement. In the case of the research reactor, the 
State initially funded the necessary provision from 
the State Fund.
The Radiation Act (Section 19) provides for the 
financial security for radioactive waste manage-
ment for non-nuclear practices as follows: the Act 
ensures that the licensee meets the costs incurred 
for rendering radioactive waste harmless and for 
carrying out any decontamination measures that 
may be needed in the environment, and ensures 
that the licensee shall furnish collateral security if 
the operations produce or are liable to produce ra-
dioactive waste that cannot be rendered harmless 
without incurring substantial cost.
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Criteria used to categorize radioactive waste
The Finnish radioactive waste classification sys-
tem includes two main categories: nuclear waste, 
and radioactive waste not originating from the use 
of nuclear energy and the associated nuclear fuel 
cycle (non-nuclear radioactive waste). Waste clas-
sification according to disposal route is illustrated 
in Figure 2.
Spent fuel from nuclear facilities
The Nuclear Energy Act defines spent fuel from 
the operation of nuclear reactors as nuclear waste. 
The Nuclear Energy Act (6 a §) defines that the 
nuclear waste generated in connection with or as a 
result of the use of nuclear energy in Finland must 
be handled, stored and permanently disposed of in 
Finland. In practice, this means that the disposal 
of spent fuel in a permanent manner is the only 
waste management option for spent nuclear fuel 
arising from the use of nuclear energy. Due to its 
high radioactivity and heat generation, spent fuel 
is regarded as high-level waste.
The main exception to the general principles 
described above regard spent fuel and other nu-
clear waste that has been generated in connection 
with or as a result of the operation of a research 
reactor in Finland. As stipulated in Section 7b of 
the Nuclear Energy Decree, the spent fuel from the 
research reactor in Finland can be handled, stored, 
and disposed of outside Finland.
Low and intermediate level waste 
from nuclear facilities
The classification system for the purpose of the 
predisposal management of LILW from nuclear fa-
cilities, including NPPs, is based on activity con-
centrations, given in Regulation STUK Y/4/2016. 
Solid and liquid waste arising from the controlled 
area of an NPP contain almost exclusively short-
lived beta and gamma emitters and are grouped 
into the following activity categories:
•	Very low-level waste (VLLW) refers to waste 
whose average activity concentration of signifi-
cant radionuclides does not exceed the value of 
  
Nuclear Waste
(Subject to Nuclear Energy Act)
Spent Nuclear Fuel Low and Intermediate
Level Waste
if activity < 100 kBq/kg
Deep Repository Rock Caverns at 
Intermediate Depth
Near Surface Landﬁll 
or Rock Caverns
 
Other Radioactive Waste
(Subject to Radiation Act)
Conditioned
Solid Waste  
Liquid Waste Solid Waste Airborne 
Discharges
Central Storage and 
disposal 
(Olkiluoto VLJ cave)
Sewage Systems Landﬁll Air
Figure 2. Classification of radioactive waste for disposal purposes.
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100 kBq/kg and the total activity does not ex-
ceed the values laid down in Section 6(1) of the 
Nuclear Energy Decree (161/1988) (Total activ-
ity < 1 TBq, α-activity < 10 GBq).
•	Low level waste (LLW) contains so little ra-
dioactivity that it can be treated without any 
special radiation protection arrangements. The 
activity concentration in the waste must then 
not be more than 1 MBq/kg, as a rule.
•	 Intermediate level waste (ILW) contains ra-
dioactivity to the extent that effective radiation 
protection arrangements are needed when the 
waste is processed. As a rule, the activity con-
centration in the waste is from 1 MBq/kg to 
10 GBq/kg.
The classification for the disposal purpose is giv-
en in Regulation STUK Y/4/2016. It distinguishes 
short-lived and long-lived waste accordingly:
•	Short-lived waste refers to nuclear waste of 
which the activity concentration after 500 years 
will be below the level of 100 megabecquerels 
(MBq) per kilogram in each disposed waste 
package, and below an average value of 10 
MBq per kilogram of waste in one emplacement 
room;
•	Long-lived waste refers to nuclear waste, of 
which the activity concentration after 500 years 
will be above the level of 100 MBq per kilogram 
in a disposed waste package, or above an aver-
age value of 10 MBq per kilogram of waste in 
one emplacement room;
Guide YVL D.4 provides for the general and case-
specific clearance of nuclear waste. Both clearance 
options are founded on the criteria for a trivial 
dose; the radiation protection requirement for both 
clearance procedures is that the annual dose to 
any member of the public or worker processing 
the material, must not exceed 10 µSv and that 
that otherwise the radiation exposure arising from 
the cleared material must be as low as reasonably 
achievable.
Mass and surface concentration based activ-
ity values for general clearance are given in YVL 
D.4. One set of values is for unlimited amounts 
of material and the values are taken from IAEA 
Safety Guide RS-G-1.7. Another set of values are 
applied for limited waste quantities not exceeding 
100 tonnes per year for one NPP or other nuclear 
installation. For case-specific clearance, the activ-
ity concentration values are determined on a case-
by-case basis but care must be taken that they 
do not exceed the exemption values given, e.g. in 
the Council Directive 96/29/Euratom and Guide 
ST 1.5.
Guide YVL D.4 also covers the clearance of 
regulated buildings and sites in the context of 
decommissioning nuclear facilities. The radiation 
protection requirement for such clearances is that 
the annual individual dose must not exceed a con-
straint between 10 µSv and 100 µSv, to be deter-
mined on the basis of optimization. The relevant 
IAEA safety standards and guides have been used 
as reference for the guide.
Discharges from nuclear facilities
Some liquid and airborne discharges arise from 
the operation of nuclear facilities. The discharge 
limits are specific to nuclides or nuclide groups 
and they must be in conformity with the annual 
dose constraints for the most exposed individual of 
the population. The dose constraint for NPPs is 0.1 
mSv per year (Nuclear Energy Decree Section 22 b) 
and 0.01 mSv per year for nuclear waste facilities 
(Nuclear Energy Decree Section 22 d, YVL D.3 and 
YVL D.5).
Radioactive waste from medical 
use, research and industry
For non-nuclear radioactive waste, constraints for 
disposal in landfill sites or sewage systems are 
provided in Guide ST 6.2. The criteria are based on 
the trivial dose as specified above for the clearance 
of nuclear waste.
According to Guide ST 6.2 Radioactive waste 
and emissions from the use of unsealed sources, 
liquid waste may be disposed of into a sewage 
system and solid waste may be delivered to a 
landfill site or an incineration plant, as long as the 
activity levels are below the nuclide specific limits 
based on the exemption limit. Sealed sources with 
activity levels below the exemption limit may be 
disposed of as non-radioactive waste. If the activity 
of a sealed source is above the exemption limit, the 
source needs to be disposed of as radioactive waste 
through a recognized facility.
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Spent fuel and radioactive waste 
management practices and plans
The main sources of radioactive waste in Finland 
are the nuclear waste generated from the opera-
tion of the two nuclear power plants (including 
four reactor units) and one small research reactor. 
Non-nuclear radioactive waste arises from a num-
ber of facilities using radioisotopes for medical, 
research and industrial applications. The manage-
ment practices for nuclear waste and non-nuclear 
radioactive waste are described in detail below. A 
concise overview of the management strategies is 
provided on the next page.
The NPP utilities Teollisuuden Voima Oyj 
(TVO) and Fortum Power and Heat Oy (FPH) each 
take care of the interim storage of spent fuel, the 
conditioning and disposal of low and intermedi-
ate level waste, and the planning and execution 
of future decommissioning of the NPPs, including 
also the disposal of the decommissioning waste 
of the NPPs. Additionally, Fennovoima, when it 
becomes a licensee, will be responsible for nuclear 
waste management and decommissioning activi-
ties as well as for the interim storage and disposal 
of spent fuel.
TVO and FPH have formed a joint company, 
Posiva, which is responsible for the preparation 
and implementation of the disposal their spent 
fuel. The disposal project currently covers spent 
fuel from the four reactors in operation and from 
the one under construction (Olkiluoto 3).
The operator of the research reactor, VTT 
Technical Research Centre of Finland Ltd, has 
facilities for the interim storage of its spent fuel, 
as well as low, intermediate level and non-nuclear 
radioactive waste. Producers of non-nuclear ra-
dioactive waste perform some waste management 
operations, such as initial storage, clearance and 
disposal into landfill type sites. According to the 
Radiation Act (592/1991), a recognized installation 
may receive radioactive wastes and sealed sources 
if it has a safety licence approved by STUK for its 
operations. If there are not any recognized instal-
lations, STUK will be responsible for rendering 
the radioactive waste harmless. STUK may agree 
with the custodian of the waste that custody of 
the waste will be permanently assigned to the 
Government for a fixed payment (for more informa-
tion see Section J Disused Sealed Sources).
Spent fuel management
Spent nuclear fuel from NPPs is stored at the 
power plant sites until it is disposed of. Initially, 
the fuel is cooled for one to five years in storage 
pools inside the reactor buildings. The Loviisa NPP 
has, in addition to the storage pools in the reactor 
buildings, a separate integrated pool type storage 
facility. The latest enlargement of the storage facil-
ity was commissioned in 2001. The installation of 
high density fuel racks was started in 2007 and 
will continue in the future according to necessity. 
The total allowable amount of spent fuel, according 
to the renewed operating licence issued in 2007, is 
1100 tU and the storage capacity with additional 
high density racks will be adequate until the end of 
the planned 50 years of operational life.
At the Olkiluoto NPP site, after cooling in pools 
in the reactor buildings, the spent fuel is trans-
ferred to an on-site facility, commissioned in 1987, 
with an initial capacity of about 1200 tU. The en-
largement of interim spent fuel storage was final-
ized in 2015. The extension of the storage capac-
ity included the construction of three new storage 
pools taking into account also the commissioning of 
Olkiluoto 3. The capacity of the interim spent fuel 
storage after this extension is 1800 tU. The exten-
sion has been included as part of the Olkiluoto 1 
and 2 operating licence and was authorized as a 
plant modification. The safety of the spent fuel 
storage sites (at both Loviisa and Olkiluoto site) 
was analysed as part of the EU stress tests in rela-
tion to the Fukushima Dai-ichi accident.
In practice, before disposal, the spent fuel will 
be stored in water pools for 30 to 50 years and 
thereafter transported or transferred to the en-
capsulation and disposal facilities in Olkiluoto. 
Posiva is implementing the spent fuel disposal pro-
gramme on behalf of its owners, TVO and FPH, in 
line with the Government Policy Decision of 1983 
and a further decision by the Ministry of Trade 
and Industry in 2003. The major past and future 
milestones of the spent fuel disposal programme 
are the following:
•	 Site	selection	for	the	spent	fuel	disposal	facility	
in 2000
•	 Start	 of	 construction	 of	 an	 underground	 rock	
characterization facility (ONKALO) in Olki-
luoto in 2004
•	 A	description	in	2009	of	the	preparedness	of	the	
Construction Licence application preparation
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Nuclear and non‑nuclear 
radioactive waste 
management strategy
Responsibilities
The Nuclear Energy Act (Section 9) prescribes that the 
generators of nuclear waste are responsible for all nu-
clear waste management measures and their appro-
priate preparation, as well as for their cost. The State 
has the secondary responsibility in case any producer 
of nuclear waste is incapable of fulfilling its nuclear 
waste management obligation (Nuclear Energy Act, 
Sections 31 and 32).
Current and future producers of nuclear waste 
must take care of the interim storage of spent fuel, and 
of conditioning and disposal of low and intermediate 
level waste and of planning for and implementation 
of the decommissioning of NPPs. Posiva Oy, a jointly 
owned company by FPH and TVO, is responsible for 
the preparations for and later implementation of its 
owners’ spent fuel disposal. VTT, as an operator of 
the research reactor FiR 1, is responsible for plan-
ning and implementation of the waste management 
and decommissioning of the facility, including the 
arrangements for disposal of the waste. Fennovoima 
Oy will be responsible for its own spent fuel disposal 
as well as for other nuclear waste management and 
decommissioning activities.
Producers of non-nuclear radioactive waste must 
manage their waste within the limits of their techni-
cal capability while ensuring safety and security. Non-
nuclear radioactive waste that cannot be cleared, in-
cluding spent sealed sources that cannot be returned 
to the manufacturer, must be handed over to an instal-
lation licensed to receive waste for the conditioning 
and transfer of radioactive waste to a central storage 
operated by STUK and later for disposal.
Waste management and 
decommissioning principles
Low and intermediate level nuclear waste and non-
nuclear radioactive waste that meets the acceptance 
criteria for the repositories at the NPP sites must be 
disposed of without unnecessary delay. Waste that 
cannot yet be disposed of must be stored safely. 
Furthermore, other low and intermediate level waste, 
such as decommissioning waste, is envisaged to be 
disposed of in geological disposal facilities at the NPP 
sites.
Disposal of TVO’s and FPH’s spent fuel is under 
preparation in accordance with a strategic plan, 
which is in line with the 1983 Government Policy 
Decision and the 2003 Decision of the Ministry of 
Trade and Industry (now the MAEA). The disposal 
operations are expected to begin in the 2020s. The 
spent fuel disposal programme is subject to a continu-
ous regulatory review. The construction licence was 
granted in 2015. The operation licence application is 
expected to be submitted to the Government in 2020.
The prospective nuclear utility Fennovoima 
submitted an Environmental Impact Assessment 
Programme at the end of June 2016 for a spent nu-
clear fuel disposal facility of its own. At the same time, 
it presented a co-operation agreement with Posiva 
Solutions Oy, a subsidiary of Posiva, to ensure that 
the knowledge developed during Posiva’s disposal 
project for spent nuclear fuel will also be available for 
Fennovoima. Co-operation started in 2016.
The implementation of decommissioning the NPPs 
will be optimized taking into account the technical 
aspects, radiological impacts, future use of the site, 
availability of a competent workforce and the costs. 
The strategy takes advantage of options for clearance 
of very low-level waste and structures of the plant and 
on-site disposal of decommissioning waste.
Financial provisions
The producers of nuclear waste bear the full financial 
responsibility for their waste management costs. A 
funding system for the provisions of future costs aris-
ing from waste management and disposal as well as 
decommissioning exists to ensure that the costs can be 
covered even in case of the waste generators’ inability 
to fulfil their obligations in the future. The pertinent 
licence-holders submit technical plans and cost cal-
culations for regulatory review at three-year intervals 
and these estimates are used as a basis for calculating 
liability estimates. After the annual confirmation of 
the financial liabilities, the licensees pay fees into a 
State controlled Nuclear Waste Managent Fund and 
provide securities for the liability not yet covered by 
the Fund.
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•	 Submittal	 of	 the	 construction	 licence	 applica-
tion for the Olkiluoto Encapsulation and Dis-
posal Facility at the end of 2012
•	 Construction	licence	for	the	Encapsulation	and	
Disposal Facility granted by Government in No-
vember 2015
•	 Construction	of	 the	disposal	 facility	 started	 in	
December 2016
•	 Readiness	 for	 starting	 disposal	 operations	
planned to be achieved in the early 2020s.
The construction of the Underground Rock 
Characterization Facility (URCF ONKALO) was 
conducted in 2004–2012. The length (chainage) of 
the tunnels is 4987 m and the tunnel reached a 
depth of 455 m. Posiva has excavated four short 
demonstration tunnels for testing the emplace-
ment technology. STUK’s regulatory control of the 
spent fuel disposal project is described in Annex 
L.2 and the current status of Posiva’s programme 
for spent fuel disposal is described in Annex L.3.
The construction licence granted by the 
Government in November 2015 enabled the dispos-
al of in total 6500 tonnes of uranium (spent fuel) 
in Olkiluoto. The estimate is based on the follow-
ing expectations of operational lifetimes: Loviisa 1 
and 2: 50 years and Olkiluoto 1, 2 and 3 60 years 
(Figure 3).
Spent fuel is planned to be encapsulated in 
copper-iron canisters. The canister design consists 
of a cast iron insert as a load-bearing element 
and an outer container made of copper to provide 
protection against corrosion. The canisters will be 
emplaced into the disposal facility that consists of 
technical rooms and other auxiliary spaces, shafts 
and of a network of central and deposition tunnels 
(the repository), which will be constructed at a 
depth of 400 to 455 m in crystalline bedrock.
The annulus between the canister and the depo-
sition hole walls will be filled with a compacted 
bentonite buffer material. A schematic layout of 
the underground disposal facility and the network 
of tunnels at Olkiluoto are illustrated in Figure 
4 and an individual deposition tunnel with two 
canister emplacement variants are illustrated in 
Figure 5.
Spent fuel from the research reactor FiR 1 
is currently stored on site. The primary option 
for its spent fuel management before disman-
tling the research reactor is to return the fuel to 
the United States according to Foreign Research 
Reactor Spent Nuclear Fuel (FRR SNF) Acceptance 
Figure 3. Timetable for the management of spent fuel from the nuclear power plants at Loviisa and Olkiluoto.
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Figure 4. A schematic presentation of the layout of the underground rock characterization facility and the network 
of disposal tunnels (KBS3-V option).
Figure 5. Disposal tunnel and canisters with both the vertical and horizontal disposal options depicted.
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Program of U.S. Department of Energy (DoE). 
Another option is interim storage and later dispos-
al in the Olkiluoto spent fuel disposal facility. This 
would require an agreement between the compa-
nies and the licensing of the Olkiluoto disposal fa-
cility also for the research reactor’s spent fuel. The 
total amount of spent nuclear fuel of the research 
reactor is about 340 kg (ca. 25 kgU).
Management of LILW from nuclear facilities
The predisposal management of LILW currently 
takes place at the NPPs under their operating li-
cences and other provisions. The waste is segregat-
ed, treated, conditioned, packaged, monitored and 
stored, as appropriate, before they are transferred 
to the site-specific disposal facilities.
At Loviisa, for the time being, the majority 
of wet LILW (radioactive concentrates, such as 
spent ion exchange resins, evaporator concentrates 
and sludges) is stored in tanks at the NPP. The 
Loviisa plant uses Fortum’s innovative selective 
ion exchange method to reduce the volume of liq-
uid radioactive waste. Fortum started liquid waste 
solidification in 2016 in Loviisa NPP after STUK 
gave authorization for operation in February 2016. 
The aim is to solidify all wet waste stored in the 
tanks in the future. At Olkiluoto, wet LILW is 
immobilized in bitumen before transfer to the dis-
posal facility. It is planned that sludge, radioactive 
concentrates and spent ion exchange resins from 
liquid waste treatment in Olkiluoto 3 will be dried 
in drums.
At both currently operating NPPs, solid LLW 
is transferred after conditioning to the disposal 
facility. Options for the management of waste be-
low clearance level are either general clearance or 
case-specific clearance. Such waste can be reused, 
recycled or disposed of in landfills. The Olkiluoto 
NPP has a landfill on site, while the Loviisa NPP 
has an agreement with a regional landfill to dis-
pose of cleared waste.
Activated metal waste consists of irradiated 
components and devices that have been removed 
from inside of the reactor vessel. So far, this kind 
Figure 6. The Loviisa repository. a) Cross-sectional 
view of the repository for LILW and the planned exten-
sion for decommissioning waste, b) Drums of LLW 
from reactor operation waste in the repository tunnel 
and c) An empty repository tunnel for solidified waste.
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Figure 7. The Olkiluoto LILW repository. LLW drums in the disposal silo (left) and cross-sectional view of the reposi-
tory lay-out (right).
of highly activated waste has not been conditioned 
but is stored at the NPPs and is expected to be 
conditioned and disposed of together with similar 
types of decommissioning waste.
According to the strategy adopted by the 
Finnish nuclear power plant operators, low and 
intermediate level wastes from reactor operations 
should be disposed of in the bedrock at the power 
plant sites. At Olkiluoto the operation of the LILW 
disposal facility started in 1992 and in Loviisa in 
1998. The disposal facilities are operated by the 
nuclear power plant operators, FPH at Loviisa and 
TVO at Olkiluoto.
The Loviisa disposal facility is located at a 
depth of approximately 110 m in granite bedrock. 
The facility consists of three halls for solid LLW 
and a cavern for immobilised ILW (Figure 6). 
Inside the cavern for ILW, the waste packages are 
emplaced in a pool-shaped structure made of rein-
forced concrete. A new hall (HJT3) was constructed 
during 2010–2013 and it has initially been licensed 
only for storage that also facilitates the sorting of 
waste, allowing clearance from regulatory control 
of some of the waste. HJT3 is also used for tem-
porary storage of the solidified waste. Licensing 
is planned later for the disposal of operational or 
decommissioning waste.
The Olkiluoto disposal facility for LILW con-
sists of two silos at a depth of 60 to 95 m in tonalite 
bedrock, one for solid LLW and the other for bitu-
minized ILW (Figure 7). The silo for solid LLW is 
a shotcrete rock silo, while the silo for bitumin-
ized waste consists of a thick walled concrete silo 
inside a rock silo where concrete boxes containing 
drums of bituminised waste will be emplaced. The 
disposal facility will be extended in the 2030s, to be 
able to receive all the LILW from Olkiluoto 1, 2 and 
3 reactor units during their planned 60 years of 
operation. Further extension of the disposal facil-
ity is also planned for decommissioning wastes of 
existing NPP units at Olkiluoto.
LILW generated from the operation of the re-
search reactor FiR 1 is stored at the reactor facility 
in Otaniemi until decommissioning. VTT is nego-
tiating with the Finnish NPP licensees (TVO and 
FPH) for possible interim storage and will continue 
negotiations later on for future disposal of decom-
missioning waste. The estimated total amount of 
decommissioning waste is about 75 tons with a 
total activity of less than 5 TBq.
Based on Fennovoima’s plans, LILW will be col-
lected, stored, handled and disposed of at the power 
plant site. Fennovoima has made an early estimate 
of amounts of different LILW types based on infor-
mation given by the plant supplier for the chosen 
reactor type (AES-2006). The plans include waste 
handling methods for dry, wet, liquid and metallic 
waste. LILW will be disposed of in a disposal facil-
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ity which will be constructed on the plant site at 
a depth of several tens of meters in the bedrock. 
Fennovoima is also considering a surface based fa-
cility as an option for the disposal of very low-level 
waste (VLLW). The management of the operational 
waste is currently only presented on a conceptual 
level. The waste management plans will be devel-
oped further during the next licensing phases.
Management of non-nuclear 
radioactive waste
An applicant for a licence for the use of sealed 
sources is required to present a plan for the man-
agement of the disused sources. The two available 
options are either to return the sources to the sup-
plier/manufacturer of the source, or delivery to the 
national long-term storage facilities operated by 
STUK’s Department of Environmental Radiation 
Surveillance. This role in operating the storage fa-
cilities is defined in Radiation Decree, Section 24 b 
(for more information see Section J Disused Sealed 
Sources).
Radioactive waste is stored under the regula-
tory control of STUK’s Department of Nuclear 
Waste and Material Regulation in an interim stor-
age cavern attached to the LILW disposal facility 
at Olkiluoto. The Department of Environmental 
Radiation Surveillance of STUK takes care of the 
waste containing nuclear material and stores it 
at STUK. The organisational structure of STUK 
clearly separates its duties in operating the cen-
tralised storage facility from its functions as the 
regulatory authority for radioactive materials and 
waste management. The disposal of sealed sources 
and other non-nuclear radioactive waste is in-
cluded in the renewed operating licence for the 
Olkiluoto LILW disposal facility. The licence was 
granted by the Government in 2012. The disposal 
of this waste started at the end of 2016.
A licensee can be exempted from preparing a 
waste management plan if the operations are ar-
ranged in such a manner that the activity limits 
regarding gaseous or liquid discharges or solid-
waste disposal, established in Guide ST 6.2, are 
not exceeded. However, even in this case STUK 
may order monitoring of discharges and reporting 
thereof, if this is considered necessary due to envi-
ronmental considerations, the nature of the work 
or the nature and amount of radioactive substanc-
es in use. In addition to being below the limits, all 
discharges to the environment must be kept as low 
as reasonably achievable.
In practice, most of the waste from the use 
of unsealed sources in Finland arise in such low 
activity concentrations or amounts that it is not 
necessary to arrange the disposal of the generated 
waste in the same way as for sealed sources. A com-
mon practice is that radionuclide laboratories store 
their short lived radioactive waste at their premis-
es until they have decayed below the limits set for 
discharge in Guide ST 6.2. However, some waste 
resulting from radiochemical research at VTT have 
been sent to STUK for storage in Olkiluoto. Some 
materials, e.g. reactor vessel materials used in 
studies conducted by VTT, are returned to the own-
ers of the sample materials for their interim stor-
age and disposal.
All radionuclide laboratories in Finland are 
inspected by STUK regularly, every 1–5 years, 
depending on the type and size of the practice, 
with storage and other activities related to waste 
management as a standard item in the inspection 
agenda.
A specific waste issue arises from disused 
smoke detectors. There are currently over 3 million 
detectors in use, each containing about 40 kBq of 
Am-241. The disposal of an individual detector into 
normal municipal waste was earlier considered, 
from the radiological point of view, as the optimum 
waste management option. However, the Council 
Directive 2002/96/EC of 27 January 2003 defines 
disused smoke detectors as waste electronic equip-
ment subject to recycling requirements. Nowadays, 
a private entrepreneur takes care of removing the 
radiation sources from recycled smoke detectors 
and hands them over to an installation licensed to 
receive condition and transfer radioactive waste 
to a central storage operated by the Radiation and 
Nuclear Safety Authority (STUK).
Decommissioning plans for nuclear facilities
The decommissioning of the Finnish operating 
nuclear power plants is not foreseen in the near 
future. The utilities have updated the decommis-
sioning plans of NPPs for regulatory review eve-
ry six years (the Nuclear Energy Act, Sections 7g 
and 28). FPH submitted an updated plan for the 
decommissioning of the Loviisa NPP for regula-
tory review in 2012 and TVO’s last plan for the 
Olkiluoto NPP decommissioning was submitted in 
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2014. The decommissioning plan for the Loviisa 
NPP is based on immediate dismantling, within 
eleven years from shutdown while for the Olkiluoto 
NPP; a safe storage period of about 30 years prior 
to dismantling is envisaged. The justification for 
postponed dismantling is based on a decrease in 
radioactivity and the availability of nuclear site 
infrastructure, since the Olkiluoto 3 unit will be 
operational while the Olkiluoto 1 and 2 units are 
being dismantled. The disposal plans for waste 
arising from the decommissioning of the NPPs are 
based on the extension of the existing on-site re-
positories for LILW. Besides the dismantling waste, 
also activated metal components accumulated dur-
ing the operation of the reactors could be disposed 
of in those repositories. The engineered barriers 
will be selected taking into account the radiologi-
cal and other safety related characteristics of each 
waste type. A special feature of the decommission-
ing plans is the emplacement of large components, 
such as pressure vessels and steam generators, in 
the disposal rooms as whole entities, without cut-
ting them into pieces.
VTT has decided to decommission its research 
reactor (FiR 1) due to insufficient funding for 
continued operation in 2012. The licensing for the 
decommissioning started in autumn 2013 with the 
Environmental Impact Assessment (EIA) proce-
dure. The EIA procedure ended in February 2015, 
when the MEAE gave its statement on the EIA 
report. VTT has applied for a licence for decom-
missioning the research reactor in June 2017. The 
dismantling is scheduled to be started in 2019 and 
to last about two years. The cost estimate for the 
decommissioning has been updated yearly since 
2014 as required by the MEAE. The dismantling 
will be regulated by STUK concerning the radia-
tion and nuclear safety aspects.
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Article 3 Scope of Application
This Convention shall apply to the safety of spent 
fuel management when the spent fuel results from 
the operation of civilian nuclear reactors. Spent fuel 
held at reprocessing facilities as part of a repro-
cessing activity is not covered in the scope of this 
Convention unless the Contracting Party declares 
reprocessing to be part of spent fuel management.
This Convention shall also apply to the safety 
of radioactive waste management when the ra-
dioactive waste results from civilian applications. 
However, this Convention shall not apply to waste 
that contains only naturally occurring radioac-
tive materials and that does not originate from 
the nuclear fuel cycle, unless it constitutes a dis-
used sealed source or it is declared as radioactive 
waste for the purposes of this Convention by the 
Contracting Party.
This Convention shall not apply to the safety 
of management of spent fuel or radioactive waste 
within military or defence programmes, unless 
declared as spent fuel or radioactive waste for the 
purposes of this Convention by the Contracting 
Party. However, this Convention shall apply to the 
safety of management of spent fuel and radioactive 
waste from military or defence programmes if and 
when such materials are transferred permanently 
to and managed within exclusively civilian pro-
grammes.
This Convention shall also apply to discharges 
as provided for in Articles 4, 7, 11, 14, 24 and 26.
Reprocessing and military or 
defence programmes
Finland has adopted a once-through nuclear fuel 
cycle. There is no reprocessing facility in Finland. 
It is not permitted to send spent fuel for reprocess-
ing to another country as the Nuclear Energy Act 
(990/1987 6 a §) denies it. Thus, all spent nuclear 
fuel, after it has been permanently removed from 
the reactor, falls in the scope of the Convention.
No spent nuclear fuel of military or defence ori-
gin exists in Finland.
Airborne and liquid discharges from nuclear 
and radioactive waste management facilities, no-
tably from NPPs, are included in the scope of this 
Convention.
Naturally occurring radioactive materials
Waste outside the nuclear fuel cycle, containing 
only naturally occurring materials (NORM-waste), 
except sealed radium sources, is not declared as ra-
dioactive waste for the purposes of the Convention. 
However, some experience with the current prac-
tice for managing NORM waste is reported in sec-
tion H.
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Article 32 Reporting, paragraph 2
This report shall (also) include:
(a) a list of the spent fuel management facilities 
subject to this convention, their location, main 
purpose and essential features;
(b) an inventory of spent fuel that is subject to this 
Convention and that is being held in storage 
and of that which has been disposed of. This 
inventory shall contain the description of the 
material and if available, give information on 
its mass and its total activity;
(c) a list of radioactive waste management facili-
ties subject to this Convention, their location, 
main purpose and essential features;
(d) an inventory of radioactive waste that is sub-
ject to this Convention that:
•	 is	being	held	in	storage	of	radioactive	waste	
management and nuclear fuel cycle facili-
ties;
•	 has	been	disposed	of;	or
•	 has	resulted	from	past	practices;
 this inventory shall contain the description of 
the material and other appropriate informa-
tion available, such as volume or mass, activity 
and specific radionuclides;
(e) a list of nuclear facilities in the process of be-
ing decommissioned and the status of decom-
missioning activities at those facilities.
Table 1. Spent fuel storage in Finland.
Loviisa nuclear power plant
Owner: FPH
Location: Hästholmen island, town of Loviisa, Southern Finland
Purpose: Interim storage of spent fuel
Capacity: 673 tHM ¹ (effective ²)
Inventory (end of 2016): 626 tHM ¹ (5167 assemblies, maximum burnup 55 MWd/kgU)
Essential features: Pool storages inside both reactor buildings 
Basket type pool storage in the NPP auxiliary building 
Rack type pool storage in the NPP auxiliary building
Olkiluoto nuclear power plant
Owner: TVO
Location: Olkiluoto island, municipality of Eurajoki, South-Western Finland
Purpose: Interim storage of spent fuel
Capacity: 1770 tHM¹ (effective ²)
Inventory (end of 2016): 1469 tHM (8720 assemblies, maximum burnup 53 MWd/kgU)
Essential features: Pool storages inside both reactor buildings 
Pool storage in a separate facility at the NPP site
FiR 1 research reactor
Operator: VTT
Location: Otaniemi, town of Espoo, Southern Finland
Purpose: Interim storage of spent fuel
Inventory (end of 2016): 4.45 kgU (24 elements, maximum burnup 33 MWd/kgU)
Essential features: Wet storage for cooling. After several years’ cooling time the elements are transferred to 
the well type dry storage.
¹ tHM means spent fuel inventory is presented in tonnes of heavy metals. 
² The reserve capacity for exceptional unloading of the entire reactor core to storage pool, for storage pool repairs and space for dummy elements are excluded.
Spent fuel and radioactive waste management facilities
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Table 2. Predisposal management of radioactive waste in Finland.
Loviisa nuclear power plant
Owner: FPH
Location: Hästholmen island, town of Loviisa, Southern Finland
Purpose: Treatment, conditioning and interim storage of LILW
Inventory (end of 2016): 1660 m³
Essential features: Pretreatment, compaction and packaging of solid LLW 
Pretreatment of liquid LILW 
Eight tanks, 300 m³ each, for storage of liquid LILW 
Solidification plant for liquid LILW 
Two storage rooms inside the NPP for packed LLW 
(Dry) storage well and pool storage for unconditioned activated waste 
On-site light built storage hall for waste candidate for clearance
Olkiluoto nuclear power plant
Owner: TVO
Location: Olkiluoto island, municipality of Eurajoki, South-Western Finland
Purpose: Interim storage of LILW
Inventory (end of 2016): 310 m³
Essential features: Pretreatment, compaction and packaging of solid LLW 
Pretreatment and bituminisation of liquid LILW 
Four buffer storage rooms for conditioned LILW 
Pools storage of unconditioned activated waste 
Treatment and storage buildings at the site for unconditioned LLW
FiR 1 research reactor
Operator: VTT
Location: Otaniemi, town of Espoo, Southern Finland
Purpose: Treatment, packaging and interim storage of LILW
Inventory (end of 2016): 6 m³
Essential features: Storage room in the basement of a laboratory building
Storage for state owned waste (recognised installation)
Owner: Suomen Nukliditekniikka
Location: Roihupelto, city of Helsinki, Southern Finland
Purpose: Buffer interim storage of radioactive waste for example from industry and hospitals
Inventory (end of 2016): 2 m³ (2.4 TBq)
Essential features: Buffer interim storage is for packing and conditioning radioactive wastes from industry and 
hospitals (e.g. spent sources). The waste is packed in form suitable for disposal. This material does 
not contain nuclear material.
Storage for small user waste containing nuclear material
Owner: STUK – Radiation and Nuclear Safety Authority
Location: Roihupelto, city of Helsinki, Southern Finland
Purpose: Buffer interim storage of small user radioactive waste containing nuclear material
Inventory (end of 2016): Pu: 10.5 g, HEU: 208 g, LEU: 27.4 g, UNat: 46.5 kg, DU: 395 kg, Th: 2.4 kg
Essential features: Buffer interim storage is for packing and conditioning radioactive wastes from industry and 
hospitals. The waste is packed in form suitable for disposal.
Storage for state owned waste
Owner: TVO/Ministry of Social Affairs and Health³
Location: Olkiluoto island, municipality of Eurajoki, South-Western Finland
Purpose: Long-term interim storage of sealed sources and other small user waste
Inventory (end of 2016): 35 m³ (36 TBq, prominent nuclides: ³H, 137Cs, 85Kr, 241Am, 238Pu, not including Th-232 (2.5 kg) and 
depleted uranium (1284 kg)
Essential features: Rock cavern attached to the Olkiluoto disposal facility
³ By an agreement made in 1996 between TVO and the Ministry of Health and Social Affairs, the waste is stored in a separate rock cavern in TVO’s Olkiluoto LILW 
disposal facility. The waste is owned by the State, with the Ministry of Social Affairs and Health as the responsible organisation.
The major part of the radioactive waste and spent 
nuclear fuel has been produced in the currently 
operating nuclear power plants at Olkiluoto (OL1 
and OL2) and Loviisa (LO1 and LO2). Spent fuel is 
currently stored in pool storage facilities located at 
the plant sites. Low and intermediate level waste is 
also stored and disposed of at the NPP sites. Small 
amounts of spent fuel and radioactive waste has 
been produced during the operation of the FiR 1 re-
search reactor in Otaniemi. The spent fuel from the 
research reactor and radioactive waste is currently 
stored at Otaniemi.
Non-nuclear radioactive waste
The licensing database maintained by STUK in-
cludes source-specific information on each sealed 
source in the licensee’s possession. This informa-
tion is updated continuously according to the licen-
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Table 3. Disposal of radioactive waste in Finland.
Loviisa disposal facility
Owner: FPH
Location: Hästholmen island, town of Loviisa, Southern Finland
Purpose: Disposal of LILW
Inventory (end of 2013): 1886 m³ (0.45 TBq, dominant nuclides Co-60, Ni-63, Cs-137)
Essential features: Rock tunnels for LLW 
Vault for solidifed ILW
Olkiluoto disposal facility
Owner: TVO
Location: Olkiluoto island, Municipality of Eurajoki, South-Western Finland
Purpose: Disposal of LILW
Inventory (end of 2013): 5681 m³ (52.0 TBq, dominant nuclides Co-60, Ni-63, Cs-137, Sr-90, C-14)
Essential features: Rock silo for conditioned packed ILW 
Rock silo for conditioned/packed LLW
sees notifications and to observations made dur-
ing inspections. Small users of radioisotopes have 
some radiation sources on their premises which 
are no longer in use but have not yet been declared 
as radioactive waste. The number of such sources 
is relatively limited, whereas according to Guide 
ST 5.1 it is prohibited to unnecessarily store sourc-
es for which no use is foreseen.
Waste from past practices
There are no significant amounts of waste from 
past practices requiring further management.
Decommissioning
VTT is currently planning the decommissioning 
of an old hot cell laboratory. The functions of the 
laboratory are being transferred step by step to a 
new VTT Centre for Nuclear Safety. The actual de-
commissioning means, for example, cleaning struc-
tures from contamination resulting from the use 
of radiation, as well as arrangements concerning 
radioactive waste resulting from the cleanup and 
finally disposal of radioactive waste. The final state 
of the laboratory after decommissioning will be 
“brown field” meaning that the laboratory building 
will be released from regulatory control for another 
use. This can be done after the premises have been 
found to be clean from radioactivity and the radio-
active waste has been properly handled and stored.
Detailed planning for the laboratory decommis-
sioning was completed during spring 2017. VTT 
compiled a decommissioning plan, which includes 
a risk assessment and descriptions of the decom-
missioning phases, the possible demolition tech-
niques, management and processing of radioactive 
and contaminated materials as well as radioactive 
waste management plans.
The actual dismantling of the laboratory can 
start after STUK has approved the decommission-
ing plan.
34
STUK-B 218
SECTION E Legislative and regulatory system
Article 18 Implementing measures
Each Contracting Party shall take, within the 
framework of its national law, the legislative, regu-
latory and administrative measures and other steps 
necessary for implementing its obligations under 
this Convention.
The necessary legislative, regulatory and other 
measures to fulfil the obligations of the Convention 
have been taken and are discussed in this report.
Article 19 Legislative and 
regulatory framework
Each Contracting Party shall establish and main-
tain a legislative and regulatory framework to gov-
ern the safety of spent fuel and radioactive waste 
management.
This legislative and regulatory framework shall 
provide for:
(a) the establishment of applicable national safety 
requirements and regulations for radiation 
safety;
(b)  a system of licensing of spent fuel and radio-
active waste management activities;
(c) a system of prohibition of the operation of a 
spent fuel or radioactive waste management 
facility without a licence;
(d) a system of appropriate institutional control, 
regulatory inspection and documentation and 
reporting; the enforcement of applicable regu-
lations and of the terms of the licences;
(e) a clear allocation of responsibilities of the bod-
ies involved in the different steps of spent fuel 
and of radioactive waste management.
When considering whether to regulate radioactive 
materials as radioactive waste, Contracting Parties 
shall take due account of the objectives of this 
Convention.
National safety requirements and 
regulations for radiation safety
In Finland, the legislation for the use of nuclear 
energy and for radiation protection was estab-
lished in 1957. The current Nuclear Energy Act 
and the Radiation Act were issued in 1987 and 
1991, respectively. Since then, several amendments 
to these acts and new detailed regulations have 
been issued.
Nuclear legislation and regulations
The current Finnish nuclear legislation is based on 
the Nuclear Energy Act from 1987, together with a 
supporting Nuclear Energy Decree from 1988.
The scope of this legislation covers e.g.
•	 The	construction,	operation	and	decommission-
ing of nuclear facilities; nuclear facilities refer 
to facilities for producing nuclear energy, in-
cluding research reactors, facilities performing 
extensive disposal of nuclear waste, and facili-
ties used for extensive manufacturing, produc-
tion, use, handling or storage of nuclear materi-
als or nuclear waste;
•	Mining	and	milling	operations	aimed	at	produc-
ing uranium or thorium;
•	 The	possession,	manufacture,	production,	trans-
fer, handling, use, storage, transport, import of 
nuclear material and nuclear waste, and export 
of nuclear waste as well as the export and im-
port of ores and ore concentrates containing 
uranium or thorium.
A significant amendment to the Nuclear Energy 
Act was passed in 1994 to reflect a new policy 
which emphasises the national responsibility to 
manage nuclear waste generated in Finland. In 
general, the export and import of nuclear waste, 
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including spent fuel, is prohibited in the revised 
Act. A notable exception is allowed for the FiR 1 
research reactor. Thus, according to the Nuclear 
Energy Act (Section 6a) the provisions forbidding 
export of nuclear waste do not apply to nuclear 
waste that has been generated in connection with 
or as a result of the operation of a research reactor 
in Finland.
The nuclear energy legislation was updated 
and reformed in 2008 to correspond to the current 
level of safety requirements and the new Finnish 
Constitution, which came into force in 2000. This 
was demanded by the new Constitution requiring 
that the general principles for the protection of citi-
zens should be provided for in governmental acts.
In 2011 two further revisions were made to 
the Nuclear Energy Act. The first was due to 
the Nuclear Safety Directive (Council Directive 
2009/71/EURATOM) and the second one includes 
provisions on mining and milling operations aimed 
at producing uranium or thorium. The licensee’s 
obligation to assure the safe use of nuclear en-
ergy was already stipulated in the Act, but the 
first amendment added the requirement that the 
obligation may not be delegated or transferred to 
another party. The licensee’s obligation to arrange 
necessary training for nuclear safety personnel 
and the responsibility of the Ministry of Economic 
Affairs and Employment (MEAE) to arrange self-
assessment and international peer reviews to eval-
uate the national framework were also included in 
the Act.
In 2012, the Nuclear Energy Act was amended 
to make some minor clarifications and to extend 
the role of inspection organisations.
Finland was active in the process of develop-
ing a proposal for a European Council Directive 
on the management of spent fuel and radioac-
tive waste. In 2013, the Nuclear Energy Act and 
the Radiation Act were amended to implement 
Directive 2011/70/EURATOM on 19 July 2011 
establishing a Community framework for the re-
sponsible and safe management of spent fuel and 
other nuclear and radioactive waste. The principles 
of a graded approach and maintaining the genera-
tion of radioactive waste to the minimum amount 
reasonably practicable were included in both Acts. 
In the Nuclear Energy Act the provisions of self-
assessment and peer review were updated to also 
cover radioactive waste management.
In 2012, the Finnish regulatory framework for 
nuclear and radiation safety was reviewed in the 
IRRS (Integrated Regulatory Review Service) peer 
review process. According to the IRRS recommen-
dations, some amendments needed to be consid-
ered for the legislation mainly concerning the in-
dependence of STUK. The Nuclear Energy Act was 
revised in 2015 to enable STUK to issue legally 
binding regulations. Amendment of Radiation Act 
was begun in 2016 and is currently ongoing.
By definition, the provisions for the use of nu-
clear energy in the Nuclear Energy Act also ad-
dress spent fuel and nuclear waste management. 
The Nuclear Energy Act Section 9 stipulates that 
a licensee whose actions result in the generation 
of nuclear waste shall be responsible for all as-
sociated waste management operations and their 
related costs. Further specific requirements on 
nuclear waste management are given in Sections 
27a to 34) and requirements for the financial provi-
sion for nuclear waste management are specified 
in Sections 35–53. Sections 35 to 53 describe the 
National Nuclear Waste Management Fund (VYR 
Fund) and its operating principles. Funds are col-
lected from licensees under the waste management 
obligation and paid into the VYR Fund based on 
the estimated waste management costs for all op-
erations, including disposal, of any nuclear waste a 
licensee has in a given year.
Based on the Nuclear Energy Act, in 2016 
STUK issued the following regulations:
•	 Radiation	and	Nuclear	Safety	Authority	Regu-
lation on the Safety of Nuclear Power Plants 
(Y/1/2016)
•	 Radiation	and	Nuclear	Safety	Authority	Regu-
lation on the Security in the Use of Nuclear 
Energy (Y/2/2016)
•	 Radiation	and	Nuclear	Safety	Authority	Regu-
lation on Emergency Response Arrangements 
at Nuclear Power Plants (Y/3/2016)
•	 Radiation	and	Nuclear	Safety	Authority	Regu-
lation on the Safety of Disposal of Nuclear 
Waste (Y/4/2016)
•	 Radiation	and	Nuclear	Safety	Authority	Regu-
lation on the Safety of Mining and Milling 
Operations Aimed at Producing Uranium or 
Thorium (Y/5/2016).
Regulations Y/1/2016 to Y/4/2016 replaced the pre-
vious Government Decrees regulating the same 
safety areas. Regulation Y/5/2016 on Uranium or 
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Thorium mining is new. The Regulations issued by 
STUK are legally binding according to Section 7q 
of Nuclear Energy Act.
The Regulations Y/1/2016 (Safety of a Nuclear 
Power Plant, Y/2/2016 (Emergency Arrangements 
of a Nuclear Power Plant) and Y/3/2016 (Security 
in the Use of Nuclear Energy) are applied to nucle-
ar power plants, which are defined as any nuclear 
facility equipped with a nuclear reactor and other 
related nuclear facilities located on the same plant 
site. Regulations Y/2/2016 and Y/3/2016 are also 
applied to other nuclear facilities to the extent ap-
plicable, based on the graded approach.
The Regulation on the Security in the Use of 
Nuclear Energy is a minor update of the previous 
Government Decree from 27 November 2008. The 
Regulations on the Safety of Nuclear Power Plants 
(Y/1/2016) and Emergency Response Arrangements 
at Nuclear Power Plants (Y/2/2016) were only 
slightly revised from the previous Government 
Decrees from 2013 and include changes to safety 
requirements arising from the Fukushima Dai-
ichi accident and new WENRA (Western European 
Nuclear Regulators’ Association; see also chapter 
Nuclear Regulatory Guidance) Safety Objectives. 
A new Regulation on the safety of mining and 
milling operations aimed at producing uranium 
or thorium (Y/5/2016) was prepared in 2015. The 
Regulation on the Safety of Disposal of Nuclear 
Waste (Y/4/2016) was a major revision of the previ-
ous Government Decree from 2008. Its structure 
was fully reorganized, and major changes were 
made based on experiences from regulatory over-
sight of the LILW disposal facilities as well as 
oversight and review of the licence application 
for Posiva’s spent fuel disposal facility. The main 
changes were related to regulation of the design 
and construction of waste treatment facilities such 
as Posiva’s encapsulation plant.
Some other minor amendments were also made 
in nuclear and radiation legislation to reflect 
changes in other legislation (e.g. labour safety, and 
the criminal code). Amendments in other national 
legislation have not caused essential changes to 
the regulatory control for waste management or to 
the safety requirements set for it.
At the end of 2016, revision to both the Nuclear 
Energy Act and the Radiation Act started due to 
the Basic Safety Standards directive and to the 
amended Nuclear Safety Directive. The revision of 
the Nuclear Energy Act will also include amend-
ments related to e.g. changes in the Pressure 
Equipment Act and licensing for nuclear facilities. 
The proposed new Nuclear Energy Act and Decree 
will introduce a decommissioning licence step. The 
decommissioning licence will be granted by the 
Government if the changes in the law are approved 
by the end of 2017 as planned. This would clarify 
the terms for the decommissioning of the nuclear 
facilities in the future.
As described above, the nuclear legislation has 
been amended several times. The MEAE has start-
ed an evaluation of the possible need of a compre-
hensive reform of the legislation.
Nuclear Regulatory Guidance
Detailed safety requirements on the management 
of spent nuclear fuel and radioactive waste result-
ing from the production of nuclear energy are pro-
vided in the YVL Guides. The YVL Guides also pro-
vide administrative procedures for the regulation. 
The YVL Guides are issued by STUK, as stipulated 
in the Nuclear Energy Act. The YVL Guides are 
rules an individual licensee or any other organisa-
tions concerned must comply with, unless some 
other acceptable procedure or solution has been 
presented to STUK through which achieves the 
required level of safety stipulated in the Nuclear 
Energy Act, the Nuclear Energy Decree and STUK 
Regulations.
The procedure to apply new or revised guides 
to existing nuclear facilities is that the publication 
of a YVL Guide does not, as such, alter any previ-
ous decisions made by STUK. After having heard 
those concerned, STUK makes a separate decision 
on how a new or revised YVL Guide applies to 
a nuclear facility in operation, or to those under 
construction, and to the licensee’s operational ac-
tivities, as well as to other nuclear facilities related 
to nuclear waste management and disposal and to 
Finland’s research reactor. For new nuclear facili-
ties, however, the guides apply as such.
Nowadays the most important references con-
sidered in the rulemaking are the IAEA safety 
standards, WENRA (Western European Nuclear 
Regulators’ Association) Safety Reference Levels 
and WENRA’s latest statement on the Safety 
Objectives for New NPPs. Other sources of safety 
information are worldwide co-operation with other 
countries using nuclear energy, e.g. with the mem-
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ber countries of OECD/NEA. The Finnish policy is 
to participate in the international discussion on 
developing safety standards and to adopt or adapt 
new safety requirements into national regula-
tions. Considering the WENRA Safety Reference 
Levels published in 2007–2015, the Finnish policy 
is to include all of them in the revised regulatory 
guide system. This was confirmed already during 
the updating work for regulatory guides through 
a systematic approach to recording all the Safety 
Reference Levels in relevant YVL guides.
STUK used to have a set of about 70 YVL guides 
in force, which have been continuously re-evaluat-
ed for updating. After amending the nuclear energy 
legislation in 2008, the revision of the existing YVL 
guide system was also commenced. The main objec-
tives of this effort were the following:
•	 to	update	the	contents	of	the	regulatory	guides,	
especially with the IAEA and WENRA require-
ments and with the lessons learnt from the 
Olkiluoto Unit 3 project,
•	 to	restructure	the	guide	system	better	to	reflect	
the various areas of safety; at the same time to 
limit the total number of guides and the need 
for cross-referencing between the guides
•	 to	 compile	 requirements	 concerning	 related	
safety issues in the same guide making it easier 
to use by the licensees and other stakeholders; 
also they will be coupled to the licensing process 
stages
•	 to	rewrite	the	separate	requirements	in	such	a	
way that each requirement would have its own 
number, be short and clearly state who-what-
when things are done; the requirements would 
be expressed in a shall-do format, and descrip-
tive text would be provided only when neces-
sary
•	 to	limit	unnecessary	prescriptiveness	when	con-
sidering the requirements.
The Director General of STUK accepted 40 
new YVL guides and they entered into force on 
December 1, 2013. In the area of waste manage-
ment, the most important changes are that the re-
quirements concerning spent fuel interim storages 
were updated to take account of the lessons from 
the Fukushima Dai-ichi accident, and that the re-
quirements concerning the decommissioning of nu-
clear facilities were included in the YVL guidance.
Legislation and regulations for 
the use of radiation sources
The Radiation Act and Decree were revised in 
1991 to take into account ICRP Publication 60 
(1990 Recommendations of the International 
Commission on Radiological Protection). The 
Radiation Act and Decree were further amend-
ed in 1998, 2005, 2008 and 2013 to conform with 
the European Community Radiation Protection 
Legislation, including:
•	 the	Council	Directive	96/29/Euratom	of	13	May	
1996, on the Protection of the Health of Workers 
and General Public Against the Dangers Aris-
ing from Ionizing Radiation,
•	 the	Council	 Directive	 2003/122/Euratom	 of	 22	
December 2003, on the Control of High-Activity 
Sealed Radiation Sources and Orphan Sources, 
as well as,
•	 the	Council	 Directive	 2006/117/Euratom	 of	 20	
November 2006, on the supervision and control 
of shipments of radioactive waste and spent 
fuel, and
•	 the	 Council	 Directive	 2011/70/Euratom	 of	 19	
July 2011, establishing a Community frame-
work for the responsible and safe management 
of spent fuel and radioactive waste.
Detailed safety requirements on the management 
of radioactive waste, subject to the Radiation Act, 
are provided in STUK’s ST Guides. The responsible 
party running a radiation practice is obliged to 
ensure that the level of safety specified in the ST 
Guides is attained and maintained.
The Council Directive 2013/39/Euratom of 5 
December 2013, laying down basic safety stand-
ards for protection against the danger arising 
from exposure to ionising radiation, and repeal-
ing Directives 89/618/Euratom, 90/641/Euratom, 
96/29/Euratom, 97/43/Euratom and 2003/122/Eur-
atom, is currently being implemented into the 
Finnish legislation.
Licensing of spent fuel and radioactive 
waste management activities
The licensing process is defined in legislation. 
The construction and operation of a nuclear facil-
ity is not permitted without a licence and licences 
are prepared by the MEAE and granted by the 
Government. For any nuclear reactor unit, spent 
nuclear fuel storage, nuclear waste disposal facil-
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ity, or another significant nuclear facility the pro-
cess consists of three steps:
•	 Decision-in-Principle	 –	 made	 by	 the	 Govern-
ment and ratified by Parliament
•	 Construction	Licence	–	granted	by	the	Govern-
ment
•	 Operating	 Licence	 –	 granted	 by	 the	 Govern-
ment.
The conditions for granting a licence are prescribed 
in the Nuclear Energy Act (Sections 18–20). The 
operating licences of a nuclear facility are granted 
for a fixed term, generally for 10–20 years. In case 
the operating licence is granted for a longer period 
than 10 years, a periodic safety review is required 
to be presented to STUK. The periodic re-licensing 
or review has allowed good opportunities for a com-
prehensive safety review.
Before a Construction Licence for a nuclear 
reactor unit, spent fuel storage, nuclear waste 
disposal facility, or other significant nuclear fa-
cility can be applied for, a Decision-in-Principle 
by the Government and a subsequent ratifica-
tion of the DiP by Parliament are required. The 
Environmental Impact Assessment (EIA) proce-
dure has to be conducted prior to the application 
for the DiP and the EIA report and the coordinat-
ing authority’s statement on the assessment report 
must be annexed to the DiP application. A condi-
tion for granting the Decision-in-Principle is that 
the construction of the nuclear facility in question 
must be for overall good of society. Further condi-
tions are as follows:
•	 The	municipality	of	the	intended	site	of	the	nu-
clear facility must be in favour of constructing 
the facility (the municipality has a veto right);
•	 No	 factors	 must	 have	 arisen	 which	 would	 in-
dicate that the proposed facility would not be 
constructed and operated in a safe manner.
The entry into force of the Government’s Decision-
in-Principle further requires ratification by 
Parliament. Parliament cannot make any changes 
to the Decision; it can only approve or reject it 
as such. The Decision-in-Principle is also granted 
for a fixed term, typically this is 5 years for nu-
clear power units. The authorization process for 
a nuclear facility is described in Figure 8. In the 
construction and operating licence application han-
dling processes, the acceptance of Parliament and 
of the hosting municipality are no longer required. 
However, the municipality’s opinion is still taken 
into account during these licence application phas-
es.
The Decision-in-Principle procedure was imple-
mented for the first time for a nuclear waste man-
agement facility during the period November 1999 
– May 2001 when Posiva applied for a Decision-in-
Principle for a disposal facility for spent nuclear 
fuel originating from the Loviisa and Olkiluoto 
nuclear power plants. The Government made the 
DiP in December 2000 and Parliament ratified the 
decision in May 2001. The same DiP procedure 
was repeated in 2002 and 2010 for the extension 
of the capacity of the spent fuel disposal facility 
to include spent fuel from the new reactor units 
Olkiluoto 3 and Olkiluoto 4. TVO decided not to 
apply for a construction licence for Olkiluoto 4 unit 
in June 2015, and thus the DiP for the NPP unit 
as well as Posiva’s DiP for final disposal of OL4 
spent fuel expired. Therefore, Posiva has a DiP in 
force for the final disposal of spent fuel from two 
reactor units in Loviisa and three reactor units in 
Olkiluoto.
The licensing system was assessed in the IRRS 
peer review mission conducted in Finland in 
October 2012. The IRRS team gave a recommen-
dation that the Finnish Government should seek 
to modify the Nuclear Energy Act so that the law 
clearly and unambiguously stipulates STUK’s legal 
authority in the authorization process for nuclear 
and radiation safety. In particular, the amend-
ments should ensure that STUK has the legal au-
thority to specify any licence conditions necessary 
for safety. The Nuclear Energy Act, Sections 23 and 
25 were amended in 2015 for this purpose. The 
IRRS also recommended clarifying the licensing 
for decommissioning nuclear facilities by setting a 
decommissioning licence, which is currently being 
implemented into the Nuclear Energy Act.
On the basis of the Nuclear Energy Act (Section 
16), minor licences for spent fuel and nuclear waste 
management activities (export, import, transfer 
and transport licences and licences for operations) 
are granted by STUK.
The licensing system for practises under the 
Radiation Act is described in Sections 16 and 17 
of the Act. The use of radiation requires a safety 
licence, which can be granted by STUK upon ap-
plication. A safety licence can be subject to extra 
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conditions needed to ensure safety. In addition, 
cases not requiring a licence are identified in the 
process, e.g. when the use of radiation or a device 
is exempted.
Prohibited operation without a licence
The use of nuclear energy without a licence pro-
vided by the Nuclear Energy Act is prohibited.
Institutional controls and 
enforcement of regulations
According to the Nuclear Energy Act (Section 55), 
STUK is responsible for the regulatory control of 
the safety of the use of nuclear energy. The rights 
and responsibilities of STUK are provided in the 
Nuclear Energy Act (Sections 55 and 63). The regu-
latory activities include authorization, review and 
assessment, inspection and enforcement, develop-
ment of regulations and guides, national registers 
and inventories, information and public communi-
cation.
The most important documents of the nuclear 
facility licensee, which shall comply with the regu-
lations and other safety requirements and are 
reviewed by STUK, are the Preliminary and Final 
Safety Analysis Reports (PSAR and FSAR), and for 
disposal facilities also the post-closure Safety Case 
documentation in support of PSAR and FSAR. 
STUK’s on-site inspections aim at verifying that 
the actual operations at the nuclear facilities com-
ply with the regulations and the documents of the 
licensee, for example.
The Radiation Act (Section 6) provides that 
adherence to the Act and regulations issued in ac-
cordance with it shall be regulated by STUK. The 
regulatory rights of STUK are described in the Act 
(Sections 53–58).
The Nuclear Energy Act and the Radiation Act 
define the enforcement system and rules for sus-
pension, modification or revocation of a licence. The 
enforcement system includes provisions for execu-
tive assistance if needed and for sanctions in case 
the law is violated.
Clear allocation of responsibilities for spent 
fuel and radioactive waste management
According to the Section 54 in Nuclear Energy 
Act, the overall authority in the field of nuclear 
energy is the Ministry of Economic Affairs and 
Employment (MEAE). The Radiation and Nuclear 
Safety Authority (STUK) is responsible for the su-
pervision of the safe use of nuclear energy accord-
ing to Nuclear Energy Act (Section 55). In addition, 
STUK is responsible for attending to the supervi-
sion of physical protection and emergency plan-
ning, and for the necessary control of the use of 
nuclear energy to prevent proliferation of nuclear 
weapons. (For more information see Article 20)
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Figure 8. Authorization of nuclear facilities in Finland.
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According to the Nuclear Energy Act (Section 
9), a licensee, whose operation generates or has 
generated nuclear waste, shall be responsible for 
all nuclear waste management measures and their 
appropriate preparation as well as for the arising 
expenses.
The NPP utilities FPH and TVO themselves 
take care of the interim storage of spent fuel, of the 
management of LILW including disposal, and of the 
planning for and implementation of the decommis-
sioning of the NPPs. Their jointly owned company, 
Posiva, takes care of the preparation for and later im-
plementation of spent fuel encapsulation and dispos-
al. Fennovoima has refined its waste management 
plans since the DiP from the NPP was granted to 
Fennovoima in 2014. The interim spent fuel storage 
and the management of LILW including its disposal 
are handled by Fennovoima in Pyhäjoki. Fennovoima 
also submitted its preliminary decommissioning 
strategy for the NPP to STUK for approval in 2015. 
Plans for the disposal of spent nuclear fuel were up-
dated by the end of June 2016 as it was required as 
a condition of the DiP and Fennovoima has started 
actions to resolve the issue. VTT is responsible for ra-
dioactive waste produced during the operation of the 
research reactor and also during decommissioning. 
Currently all produced radioactive waste and spent 
fuel is stored at Otaniemi. The waste management 
strategy for the decommissioning phase is currently 
under development.
The Radiation Act (Section 50) provides for 
the management of radioactive waste from non-
nuclear applications. The responsible party (i.e. 
the licensee or any company or organization which 
uses radiation sources in its practices) is required 
to take all measures needed to render the radioac-
tive waste arising from its operation harmless. In 
cases where a practice produces or may produce ra-
dioactive waste that cannot be rendered harmless 
without considerable expense, a financial security 
shall be furnished to ensure that these costs and 
those arising in performing any necessary environ-
mental decontamination measures are met.
The state has the secondary responsibility in 
case a producer of nuclear waste (the Nuclear 
Energy Act, Sections 31 and 32) or non-nuclear 
radioactive waste (the Radiation Act, Section 51) is 
incapable of fulfilling its management obligation.
The regulatory responsibilities are discussed 
under Article 20.
Article 20 Regulatory body
Each Contracting Party shall establish or designate 
a regulatory body entrusted with the implementa-
tion of the legislative and regulatory framework re-
ferred to in Article 19, and provided with adequate 
authority, competence and financial and human 
resources to fulfil its assigned responsibilities.
Each Contracting Party, in accordance with its 
legislative and regulatory framework, shall take 
the appropriate steps to ensure the effective inde-
pendence of the regulatory functions from other 
functions where organizations are involved in both 
spent fuel or radioactive waste management and in 
their regulation.
Bodies of the regulatory framework
According to the Nuclear Energy Act, the over-
all authority in the field of nuclear energy is the 
Ministry of Economic Affairs and Employment 
(MEAE). The Ministry prepares matters concern-
ing nuclear energy to the Government for decision-
making. Among other duties, the MEAE is respon-
sible for the formulation of a national energy policy.
According to the Radiation Act (1991/592, 
currently under revision) the Ministry of Social 
Affairs and Health is responsible for the general 
evaluation of the health hazards caused by radia-
tion, evaluation of the need for measures to limit 
exposure to radiation, and the imposition of the 
requirements for such measures as well as require-
ments for monitoring the radiation exposure of 
workers and other persons exposed to radiation. 
STUK supervises compliance with the Radiation 
Act and with the provisions and regulations is-
sued. Addionally, the medical uses of radiation are 
directed and supervised by STUK.
The mission of the Radiation and Nuclear Safety 
Authority (STUK) is ‘to protect people, society, en-
vironment, and future generations from harmful 
effects of radiation’. STUK is an independent gov-
ernmental organisation for the regulatory control 
of radiation and nuclear safety, as well as nuclear 
security and nuclear materials. STUK falls admin-
istratively under the Ministry of Social Affairs and 
Health. Interfaces with ministries and governmen-
tal organisations are described in Figure 9. It is 
emphasized that the regulatory control of the safe 
use of radiation and nuclear energy is indepen-
dently carried out by STUK. No Ministry can make 
decisions on a matter that has been defined by law 
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to be on the responsibility of STUK. STUK has no 
responsibilities or duties which would be in conflict 
with regulatory control.
The current Act on STUK was given in 1983 
and the Decree in 1997. According to the Decree, 
STUK has the following duties:
•	 regulatory	oversight	of	safety	of	the	use	of	nu-
clear energy, emergency preparedness, security 
and nuclear materials
•	 regulatory	 control	 of	 the	 use	 of	 radiation	 and	
other radiation practices
•	monitoring	 of	 the	 radiation	 situation	 in	 Fin-
land, and maintaining preparedness for abnor-
mal radiation situations
•	maintaining	national	metrological	standards	in	
its field of activity
•	 research	and	development	work	 for	enhancing	
radiation and nuclear safety
•	 providing	information	on	radiation	and	nuclear	
safety issues, and participating in training ac-
tivities in the field
•	 producing	expert	services	in	the	field	of	its	ac-
tivity
•	making	proposals	for	developing	the	legislation	
in the field, and issuing general guidelines con-
cerning radiation and nuclear safety
•	 participating	 in	 international	 co-operation	 in	
the field, and taking care of international con-
trol, contact or reporting activities as enacted or 
defined.
STUK has the legal authority to carry out regula-
tory oversight. The responsibilities and rights of 
STUK regarding the regulation of the use of nu-
clear energy and use of radiation are provided in 
the Nuclear Energy Act and Decree and also in the 
Radiation Act and Decree. STUK’s responsibilities 
and rights include the following main regulatory 
activities: authorization, review and assessment, 
inspection and enforcement, development of regu-
lations and guidelines, national registers and in-
ventories, information and public communication. 
STUK does not grant construction or operating 
licences for nuclear facilities. However, in practice 
no such licence would be issued without STUK’s 
statement, where the fulfilment of the safety regu-
lations is confirmed. The regulatory oversight is 
described in detail in Guide YVL A.1.
STUK’s Advisory Committee was established in 
March 2008. The Advisory Committee helps STUK 
to develop its functions as a regulatory, research 
and expert organisation in such a manner that the 
activities are in balance with society’s expectations 
and the needs of citizens. The Advisory Committee 
can also make assessments of STUK’s actions and 
give recommendations to STUK.
The Advisory Committee on Nuclear Safety 
was established in 1988 by decree. This Committee 
gives advice to STUK on important safety issues 
and regulations. The Committee also gives its 
statements on licence applications. The Committee 
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Figure 9. Co-operation between STUK and Ministries and other governmental organisations.
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has two international sub-committees, one for re-
actor safety (RSC) and one for safety issues re-
lated to radioactive waste (NWSC). In addition, the 
Advisory Committee on Radiation Safety has been 
established for advising the Ministry for Social 
Affairs and Health. The members of the Advisory 
Committee on Nuclear Safety and the Advisory 
Committee on Radiation Safety are nominated by 
the Government.
To assist STUK’s work in nuclear security, 
the Advisory Committee on Nuclear Security was 
established in 2009. The members of the commit-
tee come from various Finnish authorities, and 
the nuclear licensees also have their represen-
tatives as experts. The duties of the committee 
include the assessment of threats in the nuclear 
field as well as providing consultationto STUK 
on important security issues. The committee also 
aims to follow and promote both international and 
domestic co-operation in the field of nuclear re-
lated security issues. The members of the Advisory 
Committee on Nuclear Security are nominated by 
the Government.
STUK is responsible for communicating with 
the public and media on radiation and nuclear 
safety. STUK aims to communicate proactively, 
openly, promptly and clearly. A prerequisite for 
successful communication is that STUK is known 
by the media and the general public and that the 
information given by STUK is regarded as truth-
ful. Communication is based on the best available 
information and it responds to the expectations of 
the public. STUK’s own web site is an important 
tool in communication. STUK also uses social me-
dia platforms for two-way public communication. 
Internal communication provides the personnel 
with information about STUK’s activities and sup-
ports its capability in external communication.
STUK’s roles and responsibilities have been as-
sessed by a peer review. A full-scope IRRT mission 
(IAEA’s International Regulatory Review Team) 
was carried out in 2000 and a follow-up mis-
sion in 2003. An IRRS mission (IAEA’s Integrated 
Regulatory Review Service) was carried out in 
October 2012 and a follow-up mission in June 
2015.
In November 2009, a team of 11 European 
regulators carried out an EU 27 Peer Review of 
STUK’s processes for regulating radioactive waste 
management activities in Finland. The review 
focused on STUK’s regulation of the spent fuel 
disposal facility and its associated underground 
rock characterisation facility, ONKALO. The team 
concluded that STUK has a well-established, ef-
fective and efficient basis for regulating nuclear 
waste management in Finland. Nevertheless, the 
team felt that STUK needs to review its guidelines 
and regulations, which are currently based on NPP 
to ensure that they are sufficiently clear for the 
purposes of regulating waste management and to 
ensure greater transparency to stakeholders.
In June 2015, the follow-up mission, 5 interna-
tional experts and 4 IAEA staff members reviewed 
regulatory activities in Finland on the basis of 
IAEA Safety Standards, international best prac-
tices and experiences and lessons learned from 
the Fukushima Dai-ichi accident. The purpose of 
the IRRS follow-up was to review the measures 
undertaken following the recommendations and 
suggestions of the 2012 IRRS mission. The scope of 
the follow-up mission was the same as in 2012, i.e. 
to cover nuclear facilities, except the research reac-
tor FiR 1 (due to the decision on decommissioning), 
radiation sources and transport.
As a result of the follow-up mission the review 
team concluded that the recommendations and 
suggestions from the 2012 IRRS mission have been 
taken into account systematically in a compre-
hensive action plan. Significant progress has been 
made in most areas and many improvements have 
been implemented in accordance with the action 
plan. The IRRS team determined that 7 out of 8 
recommendations and 19 of 21 suggestions made 
by the 2012 IRRS mission had been effectively ad-
dressed and therefore could be considered closed.
The recommendation left open in the 2015 fol-
low-up mission deals with STUK’s position related 
to the Government, which will be discussed further 
in Finland. STUK’s current position administra-
tively under the Ministry of Social Affairs and 
Health continues to have the potential for STUK’s 
decision-making to be unduly influenced by in-
terests in medical applications of radiation. Two 
new recommendations were raised to amend the 
legislation to clarify that the decommissioning of a 
nuclear installation and closure of a disposal facil-
ity require a licence amendment; and to address 
the arrangements for research in radiation safety. 
STUK has updated its action plan to take these 
into account in its future development actions.
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Figure 10. The organisation of STUK at the end of 2016 was 321.
One of the open suggestions is related to 
STUK’s management system. Although a number 
of improvements were initiated by STUK to its 
management system, the IRRS team felt that there 
is still work that has to be undertaken for further 
enhancing STUK’s management system. For ex-
ample STUK will continue reviewing and revising 
existing Quality Manuals and guidance documents 
for consistency and improve overall descriptions 
of the processes including sub-processes and their 
independency, further develop self-assessments, 
internal and external audit programmes, develop 
more detailed procedures for use of a graded ap-
proach in the authorization systems, structures 
and components and in planning and conducting 
inspections.
Finance and resources of the regulatory body
The organisational structure and the responsibili-
ties within STUK are described in the Management 
System of STUK. Additionally, processes for regu-
latory oversight and other activities of STUK are 
presented in the Management System. The organi-
sation of STUK is described in the Figure 10.
STUK receives about 34 % of its financial re-
sources through the State budget. However, the 
costs of regulatory oversight are charged in full to 
the licensees. The model for financing the regulato-
ry work is called a net-budgeting model and it has 
been applied since 2000. In this model, the licens-
ees pay the regulatory oversight fees directly to 
STUK. In 2016, the cost of the regulatory oversight 
for nuclear safety was 19 million €. The regulatory 
oversight of the use of radiation and non-nuclear 
waste was about 3.4 million € in 2016.
STUK has adequate resources to fulfil its re-
sponsibilities in regulatory oversight. The net-
budgeting model makes it possible, for example, 
to increase personnel resources flexibly based on 
needs.
At the end of 2016, the number of staff in 
the department of Nuclear Waste and Material 
Regulation came to 26. The regulatory oversight 
of waste management facilities is supported by 
the Nuclear Reactor Regulations department with 
more than 100 experts from different disciplines. 
At the end of 2016, the number of staff in the 
Radiation Practices Regulation Department was 
52. Non-nuclear radioactive waste is mainly regu-
lated by the Radiation in Industry section, which 
has a staff of 8. The expertise of STUK covers 
all the essential areas needed in the oversight 
of the use of nuclear energy. As needed, STUK 
orders independent analyses, reviews, and as-
sessments from technical support organisations 
to complement its own review and assessment 
work. The main technical support organisation of 
STUK is the VTT Technical Research Centre of 
Finland Ltd., but also Lappeenranta University 
of Technology (LUT) and Aalto University (former 
Helsinki University of Technology) are important. 
Furthermore, international technical support or-
ganisations and experts are used if needed.
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Ensuring competence of the regulatory body
The management of STUK highlights the need 
for a competent workforce. To this end STUK 
has adopted a competence management system. 
Nuclear and radiation safety and regulatory com-
petencies are also emphasised in STUK’s strat-
egy. Implementation of the strategy is reflected 
in the annual training programmes, on the job 
training and new recruitment. The national nu-
clear safety (SAFIR) and waste management re-
search (KYT) programmes play an important role 
in the competence building for all essential organi-
sations involved in nuclear energy. The funding of 
the programme according to the Nuclear Energy 
Act (Articles 53d and 53e) comes from the licence 
holders via the State Nuclear Waste Management 
Fund (VYR). These research programmes have two 
roles: firstly, ensuring the availability of experts 
and tools for regulatory oversight, and secondly, 
ensuring the on-line transfer of research results to 
the organisations participating in the steering of 
the programmes and fostering the expertise. STUK 
has an important role in the steering of these pro-
grammes.
Most of the professional staff at STUK conduct-
ing safety assessments and inspections vehold a 
university level degree. The average experience 
of the staff is about 15 years in the nuclear field. 
A competence analysis is carried out on a regular 
basis and the results are used as the basis for 
training programmes and new recruitments. The 
training programme includes internal courses as 
well as courses organised by external organisa-
tions. On average, 5 % of the annual working hours 
have been used to enhance competence.
An induction programme is set up at STUK 
for all newly recruited inspectors. In addition to 
administrative issues, the induction programme 
includes familiarisation with legislation, regula-
tory guidance and regulatory oversight practices. 
The programme is tailored to each new inspector 
and its implementation is followed by the superior 
of the employee. STUK has also participated in the 
preparation and execution of a basic professional 
training course on nuclear safety and nuclear 
waste management with other Finnish organ-
isations in the field (described in more detail in 
Article 22).
National research programmes
In Finland, VTT Technical Research Centre of 
Finland Ltd is the largest research organisation 
in the field of nuclear energy. At VTT, about 200 
experts work in the field of nuclear energy, about 
half of them full-time. Two thirds of the radio-
active waste management research in Finland is 
focused on the disposal of spent fuel. The larg-
est individual research organizations are VTT, 
LUT (Lappeenranta University of Technology), 
GTK (the Geological Survey of Finland), and Aalto 
University (formerly the Helsinki University of 
Technology, HUT).
The Nuclear Energy Act was amended in 2003 
to ensure funding for nuclear waste management 
research in Finland. Funds are collected annually 
from the licence holders into a special fund under 
the State Nuclear Waste Management Fund (VYR). 
For the research into nuclear waste, the annual 
funding payments are proportional to the current 
fund holdings for future waste management activi-
ties. In 2016 the Nuclear Energy Act was amended 
and a temporary increase in the money collected 
for the fund was introduced. The purpose of the 
temporary increase of the research funding is to re-
new the ageing infrastructure of the nuclear ener-
gy related research. The increased funding will be 
collected between 2016 and 2025. During the first 
stage, the additional funding is allocated for the 
commissioning of the new VTT Centre for Nuclear 
Safety (CNS) building, and in the second stage, for 
a thermohydraulic laboratory at Lappeenranta 
University of Technology.
The research projects have been selected so 
that they support and develop the competence in 
nuclear safety and nuclear waste management and 
to create preparedness for the regulator to be able 
to respond to emerging and urgent safety issues. 
These national safety research programmes are 
called SAFIR and KYT. The objective of KYT2018 
(the Finnish Research Programme on Nuclear 
Waste Management) is to ensure the sufficient 
and comprehensive availability of nuclear techno-
logical expertise and other capabilities required by 
the authorities when comparing different nuclear 
waste management approaches and implemen-
tation methods. Similarly to the previous pro-
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gramme, KYT2018 is also divided into three main 
categories:
•	 new	 and	 alternative	 technologies	 in	 nuclear	
waste management
•	 long-term	 safety	 research	 in	 nuclear	 waste	
management and
•	 social	 science	 studies	 related	 to	nuclear	waste	
management.
The main emphasis in the KYT research pro-
gramme will continue to be devoted to safety re-
lated research. The funding of the research pro-
gramme is provided mainly by the State Nuclear 
Waste Management Fund (VYR) into which those 
responsible for nuclear waste management will an-
nually pay 0.13 % from 2016 to 2020, and 0.10 
% from 2021 to 2025 of their respective assessed 
liability. In 2016 the level of funding of the KYT 
research programme was 2.9 million €.
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Article 21 Responsibility of the 
licence holder
Each Contracting Party shall ensure that prime 
responsibility for the safety of spent fuel or radio-
active waste management rests with the holder of 
the relevant licence and shall take the appropriate 
steps to ensure that each such licence holder meets 
its responsibility.
If there is no such licence holder or other re-
sponsible party, the responsibility rests with the 
Contracting Party which has jurisdiction over the 
spent fuel or over the radioactive waste.
The responsibility for safety rests with the licensee 
as prescribed in the Nuclear Energy Act. Also ac-
cording to the Act (Section 9), each licensee, whose 
operations generate or have generated nuclear 
waste, are responsible for all nuclear waste man-
agement measures and their appropriate prepa-
ration, and are responsible for their costs. If the 
licence holder is found not to be capable of car-
rying out the waste management completely or 
partly, the Government shall order that such nu-
clear waste be transferred to the responsibility of 
the State. The waste management obligation of 
the licensee will expire when the disposal of nu-
clear waste has been completed and STUK has 
confirmed that the nuclear waste is permanently 
disposed of in an approved manner (Sections 31–34 
of the Nuclear Energy Act).
Furthermore, the licensee is responsible for se-
curity and emergency preparedness arrangements 
and other necessary arrangements for the limita-
tion of nuclear damage. The authorities regulate 
these arrangements, but the responsibility belongs 
to the licensees. To ensure that the financial li-
ability for the future management and disposal 
of nuclear waste and for the decommissioning of 
nuclear facilities is covered, the licensees under a 
waste management obligation must fulfil the finan-
cial provision obligation by making payments into 
the State Nuclear Waste Management Fund (VYR), 
and furnish the State with securities as a precau-
tion against insolvency. The State Nuclear Waste 
Management Fund is independent of the State 
budget, but it is controlled and administered by the 
MEAE.
As a precondition for granting a safety licence 
for the use of radiation, the Radiation Act requires 
(Section 16) that the applicant presents valid proof 
on the safe management of any radioactive waste 
which may be generated. Further, the Radiation 
Act (Section 50) provides that the responsible party 
must organize the practice so that it meets all radia-
tion safety requirements prescribed in the Act and 
must take all the measures needed to render ra-
dioactive waste arising from its operation harmless. 
The Act also provides for the responsibility for de-
contamination of the environment if radioactive ma-
terial is released to such an extent that the result-
ing health or environmental hazards require action. 
According to the Act (section 50), in the utilization of 
natural resources containing radioactive materials, 
the responsible party shall ensure that radioactive 
waste does not pose any health or environmental 
hazard during operations, including measures tak-
en while finally stopping these activities.
The Radiation Act (Section 51) provides that if 
the responsible party does not meet the require-
ments set for radioactive waste management, the 
State has the secondary obligation in managing the 
radioactive waste or residues. The same applies if 
the origin of the waste is unknown, or no primary 
responsible party can be found.
It is the responsibility of the regulatory body to 
verify that the licensees fulfil their responsibilities 
set in the regulations. This verification is carried out 
through safety reviews and assessments as well as 
inspection programmes established by STUK.
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Article 22 Human and financial 
resources
Each Contracting Party shall take the appropriate 
steps to ensure that:
(a) qualified staff are available as needed for 
safety-related activities during the operating 
lifetime of a spent fuel and a radioactive waste 
management facility;
(b) adequate financial resources are available to 
support the safety of facilities for spent fuel 
and radioactive waste management during 
their operating lifetime and for decommission-
ing;
(c) financial provision is made which will en-
able the appropriate institutional controls and 
monitoring arrangements to be continued for 
the period deemed necessary following the clo-
sure of a disposal facility.
Human resources
The licensee has the prime responsibility for en-
suring that his employees are qualified and au-
thorized for their jobs. According to the Nuclear 
Energy Act (Section 55) STUK is responsible for 
controlling the necessary qualifications of the per-
sons engaged in activities important to nuclear 
safety. The regulatory requirements for human 
resources are stated in the Nuclear Energy Act 
(Sections 7, 19 and 20), STUK Regulations (STUK 
Y/1/2016 and STUK Y/4/2016) and Guide YVL A.4. 
The requirements for the licensees’ personnel are 
set out in the Nuclear Energy Act Section 7, which 
stipulates that the personnel should be well suit-
ed for their duties, competent and well trained. 
Further according Nuclear Energy Act Section 7 
a nuclear facility must have a responsible director 
for construction and operation of the nuclear facil-
ity and responsible persons for emergency prepar-
edness, security and safeguards and their deputies 
– all approved by STUK. According to the Nuclear 
Energy Act (Section 19), a necessary condition for 
granting a construction licence for a nuclear facil-
ity is the availability of the necessary expertise. 
According to the Nuclear Energy Act (Section 20), 
an operating licence of a nuclear facility can be 
granted if the applicant has the necessary exper-
tise available and, in particular, if the operating 
organisation and the competence of the operating 
staff are appropriate.
According to Section 25 of the STUK Regulation 
STUK/Y1/2016 and Section 38 of the STUK 
Regulation STUK Y/4/2016, significant functions 
with respect to safety within nuclear power plants 
and disposal facilities must be designated, and 
training programmes must be prepared for devel-
oping and maintaining the professional qualifica-
tions of the personnel working in such positions.
The Guide YVL A.4 sets out the requirements 
for qualifications and training of the personnel 
working in functions that are important for facility 
safety. The Guide also has more specific require-
ments for safety critical positions, e.g. for the 
responsible director and persons responsible for 
safeguards, emergency preparedness and security. 
It also has specific requirements on management 
and leadership competences. The guide is also ap-
plied for the waste management company, Posiva, 
as it is a licensee of a nuclear facility.
NPP utilities and Posiva have special train-
ing programmes including waste management for 
their personnel. Staff training at Posiva is based 
on personal training and development plans in 
addition to company-level plans, which are updat-
ed annually. In addition, Posiva co-operates with 
other European waste management organizations 
in the framework of the Technology Platform for 
Implementing Geological Disposal of Radioactive 
Waste (IGD-TP) and has bilateral agreements or 
understandings on international co-operation with 
several research and implementing organizations 
acting in the area of nuclear waste management. 
Posiva also participates in the EURATOM projects 
under the Horizon 2020 research framework pro-
gramme and in various working groups and pro-
jects of the Nuclear Energy Agency of the OECD.
STUK’s inspection programmes are one of the 
key instruments for regulatory oversight of con-
struction, commissioning and operation of licen-
sees and licence applicants. The overall functional-
ity of Posiva’s management system, organization 
structure, processes, and procedures are included 
in STUK’s inspection programmes for the different 
phases of Posiva’s nuclear facility project. During 
2014–2016 STUK has paid especially attention 
through the inspection programmes to assessing 
Posiva’s human resource strategy, development, 
and planning.
In activities related to the use of radiation other 
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than in nuclear facilities, the Radiation Act (Section 
14) prescribes that the responsible party is required 
to ensure that sufficient expertise is available in 
safety related matters of operations, taking into ac-
count the nature and the risks posed by the opera-
tion. The responsible party must appoint a radiation 
safety officer. In a licence application the applicant 
must provide information on the competence of the 
personnel working with radiation.
STUK specifies the qualifications for the radia-
tion safety officer and other personnel, as applica-
ble, and carries out inspections to check that these 
qualification requirements are met (Section 18 of 
the Radiation Act). The licensee must provide ap-
propriate training for employees. Guide ST 1.4 sets 
the requirements for the organisation for the use of 
radiation including the competences needed. Guide 
ST 1.8 further sets out detailed requirements on 
radiation protection training for radiation safety 
officers and qualified experts. Competence includ-
ing a general part covering the basics of radiation 
protection and the appropriate legislation need to 
be demonstrated by an exam. Special requirements 
are attributed to different fields of applications of 
radiation.
Strengthening and maintaining 
competence building in Finland
Ensuring an adequate national supply of experts 
in nuclear science and technology and a high-qual-
ity research infrastructure is recognized as a con-
tinuous challenge in Finland as the resource need 
in the nuclear area is currently high due to many 
ongoing projects in the country (e.g. the Olkiluoto 3 
project, the new reactor project Hanhikivi 1, and 
the spent nuclear fuel disposal project and decom-
missioning of the research reactor). The long time 
scales especially associated with the spent fuel dis-
posal also underline the importance of the avail-
ability of qualified domestic experts in the field in 
the future. The availability of competent human 
resources has been instigated by training young 
experts in the nuclear safety field in different ways, 
e.g. on doctoral programmes and separately ar-
ranged courses.
The basic training on nuclear area is provided 
by the Lappeenranta University of Technology 
and in the metropolitan area by Aalto and 
Helsinki universities. Lappeenranta University of 
Technology offers M.Sc. Major program in Nuclear 
Engineering; Aalto University offers a Minor 
program in nuclear engineering, and Helsinki 
University offers degrees in radiochemistry.
During 2012–2015, three Universities Aalto, 
Helsinki University and Lappeenranta University 
of Technology run a doctoral programme called 
YTERA (YTERA – Doctoral Programme for 
Nuclear Engineering and Radiochemistry), which 
was funded by the Academy of Finland, the univer-
sities and industry (the NPP utilities and Posiva). 
The aim was to ensure the supply of high-level 
expertise in nuclear engineering and radiochemis-
try and to create a permanent network for nuclear 
post-graduate education. The programme covered 
all fields of nuclear engineering and radiochem-
istry including nuclear waste management and it 
involved close collaboration with Finnish research 
bodies, industry and authorities that deal with 
nuclear energy generation. In general, the YTERA 
doctoral programme has achieved its goals. During 
the programme 21 new doctors graduated.
The main organisations in the nuclear en-
ergy area in Finland develop and organize the 
basic professional training course on nuclear safety 
(“YK course”), which is an annually held approxi-
mately 6-week training programme for students 
and staff members of the participating organisa-
tions (STUK, the licensees, VTT, Aalto University, 
Lappeenranta University of Technology and the 
Ministry of Economic Affairs and Employment). 
The first course commenced in September 2003 
and the 14th basic professional training course 
started in the autumn of 2016. At the moment, over 
900 newcomers and junior experts have partici-
pated in these courses. The content and structure 
of the course have been enhanced according to 
feedback received from the participants.
The first national nuclear waste management 
course (“National YJH course”) commenced in 
2010. The current course with a six-day curricu-
lum has been running since 2011 for around 
20-25 students at a time and equalling 2 ECTS 
credits (ECTS = European Credit Transfer and 
Accumulation System), with around 100 partici-
pants altogether by the end of 2016. The train-
ing content is produced and developed jointly by 
the participating organizations. The YJH and YK 
courses will be merged into one YJK-course start-
ing from autumn 2017.
During 2010–2012 a committee set up by the 
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MEAE worked on a report to provide recommen-
dations and steps to be taken until the 2020s for 
ensuring competence and resources needed for the 
nuclear sector. One of the recommendations of the 
committee was that the future needs and focus 
areas for research in the Finnish nuclear energy 
sector must be accurately defined and a long-term 
strategy must be drawn up for further develop-
ment of research activities. This calls for a sepa-
rate joint project among research organisations 
and other stakeholders in the field. The update of 
the competence review is planned to be carried out 
in 2017 to reflect the current changes in the oper-
ating environment.
At the end of January 2013, the MEAE set up 
a working group to prepare a research and de-
velopment strategy (YES). The nominated mem-
bers of the working group included experts from 
STUK, VTT, the Finnish Academy, Aalto University, 
the Lappeenranta University of Technology, the 
University of Helsinki, Fortum, TVO and Posiva. 
The results of the research and development strat-
egy work were published at the end of April 2014. 
The report “Nuclear Energy Research Strategy” 
emphasizes the importance of the research in com-
petence building. The recommendations of the work-
ing group were the following: 1) The areas of focus 
in nuclear energy research must be compiled into 
wide-ranging national programmes. 2) The scien-
tific level of Finnish nuclear energy research needs 
to be raised. 3) Active participation is needed in 
international research that is important for Finland 
through broad-based national multidisciplinary col-
laboration. 4) To secure the quality and quantity of 
researcher education, a broad and comprehensive 
doctoral programme network needs to be estab-
lished for the nuclear energy field. 5) Building, 
maintaining, and utilising infrastructure requires 
coordination at the national level. Financing needs 
to be considered strategically and the roles of na-
tional financiers need to be clarified. 6) In research 
activities, input is needed for innovation develop-
ment. The growth of business operations and in-
ternationalisation should be supported by bringing 
the players together under Team Finland. 7) It is 
proposed that an advisory committee be set up in 
connection with the MEAE which would be linked 
to nuclear energy research and co-operation and 
that this would act as a permanent expert body to 
support decision-making in national questions re-
lated to the nuclear energy. The MEAE has started 
the implementation of the recommendation. In 2015 
the Nuclear Energy Act was changed to ensure the 
financing for the enhancement of nuclear safety re-
search infrastructure.
Financial resources
In Finland,each lisensee is responsible for all on-
going costs caused by radioactive waste manage-
ment and decommissioning of nuclear facilities. 
The rationale of the funding system, which collects 
financial provisions from the waste generators for 
radioactive waste management and decommis-
sioning, is to ensure that the funds for the future 
waste management are collected that the assets 
are available even in the case where the waste gen-
erator is unable to fulfil its obligations.
The Nuclear Energy Act (Section 35 to 53) pro-
vides detailed regulations for the funding arrange-
ments and provisions for nuclear waste manage-
ment and the Decree on the State Nuclear Waste 
Management Fund further specifies the system 
for financial provisions. The financial provisions 
are described in greater detail in the Decision 
by the Government on Financial Provisions 
for the Cost of Nuclear Waste Management 
(165/1988). The Decision by the Government on 
Financial Provisions for the Cost of Nuclear Waste 
Management will be replaced by a Government 
decree in 2017. The producers of nuclear waste are 
obliged to present justified estimates every three 
years of the future cost of managing their existing 
waste, including spent nuclear fuel disposal and 
decommissioning of facilities. The MEAE annually 
confirms the assessed liability and the proportion 
of liability the Nuclear Waste Management Fund 
has to reach (the fund target). The tasks of the 
Nuclear Waste Management Fund are described 
in detail in the Government Decree on the State 
Nuclear Waste Management Fund (161/2004). The 
waste generators annually pay the difference be-
tween the fund target and the amount already 
existing in the Fund, but can also be reimbursed 
if the funded amount exceeds the liabilities. The 
waste generators must provide collateral securities 
to MEAE for the portion of financial liability that 
is not yet covered by the Fund.
In 2012, the VTT Technical Research Centre of 
Finland, which operates the research reactor (FiR-
1), decided to shut down the reactor and the plan-
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ning of the decommissioning phase started. VTT is 
responsible for observing similar requirements for 
funding as described above.
The current estimates, including costs from 
the management of existing waste quantities and 
from the decommissioning of current NPPs and the 
research reactor, amounted to about 2497 million 
Euros at the end of 2016.
Financial provisions for post-closure
According to the Nuclear Energy Act (Section 32), a 
condition for the expiry of the obligation for waste 
management of a nuclear waste generator is that 
the waste has been permanently disposed of in 
an approved manner and a lump sum to the State 
for the further control of the waste has been paid. 
Thereafter, the State is responsible for the nec-
essary waste management measures and the in-
curred costs.
According to the Radiation Act (Section 51), the 
responsible party and others who have taken part 
in producing or handling the radioactive materials 
or waste must compensate the State for the costs 
incurred by the measures taken to render the 
waste harmless and to decontaminate the environ-
ment.
Article 23 Quality assurance
Each Contracting Party shall take the necessary 
steps to ensure that appropriate quality assurance 
programmes concerning the safety of spent fuel and 
radioactive waste management are established and 
implemented.
The Nuclear Energy Decree (Section 35) requires 
that a description of the applicant’s quality man-
agement for the construction phase must be sub-
mitted to STUK for approval when applying for a 
construction licence for a nuclear facility. The ap-
plicant must assess how organizations participat-
ing in the construction satisfy the Finnish safety 
and quality requirements. The assessment needs 
to be included in the Preliminary Safety Analysis 
Report (PSAR) which must be sent to STUK for 
approval. When applying for the operating licence, 
the applicant has to send the management system 
manual to STUK for approval according to the 
Nuclear Energy Decree (Section 36).
According to the STUK’s regulation on the 
Safety of Disposal of Nuclear Waste (Section 38), 
organisations participating in the design, construc-
tion, operation, and decommissioning of a nuclear 
waste facility or closing of a disposal facility must 
employ a management system to ensure the man-
agement of nuclear safety, radiation safety and 
quality. The management system must ensure that 
priority is always be given to safety and that the 
requirements for quality management are com-
mensurate to the importance of any actions regard-
ing safety. The management system must further 
be systematically assessed and developed. The 
management system requirements concerning nu-
clear facilities are provided in the Guide YVL A.3 
reflecting the updating of the IAEA requirements 
and guidelines.
Measures taken by licence holders
The licensees (FPH and TVO) have established 
and implemented integrated management systems 
(IMS) consistent with Guide YVL A.3. The licen-
sees must maintain, develop and continuously im-
prove their management systems according to the 
requirements set out in Guide YVL A.3.
Posiva has established and implemented its 
integrated management system (IMS). STUK has 
reviewed and approved the management system as 
part of the construction licence application docu-
mentation. The management system needs to be 
supplemented and updated before the commission-
ing and operating phases of the project.
The construction licence was granted to Posiva 
in November 2015. During 2016 STUK re-evalu-
ated the readiness of Posiva’s organization for the 
construction activities. As a part of this evalua-
tion also the integrated management system and 
Posiva’s most important functions were assessed 
through several inspections at the site. STUK’s ap-
proval for the launching the construction activities 
of the disposal facility was given in late 2016 and 
Posiva started the construction of the facility in 
December 2016.
Posiva’s contractors supplying products impor-
tant to safety musty also have a quality manage-
ment system fulfilling the main requirements of 
Guide YVL A.3. These organisations also need to 
prepare a supply specific quality plan for the de-
sign, manufacturing and testing of the products. 
STUK verifies the implementation of the quality 
management systems and the quality plan with a 
graded approach through reviews and inspections. 
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As a part of this oversight STUK participates in 
the safety related contractor audits performed by 
Posiva.
Management system of the regulatory body
STUK itself has a Quality Management System, 
which consists of a safety and quality policy, qual-
ity manuals on different levels, evaluation and 
assessment procedures and follow-up on develop-
ment projects. The policy statement was updated 
in 2015 based on the strategy plans. The qual-
ity manuals contain the safety and quality policy, 
descriptions of the quality system, organization 
and management, main and supporting working 
processes and the procedures related to them. The 
results of systematic internal audits, self-assess-
ments and external evaluations, including inter-
national evaluations (such as IRRS follow up in 
2015) as well as feedback from licensees, customers 
and other interested parties, are used as inputs for 
the development and continuous improvement of 
STUK’s Quality Management System.
STUK also evaluates the contractors as part 
of the procurement process. STUK uses only ap-
proved contractors. The approval is based on au-
dits or detailed evaluations performed through a 
review of tender documentation. Important issues 
in the evaluations include professional skills, in-
dependence, and impartiality of the contractor 
as well as their capacity to produce high quality 
services.
Article 24 Operational radiation 
protection
Each Contracting Party shall take the appropriate 
steps to ensure that during the operating lifetime 
of a spent fuel or radioactive waste management 
facility:
(d) the radiation exposure of the workers and the 
public caused by the facility shall be kept as 
low as reasonably achievable, economic and 
social factors being taken into account;
(e) no individual shall be exposed, in normal 
situations, to radiation doses which exceed na-
tional prescriptions for dose limitation which 
have due regard to internationally endorsed 
standards on radiation protection; and
(f) measures are taken to prevent unplanned and 
uncontrolled releases of radioactive materials 
into the environment.
Each Contracting Party shall take appropriate 
steps to ensure that discharges shall be limited:
(g) to keep exposure to radiation as low as reason-
ably achievable, economic and social factors 
being taken into account; and
(h) so that no individual shall be exposed, in 
normal situations, to radiation doses which 
exceed national prescriptions for dose limita-
tion which have due regard to internationally 
endorsed standards on radiation protection.
Each Contracting Party shall take appropriate 
steps to ensure that during the operating lifetime 
of a regulated nuclear facility, in the event that an 
unplanned or uncontrolled release of radioactive 
materials into the environment occurs, appropriate 
corrective measures are implemented to control the 
release and mitigate its effects.
Basic radiation protection requirements
The basic requirements for the safe use of nu-
clear energy are given in the Nuclear Energy Act. 
The principles of justification, optimisation and 
dose limitation are included in the Radiation Act 
(Section 2). Occupational dose limits and dose 
limits for the general public are set forth in the 
Radiation Decree (Sections 3 to 6). These limits 
conform to the ICRP 103 Recommendation (2007), 
ICRP 60 Recommendation (1990) and the Council 
Directive 96/29/EURATOM. The implementation 
of the Council Directive 2013/59/EURATOM (re-
placing the Council Directive 96/29/EURATOM) in 
Finnish legislation is currently ongoing.
According to the Radiation Decree (Section 3), 
the effective dose from occupational exposure must 
not exceed 20 mSv per year as an average over five 
years, or 50 mSv in any single year. Medical sur-
veillance of employees of NPPs and other working 
places, where employees are engaged in radiation 
work, is performed following the Radiation Act 
and subsequent legislation implementing the re-
lated provisions of the Council Directive 96/29/
EURATOM.
The Radiation Decree (Section 7) states that 
the detailed instructions on the application of the 
maximum values laid down for radiation exposure 
and on the calculation of radiation doses shall 
be issued by STUK. The decree further states 
that notwithstanding the dose limits given in the 
Decree (Sections 3 to 6), e.g. the 1 mSv/a limit for 
the general public, STUK may, in individual cases, 
52
STUK-B 218 SECTION F Other General Safety Provisions
set constraints lower than the maximum values, 
if such constraints are needed to take account of 
the radiation exposure originating from different 
sources and to keep the exposure as low as reason-
ably achievable.
Dose constraints
The maximum values for radiation exposure caused 
to the population in the vicinity of a NPP and a nucle-
ar waste facility, including spent fuel storage, spent 
fuel encapsulation, operation of the disposal facility, 
anticipated operational occurrences or accidents, as 
well the maximum values of long-term radiation ex-
posure caused by the disposal of nuclear waste are 
given in the Nuclear Energy Decree (161/1988). The 
annual dose of the most exposed individual among 
the population arising from the normal operation of 
a nuclear waste facility must be insignificantly low 
(more specific in the guide YVL D.5). The annual 
dose limit from the normal operation of an NPP is 
0.1 mSv. Other annual dose limits for anticipated 
operational occurrences and accidents are the same 
for both NPPs and nuclear waste facilities. The limit 
for an anticipated operation occurrence is 0.1 mSv, 
while the limit for a Class 1 postulated accident is 1 
mSv, and the limit for a Class 2 postulated accident is 
5 mSv and the limit for a design extension condition 
is 20 mSv per year. The dose limits are defined for the 
entire nuclear facility, including all nuclear facilities 
on the site.
The STUK Regulation (STUK Y/4/2016) pro-
vides more specific requirements for the disposal 
of spent nuclear fuel and facilities for handling 
and storage of spent nuclear fuel and other nu-
clear waste that are not part of a nuclear power 
plant. For example, the amount of spent nuclear 
fuel stored at any one time at a nuclear waste 
facility intended for the handling of spent nuclear 
fuel must be limited in a manner that involves no 
extensive measures to protect the public or which 
would impose long-term restrictions on the use of 
extensive land and water areas as a result of an 
accident situation.
STUK has issued several YVL Guides dealing 
with radiation protection regarding the design and 
operation of NPPs (Guides YVL C.1, C.2, C.3 and 
D.3). These also cover spent fuel storage, on-site 
waste management facilities and other nuclear 
waste facilities, including the operational period 
of disposal facilities for both LILW and spent fuel. 
The Guides define the level of safety required and 
form the basis for the regulatory review of the li-
cence application as well as for review and inspec-
tion during commissioning and operation.
In the Guide YVL D.5, STUK has specified that 
a disposal facility shall be so designed that the av-
erage annual dose to the most exposed individuals 
of the population, arising from normal operation 
of the facility, may not exceed the 0.01 mSv con-
straint. The constraint is stricter than the limit for 
an NPP.
Nuclear facilities must have a written pro-
gramme (the ALARA action programme) to keep 
doses low. Based on the principle of continuous 
development, the programme must include both 
short-term and long-term plans and measures to 
limit the doses of occupationally exposed workers. 
From the overall viewpoint of radiation protection, 
the action programme must take into account the 
facility’s operation, water chemistry, plant modifi-
cations, materials, decontamination, waste man-
agement, testing and inspections etc. The pro-
gramme must include target limits for the highest 
individual annual and collective dose (for an NPP: 
manSv/GW net electric power) that must not be ex-
ceeded and this limit must be continuously devel-
oped. The ALARA action programme must be kept 
up-to-date and submitted to STUK for information.
A Licensee of a nuclear facility must present an 
analysis of the radioactive releases and radiation 
exposure to the population arising from the normal 
operation and from anticipated operational occur-
rences of the plant and for potential accidents. The 
reports must also demonstrate that the radiation 
exposure arising from the operation of the plant is 
as low as reasonably achievable (ALARA) and that 
radioactive releases to the environment are limited 
by employing the best available techniques (BAT).
In the YVL Guides, reporting requirements 
concerning exceptional situations including excep-
tional releases are given. Release rate limits are 
also given in the Guides, ensuring actions to be 
taken already before a release limit is reached. The 
Guides also stipulates requirements concerning 
the monitoring of release pathways and monitoring 
the environment of a nuclear facility.
Operational experiences
Experience gained from the operation of Finnish 
nuclear facilities shows that the dose constraints 
STUK-B 218
53
SECTION F Other General Safety Provisions
have not been exceeded, and that the ALARA prin-
ciple has been followed. The results of environmen-
tal surveillance programmes show that the amount 
of radioactive materials in the environment at the 
NPP sites, originating from the Finnish nuclear 
facilities, has been very low. The calculated radia-
tion exposures to the most exposed persons in the 
environment at the NPPs are currently less than 
one per cent of the dose constraint (Figure 11). The 
new NPP unit, Olkiluoto 3, will have advanced 
liquid and gaseous effluent treatment systems and 
it is expected that the discharges from the entire 
Olkiluoto NPP will remain at the current low level 
after the commissioning of the new unit. It should 
also be noted that the dose constraints and actual 
doses discussed above apply to the entire operation 
of the NPP and the contributions due to long-term 
spent fuel storage and waste management are in-
significant fractions of the total exposure: the occu-
pational collective doses resulting from waste man-
agement, decontamination and spent fuel manage-
ment activities at the both NPPs are of the order of 
some hundredths of manSv per year.
Article 25 Emergency preparedness
Each Contracting Party shall ensure that before 
and during operation of a spent fuel or radioactive 
waste management facility there are appropriate 
on-site and, if necessary, off-site emergency plans. 
Such emergency plans should be tested at an ap-
propriate frequency.
Each Contracting Party shall take the appropri-
ate steps for the preparation and testing of emer-
gency plans for its territory insofar as it is likely to 
be affected in the event of a radiological emergency 
at a spent fuel or radioactive waste management 
facility in the vicinity of its territory.
On-site emergency preparedness
The emergency preparedness plans for spent nu-
clear fuel storages and existing radioactive waste 
management facilities are included in the plans 
and arrangement for NPPs. The preliminary plans 
for emergency preparedness for disposal facilities 
for spent nuclear fuel were presented as part of 
Posiva’s construction license application as re-
quired by the Nuclear Energy Decree (Section 35). 
In the preliminary emergency plan Posiva has de-
scribed the planning of emergency arrangements, 
preparedness and actions in emergency situations 
and so on. STUK has approved Posiva’s prelimi-
nary emergency plan in April 2014. According to 
the Nuclear Energy Act (Section 20), adequate on-
site emergency preparedness arrangements are re-
quired before starting the operation of a nuclear 
facility. The basic regulations for on-site emergency 
preparedness for nuclear installations are given in 
STUK’s Regulation on Emergency Arrangements 
at Nuclear Power Plants (STUK Y/2/2016) and the 
detailed requirements by STUK in Guide YVL C.5. 
The regulation (STUK Y/2/2016) and Guide YVL 
C.5 also apply to other nuclear facilities and trans-
portations as required by the danger they pose.
The licensee is responsible for the on-site emer-
gency response arrangements. STUK’s Regulation 
states e.g. that emergency planning must be based 
on an analysis of a nuclear facility’s behavior in 
emergencies and on the analysis of the consequenc-
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Figure 11. Committed doses (µSv/a) calculated by STUK to members of critical groups in the vicinity of the 
 Finnish NPPs due to annual discharges of radioactive substances. The dose constraint is 100 µSv/a.
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es of emergencies. Action in an emergency must be 
planned to take into account the controllability of 
events as well as the severity of their consequenc-
es. Therefore, emergencies are classified and de-
scribed briefly in the emergency plan of a nuclear 
facility. In the Regulation (STUK Y/2/2016), the de-
sign basis for emergency planning is a simultane-
ous accident at the site’s nuclear facilities and the 
Regulation also requires that appropriate training 
and exercises are arranged to maintain operational 
preparedness. Training exercises must be arranged 
in co-operation with the authorities concerned.
Emergency training and exercises are arranged 
annually for the emergency response organization 
of the nuclear facilities. The emergency training in-
cludes classroom and group-specific practical train-
ing, as well as special training, such as first aid, 
fire and radiation protection training. In addition 
to severe accidents, emergencies covered by the 
emergency response exercises must also include 
conditions classified as alerts. The content and 
scope of the training as well as feedback obtained 
from the training are assessed in the inspections of 
the STUK’s periodic inspection programme.
On-site emergency exercises are conducted at 
the NPPs annually so that at least the licensee per-
sonnel, local off-site emergency management group 
and STUK participate in them. There are always 
observers from STUK and several other organiza-
tions to assess the performance of the exercising 
teams. The scenarios have varied from severe reac-
tor accidents to alert-status events, which involve 
alerting the nuclear power plant emergency organ-
ization to the extent necessary to ensure the safety 
level of the plant. Additionally, exercises for other 
situations, such as security-related incidents are 
regularly conducted. STUK verifies the prepared-
ness of the organizations operating nuclear power 
plants in yearly on-site inspections, as well as by 
supervising the licensee’s emergency training and 
exercises. Emergency preparedness at the Loviisa 
and Olkiluoto power plants meet the regulatory 
requirements. Posiva must deliver the emergency 
plan in its operating licence application, and dur-
ing the commissioning of Posiva’s nuclear waste 
facilities the emergency arrangements must com-
ply with the emergency plan. Furthermore, an 
emergency exercise must take place before spent 
fuel is transferred or transported into the site area.
Concerning the small users of radiation sources, 
the Radiation Decree (Section 17) stipulates that 
STUK has to be notified immediately in case of any 
abnormal occurrence connected to the use of radia-
tion and substantially detrimental to safety at the 
place where the radiation is used or in its environ-
ment. In addition, STUK must be informed if a ra-
diation source has disappeared, been stolen, lost or 
otherwise ceased to be in the licensee’s possession.
Off-site emergency preparedness
In addition to the on-site emergency plans estab-
lished by the licensees, off-site emergency plans 
required by the rescue legislation (379/2011) are 
prepared by the regional authorities. The require-
ments for off-site plans and activities in a radia-
tion emergency are provided in the Decree of the 
Ministry of Interior (612/2015). STUK acts as an 
expert body who supports and provides recommen-
dations to authorities responsible for making deci-
sions and implementing protective actions in case 
of nuclear or radiological emergency.
STUK publishes VAL Guides for emergency re-
sponses. Guide VAL 1 (2012) “Protective Measures 
in the Early Phase of a Nuclear or Radiological 
Emergency” and VAL 2 (2012) “Protective 
Measures in an Intermediate Phase of a Nuclear 
or Radiological Emergency” provide detailed guid-
ance. In the case of an accident the local authori-
ties are alerted by the operating organisation of 
the plant.
The Ministry of Interior has published a guide 
“Nuclear or Radiological Emergencies” (MI publi-
cation 10/2016), which contains detailed informa-
tion on the arrangements in Finnish society in the 
case of a nuclear or radiological emergency.
STUK has an Emergency Preparedness Manual 
for its own activities in case of a nuclear or radio-
logical emergency. STUK has an expert on duty on 
a 24/7 basis. Notifications of an exceptional event 
(alarm) may be received from the operating organi-
sations of the facilities, or from the automatic ra-
diation monitoring network that covers the whole 
country (approx. 250 measuring stations), or from 
foreign authorities.
The off-site emergency plans include provisions 
to inform the population in the case of an accident. 
Written instructions on radiological emergencies, 
emergency planning and response arrangements 
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have been provided to the population living within 
a 20 km Emergency Planning Zone. These instruc-
tions are regularly updated and distributed.
The regulations and guides are tested in full-
scale off-site emergency exercises conducted every 
third year at both operating Finnish NPPs with 
the participation of all organizations with a role in 
the emergency response. In addition, the NPPs run 
smaller-scale exercises with the Rescue Service 
and STUK at least once every year.
The rescue planning is enhanced by the co-op-
eration between the nuclear power plant, regional 
rescue services, regional police departments and 
STUK. There are permanent coordination groups 
for both Loviisa and Olkiluoto NPPs to ensure 
coordinated and consistent emergency plans, as 
well as to improve and develop emergency plan-
ning and arrangements and to share lessons from 
the exercises, regulations and other information. 
Furthermore, extensive training is arranged by 
these groups.
Early notification and communication
The on-site and off-site plans include provisions to 
inform the population in case of an accident. In ad-
dition, written information on radiation emergen-
cies, emergency planning and response arrange-
ments have been provided to the population. Such 
information can also be found on the Internet pag-
es of regional rescue services. Citizens living near 
nuclear facilities are regularly provided with more 
detailed written information on nuclear accidents 
and protective measures needed during emergen-
cies.
STUK is the National Warning Point and the 
National Competent Authority in Finland for any 
kind of situation which might result in actual or 
potential deterioration of radiation safety of the 
population, environment or society. STUK is able 
to give advice to local, regional and governmental 
authorities on any required emergency response 
actions 24 hours a day.
Finland is a Contracting Party to the Inter-
national Convention on Early Notification of a 
Nuclear Accident, as well as to the Convention 
on Assistance in the Case of a Nuclear Accident 
or Radiological Emergency, both signed in Vienna 
in 1986. Furthermore, as a Member State of the 
European Union, the Council Directives and 
Regulations and Decisions concerning accident sit-
uations apply in Finland. In addition, Finland has 
respective bilateral agreements with Denmark, 
Germany, Norway, Russia, Sweden and Ukraine. 
Accordingly, arrangements have been agreed on 
to directly inform the competent authorities of 
these countries in the case of an accident. Similar 
arrangements ensure direct notification to the 
authorities of Estonia. The bilateral agreements 
also cover the exchange of relevant information on 
nuclear facilities.
The Nordic countries have published two joint 
documents that detail the co-operation arrange-
ments in case of a radiological emergency. The 
Nordic Manual (updated 2015) describes practical 
arrangements regarding communication and infor-
mation exchange to fulfil the stated obligations in 
bilateral agreements between the Nordic countries. 
The arrangements described in this document 
include all phases of events, including intermedi-
ate and recovery phases. The second document, 
the Nordic Flag Book (published 2014), describes 
joint guidelines, including operational interven-
tion levels, for protective measures concerning the 
population and functions of society in case of nu-
clear or radiological emergencies. These guidelines 
agreed by radiation and nuclear safety authorities 
in Denmark, Iceland, Finland, Norway and Sweden 
form a unique document as it includes harmonised 
and practical criteria for early protective measures, 
as well as recovery actions after contamination. 
The Nordic Manual and Nordic Flag Book ensure 
that the response to any nuclear or radiological 
emergency in the Nordic countries is harmonised 
and consistent between the countries.
In addition to the domestic nuclear emergency 
exercises held annually on each nuclear power 
plant sites, STUK has taken part in international 
emergency exercises. STUK has also participated 
as a co-player in emergency exercises arranged 
by the Swedish and Russian nuclear power plant 
operators and authorities. Neighbouring countries 
have been actively invited to take part in the 
Finnish exercises.
Article 26 Decommissioning
Each Contracting Party shall take the appropriate 
steps to ensure the safety of decommissioning of a 
nuclear facility. Such steps shall ensure that:
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(i) qualified staff and adequate financial resourc-
es are available;
(j) the provisions of Article 24 with respect to op-
erational radiation protection, discharges and 
unplanned and uncontrolled releases are ap-
plied;
(k) the provisions of Article 25 with respect to 
emergency preparedness are applied; and
(l) records of information important to decommis-
sioning are kept.
Regulatory requirements
The Nuclear Energy Act (Section 7 g) states that 
the design of a nuclear facility must provide for the 
facility’s decommissioning and that the related de-
commissioning plan should be presented. The de-
commissioning plan for a nuclear facility must be 
sent to STUK for approval as part of construction 
and operating licence application for the facility 
(Sections 34 and 36 in the Nuclear Energy Decree). 
During operation, the licensee is obligated to pre-
pare decommissioning plans for regulatory review 
every six years (Section 28 in the Nuclear Energy 
Act). These plans aim at ensuring that decom-
missioning can be appropriately performed when 
needed and estimates for decommissioning costs 
are provided. According to the Nuclear Energy Act 
(Section 7g), when the operation of a nuclear facil-
ity has been terminated, the facility must be de-
commissioned in accordance with a plan approved 
by STUK. The dismantling of the facility and other 
measures taken for the decommissioning of the 
facility may not be postponed without due cause.
Guide YVL D.4 requires that provision for the 
decommissioning of the nuclear facilities must 
already be made during the design phase. During 
the design phase, the licence applicant must es-
tablish the decommissioning strategy. This strat-
egy must be regularly evaluated and if necessary 
updated during the commissioning of the facility. 
The limitation of radioactive waste generation and 
of the radiation exposure of workers and the en-
vironment arising from decommissioning must be 
considered.
The general provision for licensing and the 
waste management obligation is included in the 
current nuclear energy legislation. Guide YVL D.4 
was published in 2013 and it includes more specific 
requirements for decommissioning than the earlier 
Guide YVL 8.2. The guidance will be developed 
further based on the experiences gained from FiR 1 
decommissioning.
The licensees are responsible for the implemen-
tation and costs of decommissioning. As described 
in Section F, Article 22, assets are collected in the 
Nuclear Waste Management Fund. The State has 
the secondary responsibility in case the licensee is 
incapable of implementing its responsibilities. In 
this case the costs are covered by assets collected 
in the Fund and by the securities provided by the 
licensees.
Also in cases of uses of radioactive sources sub-
ject to the Radiation Act, the licensee is responsible 
for decommissioning. The licensee must provide 
evidence that all disused sources have been trans-
ferred from the site appropriately, and, where ap-
propriate, that there is no remaining contamination. 
Sections 19 and 31f of the Radiation Act prescribe 
practices subject to a financial provision in the li-
censing phase to ensure the availability of sufficient 
funds to cover the decommissioning costs.
Decommissioning plans
The four nuclear power plant units in Finland had 
been in operation for 34 to 39 years at the end of 
2016. These units are planned to operate up to an 
overall operation period of 50 (Lo1 & Lo2) and 60 
years (OL1 & OL2). No nuclear power plants are 
currently being decommissioned or planned to be 
decommissioned in the near future.
The most recent update of the NPP decommis-
sioning plan made by FPH was issued at the end 
of 2012. TVO updated its decommissioning plan 
for the OL1 and OL2 units at the end of 2014. The 
decommissioning plan for OL3 was submitted to 
STUK as a part of the operation licence application 
of the plant in 2016. Fennovoima has also sub-
mitted the preliminary decommissioning plan for 
STUK’s approval as part of a construction licence 
application in 2015. VTT is currently updating the 
decommissioning plan for the research reactor for 
the decommissioning licence application. VTT is 
also preparing the decommissioning plan for the 
old hot cell laboratory located in Otaniemi, Espoo.
The decommissioning plans include assess-
ments of the occupational and off-site radiological 
safety of the operations. The plans include detailed 
descriptions of the required dismantling and waste 
management operations, including estimates of the 
workforce and other resources needed. The plans 
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are based on the actual designs of the facilities and 
take into account the facility activity inventories. 
The contamination levels in the facilities are fol-
lowed by means of specific monitoring and record-
ing programmes.
The first decommissioning project in Finland 
is the decommissioning of VTT’s research reactor 
FiR 1 in 2018–2022. The decision to shut down the 
research reactor was made in 2012 by VTT (the 
operator). In June 2015, the research reactor was 
permanently shut down and VTT started detailed 
planning of the reactor decommissioning and dis-
mantling. The Environmental Impact Assessment 
(EIA) process for decommissioning was conducted 
in 2013–2015. The end point of the EIA process 
was MEAE’s statement about the EIA report in 
February 2015. VTT has prepared an operating 
licence application for decommissioning since there 
is not yet a separate decommissioning licence 
stated in Finnish legislation. VTT submitted the 
application for the operating licence regarding the 
decommissioning in June 2017.
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Article 4 General safety requirements
Each Contracting Party shall take the appropriate 
steps to ensure that at all stages of spent fuel man-
agement, individuals, society and the environment 
are adequately protected against radiological haz-
ards. In so doing, each Contracting Party shall take 
the appropriate steps to:
(a) ensure that criticality and removal of residual 
heat generated during spent fuel management 
are adequately addressed;
(b) ensure that the generation of radioactive waste 
associated with spent fuel management is kept 
to the minimum practicable, consistent with 
the type of fuel cycle policy adopted;
(c) take into account interdependencies among the 
different steps in spent fuel management;
(d) provide for effective protection of individuals, 
society and the environment, by applying at 
the national level suitable protective methods 
as approved by the regulatory body, in the 
framework of its national legislation which 
has due regard to internationally endorsed 
criteria and standards;
(e) take into account the biological, chemical and 
other hazards that may be associated with 
spent fuel management;
(f) strive to avoid actions that impose reason-
ably predictable impacts on future generations 
greater than those permitted for the current 
generation;
(g) aim to avoid imposing undue burdens on fu-
ture generations.
Scope and principal regulations
Finland has adopted the once-through principle 
for spent nuclear fuel management as described 
in Section B. Spent fuel is currently stored at the 
NPPs’ spent fuel interim storage facilities. The dis-
cussion in this Section is limited to the interim 
storage of spent fuel whereas the disposal plans 
for spent fuel are discussed in Section H, Safety of 
radioactive waste management.
The general regulations for the safety of spent 
fuel storage are included in the STUK Regulation 
(STUK Y/1/2016). More specific technical require-
ments are given in YVL Guides such as YVL D.3.
Criticality and removal of residual heat
According to the STUK Regulation (STUK 
Y/1/2016), the handling and storage of spent nu-
clear fuel, maintenance of subcritical conditions, 
integrity of fuel cladding, adequate heat removal 
and radiation shielding shall be ensured with a 
high degree of certainty. The Nuclear Energy Act, 
Guides YVL A.1 and YVL D.3 require that NPPs 
must have sufficient space and systems for the 
safe handling, treatment, storage and inspection of 
fresh and spent fuel. Sub-criticality requirements 
are given in Guide YVL B.4. Sub-criticality of the 
spent fuel during interim storage must be ensured 
primarily through structural design solutions. The 
requirements concerning handling and storing 
spent fuel are given in Guide YVL D.3. Fuel dam-
age in fuel storages and in fuel transfers are to be 
minimized by design solutions.
Spent fuel cooling must satisfy the single fail-
ure criterion. This requirement is given in Guide 
YVL B.1.
Existing interim storage facilities in Olkiluoto 
and Loviisa have ensured the sub-criticality of 
the spent fuel in the pools through the structural 
design of the racks and by choosing the boron con-
taining rack material. In the Olkiluoto spent fuel 
storage, ion exchanged water is used in the pools, 
while the Loviisa spent fuel storage has boron con-
taining cooling water in storage pools.
The cooling of the spent fuel in the storage pools 
is implemented with cooling water systems. Both 
spent fuel storages have two redundant cooling 
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water circuits. If the cooling circuits are disabled 
in accidental conditions, cooling water can be fed 
from other sources to maintain the water level in 
the storage pools. At Loviisa NPP a small cooling 
tower is connected to the interim spent fuel storage 
cooling system to ensure cooling if the heat sink 
used in normal condition conditions is lost (see also 
Articles 5 and 7).
Waste minimization
Minimizing the amount of nuclear waste arising 
in spent fuel storage is related to minimizing the 
corrosion of the fuel assemblies and storage equip-
ment and also limiting the leakage from damaged 
fuel bundles. The requirements concerning these 
issues are stated in Guide YVL D.3. The coolant of 
spent fuel pools must also be kept sufficiently clear 
and clean to facilitate the fuel identification.
The operating Finnish NPPs have performed 
measures to minimize the radioactive waste pro-
duced in spent fuel storage. In the Olkiluoto NPP, 
leaking fuel assemblies are closed in hermetically 
sealed capsules to minimize the Cs-activity in the 
fuel pool cooling water clean-up system.
In Loviisa NPP, leaking fuel assemblies are 
stored in spent fuel pools without specified capsules. 
Pool water samples are taken regularly and no sig-
nificant activity originating from leaking fuel rods 
has been identified. In Loviisa, the cobalt content of 
the shielding elements has been decreased to mini-
mize the amount of activation products in the cool-
ing water and in the decommissioning waste.
Interdependencies
The Finnish once-through spent fuel management 
strategy provides that the spent fuel is stored in 
interim storage facilities and is then planned to 
be disposed of in deep bedrock. The spent fuel of 
TVO and FPH is planned for disposal in Olkiluoto, 
in close vicinity of the largest present interim 
storage. The disposal plans, including spent fuel 
transfer and transport, encapsulation and disposal, 
have been adapted to all the fuel types in use in 
Olkiluoto reactor units 1 to 3 and in Loviisa units 
1 and 2.
Posiva, the implementing organization for the 
spent fuel disposal of TVO and FPH, is co-owned 
as a joint company by these NPP utilities. Even 
though Posiva is the implementer of the final dis-
posal, the waste management obligations remain 
with the NPP utilities. NPP utilities makes sure 
that the interdepencies between the different steps 
in spent fuel management are taken into account 
in their waste management plans. Fennovoima 
Oy is responsible for the disposal of its own future 
spent fuel. Fennovoima started the EIA process for 
its own disposal site in June 2016 as required as a 
condition of the DiP.
Protection of individuals, society 
and the environment
The operational radiation protection requirements 
for spent fuel storage are discussed in Article 24. 
The operating experience, as discussed in Article 
9, indicate that spent fuel storage has led to practi-
cally no releases and occupational radiation expo-
sures have been very low.
Biological, chemical and other hazards
The biological, chemical and other non-radiological 
hazards posed by the spent fuel storage are low 
compared to the potential radiological hazards. 
Such hazards are regulated by legislation related 
to general occupational safety and to the manage-
ment of hazardous substances.
Protection of future generations 
and avoidance of undue burdens 
on future generations
The interim storage of spent fuel is envisaged to 
last several decades. The current high level of safe-
ty can be maintained during that time by means of 
appropriate operational, maintenance and surveil-
lance procedures. The nuclear power plant licensee 
is responsible for the storage safety, operations and 
costs. The assets collected in the State Nuclear 
Waste Management Fund cover the future costs of 
storage in case the licensee is no more able to take 
care of its responsibilities. Thus, the future genera-
tions are adequately protected and any other un-
due burdens will not be imposed on them.
Article 5 Existing facilities
Each Contracting Party shall take the appropriate 
steps to review the safety of any spent fuel manage-
ment facility existing at the time the Convention 
enters into force for that Contracting Party and to 
ensure that, if necessary, all reasonably practicable 
improvements are made to upgrade the safety of 
such a facility.
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Safety reviews
The latest comprehensive safety assessments of 
the Loviisa and the Olkiluoto NPPs, including 
the spent fuel storages, were carried out for the 
Loviisa NPP in connection with the periodic safety 
review in 2014–2016 and for the Olkiluoto NPP in 
2007–2009. The next periodic safety review will 
be carried out in 2016–2017 in connection with 
the renewal of operating licences for the Olkiluoto 
NPP reactor units which has been submitted to the 
regulator.
The enlargement of the spent fuel storage facil-
ity at Olkiluoto, which started in 2009, was com-
pleted in 2015, when STUK finalised the safety 
assessment on commissioning of the extension and 
approved TVO’s application to increase the capac-
ity of the spent fuel storage facility.
Following the accident at the Fukushima Dai-
ichi nuclear power plant, national safety assess-
ments as well as EU level stress tests were initi-
ated in Finland in 2011 and 2012. The safety of 
spent fuel storage facilities were assessed as part 
of NPP safety assessments. STUK has reviewed 
the results and made licensee specific decisions in 
July 2012. Based on the results, it was concluded 
that no such hazards or deficiencies were found 
that would have required immediate action in 
Finnish NPPs. However, areas where safety can be 
further enhanced were identified (e.g. decreasing 
the dependency on the plant’s normal electricity 
supply and distribution systems, as well as on sea 
water cooled systems for residual heat removal of 
the reactor, containment and spent fuel storage 
pools, protection against external flooding, seismic 
resistance of spent fuel pools and fire-fighting sys-
tems) and there are plans on how to address these 
areas, some of which have already been imple-
mented. As an example, Loviisa NPP has already 
completed modifications to ensure long-term decay 
heat removal in case of the loss of seawater by 
implementing an alternative ultimate heat sink, 
two air-cooled cooling units. Additionally, the avail-
ability of extra feed water into the storage pools 
has been improved. TVO has improved the seismic 
resistance of the fire water systems and also pro-
vided additional feed water sources into the spent 
fuel pools.
The comprehensive safety assessments for ap-
plications for the renewal of licences include up-
dating the following safety relevant documents 
(among others):
•	 Final	safety	analysis	reports	(FSARs)
•	 Quality	assurance	programmes	for	operation
•	 Technical	specifications
•	 Programmes	for	periodic	inspections
•	 Plans	for	nuclear	waste	management,	including	
decommissioning and disposal
•	 Timetables	for	nuclear	waste	management	and	
estimated costs
•	 Plans	for	physical	security	and	emergency	pre-
paredness
•	 Administrative	rules	for	the	facilities
•	 Programmes	 for	 radiation	 monitoring	 in	 the	
environment of the facilities
•	 Licensee	 assessments	 of	 compliance	 with	 the	
regulations, including assessment of the fulfil-
ment of YVL Guides’ requirements
•	 Licensee	assessments	of	how	an	adequate	safe-
ty level has been maintained.
The periodic safety review report must include the 
same updated information, as appropriate.
The re-licensing safety reviews and statements 
of STUK given to the MEAE concluded, regarding 
radiation and nuclear safety, that the conditions 
at the Loviisa and the Olkiluoto NPPs comply 
with the national nuclear energy legislation and 
regulations. In addition to the review of the above-
mentioned documents, STUK has also made in-
dependent safety assessments and has annually 
made a number of regular and topical inspections 
of the facilities.
Need for safety enhancement
The continuous safety assessment and enhance-
ment approach applied in Finland is based on the 
Nuclear Energy Act (Section 7a) stating that the 
safety of the use of nuclear energy shall be as 
high as reasonably achievable. To further enhance 
safety, all actions justified by operational experi-
ence, safety research and the progress in science 
and technology shall be taken.
Safety improvements have been annually im-
plemented at the Loviisa and Olkiluoto NPPs 
including the facilities for spent nuclear fuel han-
dling and interim storage since the commissioning 
of the reactor units. At the Olkiluoto spent fuel 
storage facility, recent safety improvements have 
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been carried out in connection with the enlarge-
ment of the spent fuel storage facility. There exists 
no urgent need for additional improvements to up-
grade the safety of these storage facilities.
Article 6 Siting of proposed facilities
Each Contracting Party shall take the appropriate 
steps to ensure that procedures are established and 
implemented for a proposed spent fuel management 
facility:
(a) to evaluate all relevant site-related factors 
likely to affect the safety of such a facility dur-
ing its operating lifetime;
(b) to evaluate the likely safety impact of such a 
facility on individuals, society and the environ-
ment;
(c) to make information on the safety of such a 
facility available to members of the public;
(d) to consult Contracting Parties in the vicinity 
of such a facility, insofar as they are likely to 
be affected by that facility, and provide them, 
upon their request, with general data relating 
to the facility to enable them to evaluate the 
likely safety impact of the facility upon their 
territory.
In so doing, each Contracting Party shall take the 
appropriate steps to ensure that such facilities shall 
not have unacceptable effects on other Contracting 
Parties by being sited in accordance with the gen-
eral safety requirements of Article 4.
Siting process and site-related factors
The spent fuel management facilities are nuclear 
facilities, either as an integrated part of a nuclear 
power plant or as separate facilities. All the present 
spent fuel management facilities in Finland are lo-
cated on the NPP sites. According to the Nuclear 
Energy Act and the Nuclear Energy Decree the ap-
plication for a Decision-in-Principle has to include 
(among other things):
•	 An	outline	of	 the	ownership	and	occupation	of	
the site,
•	 A	description	of	settlement	and	other	activities	
and town planning arrangements at the site 
and in its vicinity,
•	 An	evaluation	of	the	suitability	of	the	site	and	
the restrictions caused by the planned nuclear 
facility on the use of surrounding areas,
•	 An	 assessment	 report	 in	 accordance	 with	 the	
Act on the Environmental Impact Assessment 
Procedure (252/2017), as well as a description 
of the design criteria the applicant will observe 
in order to avoid environmental damage and to 
restrict the burden to the environment. More 
detailed requirements on the Environmental 
Impact Assessment are provided in the Decree 
(277/2017) on the Environmental Impact As-
sessment Procedure.
In the design of a nuclear power plant, including 
spent fuel management facilities on site, site-relat-
ed external events must be taken into account. The 
STUK Regulation (STUK Y/1/2016) provides as fol-
lows: “The safety impact of local conditions, as well 
as the physical protection and emergency prepared-
ness arrangements, shall be considered when select-
ing the site of a nuclear power plant. The site shall 
be such that the impediments and threats posed 
by the plant to its environment remain extremely 
minor and heat removal from the plant to the en-
vironment can be reliably implemented.” In 2013 
STUK issued Guide YVL A.2, “Site for nuclear fa-
cility”, which generally describes all the require-
ments concerning the site and surroundings of a 
nuclear facility. It also provides requirements on 
safety factors affecting the site selection and cov-
ers regulatory control. Specific provisions against 
earthquakes are provided in Guide YVL B.7.
Deterministic analyses are made to assess the 
impact of various natural phenomena and other 
external events. A probabilistic risk analysis (PRA) 
is required as part of the safety review for con-
struction and operating licences and provides in-
formation on the estimated frequency of releases 
of radioactive substances and radiation exposures 
brought about by internal and external events. 
The requirements of the PRA are given in Guide 
YVL A.7, “Probabilistic risk assessment and risk 
management of a nuclear power plant” which was 
issued by STUK in 2013. Restrictions for the type 
and amount of human activity in the vicinity of the 
nuclear facility site are described in Guide YVL A.2.
Assessment of new nuclear power 
plants and candidate sites
The construction Licence for the Olkiluoto 3 unit 
was granted by the Government in February 2005. 
Site-related factors were evaluated and reviewed 
in connection with the construction licence proce-
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dure. Further clarifications have been submitted 
by the licensee during construction.
During 2008–2009 three applications for the 
Decision-in-Principle for new NPP units were 
submitted to the Government. The relevant site-
related factors potentially affecting the safety of 
the new planned NPP units and the related nucle-
ar facilities during their projected lifetimes were 
evaluated for the existing Loviisa and Olkiluoto 
sites and for the alternative new sites at Pyhäjoki, 
Simo and Ruotsinpyhtää. The evaluations were 
reviewed by STUK and other expert organizations 
in their respective fields. In addition to the Finnish 
regulations, IAEA Safety Requirements and Safety 
Guides, and WENRA requirements were consid-
ered in the review.
Safety impact
The safety impacts of a spent fuel management 
facility are analysed either in the safety analysis 
reports presented as part of the construction or in 
the operating licence applications of NPPs regard-
ing spent fuel storage. The operating licences for 
nuclear facilities are granted for a limited period 
of time. For the licence renewal and the Periodic 
Safety Review, a comprehensive re-assessment of 
safety, including the environmental safety of the 
nuclear facility and the effects of external events 
on the safety of the facility, must be performed. 
STUK reviews the licence applications, including 
all site-specific safety reports.
Availability of information
The availability of information related to the sit-
ing process for a major nuclear facility is based on 
Finnish legislation on the openness of information, 
notably the Act on the Openness of Government 
Activities (621/1999). Further requirements are 
based on the Act and Decree on the Environmental 
Impact Assessment Procedure and the Nuclear 
Energy Act. The first step of consultation with 
the general public is the Environmental Impact 
Assessment (EIA) procedure. Public hearings are 
arranged both in the programme phase of the EIA 
and during the actual impact assessment. The re-
sponsible contact authority for that procedure is 
the MEAE. The EIA report and the statement of 
the MEAE must be attached to the application for 
the Decision-in Principle.
The Nuclear Energy Act (Section 13) states 
that, before the Decision-in-Principle is made, the 
applicant must make an overall description of the 
facility, the environmental effects it is expected to 
have and of its safety available to the public. The 
MEAE must provide a chance for residents and 
municipalities in the immediate vicinity of the 
nuclear facility, as well as local authorities, to pres-
ent their opinions in writing before the Decision-
in-Principle is made. Furthermore, the Ministry 
must arrange a public hearing in the municipality 
where the planned site of the facility is located 
and during this hearing the public must have the 
opportunity to give their opinions either orally or 
in writing. The presented opinions must be made 
known to the Government. The Act (Section 14) 
further provides that a necessary prerequisite for 
the Decision-in-Principle is that the planned host 
municipality for the nuclear facility is in favour of 
siting the facility in that municipality.
Consulting of Contracting Parties
Finland is a party to the Convention on Environ-
mental Impact Assessment in a Trans boundary 
Context, signed in Espoo in 1991. The Finnish pol-
icy is (Act 252/2017) to provide full participation to 
all neighbouring countries which may be affected 
by the nuclear facilities in question.
During 2014–2016 there have been three 
Environmental Impact Assessments in Finland. 
Fennovoima submitted the EIA report concerning 
Hanhikivi NPP to MEAE in February 2014. The 
statement by the MEAE was given in June 2016. 
In the assessment procedure with respect to cross-
border environmental impact, based on the Espoo 
Convention, the Ministry of the Environment noti-
fied the authorities of Sweden, Denmark, Norway, 
Germany, Poland, Lithuania, Latvia, Estonia, 
Russia and Austria about the EIA Programme. 
Austria, Sweden, Denmark, Norway, Germany, 
Estonia, Latvia, Russia and Poland participated in 
the international hearing on the EIA programme. 
Lithuania did not participate at this stage, but 
they requested to be involved in the EIA reporting 
and the construction licensing stages.
The Environmental Impact Assessment (EIA) 
process for the decommissioning of the research 
reactor FiR 1 was conducted in 2013–2015. The 
EIA report was submitted to the MEAE in October 
2014 and the process ended in February 2015 with 
the MEAE’s statement on the EIA programme. The 
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Espoo Convention was not followed in this case, 
because the environmental influence, if any exist, 
are local.
In June 2016 Fennovoima submitted an EIA 
programme concerning the disposal of spent nucle-
ar fuel to the MEAE. The hearing process was con-
ducted by the MEAE in autumn 2016 in Finland 
and abroad according to the Espoo Convention. The 
MEAE’s statement was submitted to Fennovoima 
in December 2016.
Article 7 Design and construction 
of facilities
Each Contracting Party shall take the appropriate 
steps to ensure that:
(a) the design and construction of a spent fuel 
management facility provide for suitable meas-
ures to limit possible radiological impacts on 
individuals, society and the environment, in-
cluding those from discharges or uncontrolled 
releases;
(b) at the design stage, conceptual plans and, as 
necessary, technical provisions for the decom-
missioning of a spent fuel management facility 
are taken into account;
(c) the technologies incorporated in the design 
and construction of a spent fuel management 
facility are supported by experience, testing or 
analysis.
Regulatory approach
According to the Nuclear Energy Act (Section 19) 
the prerequisite for granting a construction licence 
is that the location of a nuclear facility is appro-
priate with respect to the safety of the planned 
operations and that environmental protection has 
been taken into account appropriately. The site re-
lated prerequisite for granting an operating licence 
(Section 20) is that the environmental protection 
has been taken into account appropriately. The 
Nuclear Energy Decree (Section 32) requires that 
the construction licence application must include 
a description of the effects of the nuclear facility 
on the environment and a description of the design 
criteria that will be observed by the applicant in 
order to avoid environmental damage and to re-
strict the burden on the environment. In Operating 
licence application (Section 34) there should be a 
description of the measures to restrict the burden 
caused by the nuclear facility on the environment.
The guiding requirements for spent nuclear 
fuel storage design and construction are described 
in the STUK Regulation (STUK Y/1/2016) on the 
Safety of Nuclear Power Plants. More detailed 
requirements for the design and construction of 
nuclear facilities are given in the Guides YVL A.2, 
YVL A.5, YVL B.1, YVL B.3 and YVL D.3. The gen-
eral design of the nuclear facility and the technol-
ogy used are first assessed by STUK for when re-
viewing the application for a Decision-in-Principle 
and performing a preliminary safety assessment of 
the facility. More detailed safety assessments are 
carried out by STUK when reviewing applications 
for construction licences and for the operating li-
cence, as well as in connection with possible plant 
modifications. In the operating licence renewals 
and in the periodic safety reviews the facility de-
sign is reassessed against safety requirements and 
advancements in science and technology.
The limitation of radiological impact is dis-
cussed in Section F in the context of Article 24.
Provisions for decommissioning
The Nuclear Energy Act (Section 7g) states that 
provisions for decommissioning must be included 
in the design of a nuclear facility. In the context of 
the licensing requirements, the STUK Regulation 
(STUK Y/1/2016) states that the design of an NPP 
must take into account decommissioning so as to 
limit waste volumes and radiation exposure both 
to workers and to the environment. The Nuclear 
Energy Decree (Section 32) requires that the ap-
plication for a construction licence must include a 
description of the applicant’s plans and available 
methods for arranging nuclear waste management, 
including the decommissioning of the nuclear facil-
ity and the disposal of nuclear waste, and a de-
scription of the timetable for nuclear waste man-
agement and its estimated costs. More detailed re-
quirements are given in Guides YVL A.1 and YVL 
D.4. The requirements regarding decommissioning 
plans are discussed in Chapter F.
Proven technology
The requirement to use high quality, carefully ex-
amined and well-tested technologies that are prov-
en by experience are stated in the design require-
ments provided in the STUK Regulation (STUK 
Y/1/2016). Detailed requirements on the design of 
spent fuel handling systems are given in Guides 
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YVL B.1, YVL D.3 and YVL E.11. Spent fuel stor-
age at the Finnish NPPs is based on water pool 
technology, for which extensive experience exists 
worldwide.
Implementation during the review period
An assessment of the design of the facility and 
related technologies is made by STUK for the first 
time when assessing the application for a Decision-
in Principle. Later on, the evaluation is continued, 
when the Construction Licence application is re-
viewed. Finally, a detailed evaluation of systems, 
structures and components is carried out through 
the design approval process during construction or 
facility modification phase.
The design of the Olkiluoto spent fuel storage 
facility and its extension was reviewed by STUK 
when licensing the construction of the extension 
part of the storage facility. The review included a 
preliminary safety analysis report and other safety 
related documents. Protection against a large air-
plane crash has been included in the design of the 
extension and it has also been improved for the ex-
isting part of the facility. Additionally, the cooling 
water systems for the spent fuel pools have been 
improved to enable a water feed from outside the 
plant. The monitoring of the storage pool water lev-
el and temperature has been improved to take into 
account earthquake resistance and loss of the facil-
ity power supply to address lessons learned from 
the Fukushima Dai-ichi accident. The enlargement 
of the spent fuel storage facility at Olkiluoto was 
completed when STUK finalised the safety as-
sessment on commissioning the extension and ap-
proved TVO’s application to increase the capacity 
of the spent fuel storage facility in summer 2015. 
The final review included a Final Safety Analysis 
Report and the other safety related documents.
Additionally, the Loviisa spent fuel storage facil-
ity has been improved since the Fukushima Dai-ichi 
accident. The main changes were aimed at reducing 
the dependency on the plant’s normal electricity 
supply and distribution system, as well as on the 
seawater cooled systems for residual heat removal 
from the reactor, containment and spent fuel pools. 
Two air-cooled cooling units were constructed and 
commissioned in 2014–2015 to ensure long-term 
decay heat removal in case of the loss of seawater. 
The design plans for the installation of a diverse 
water supply to the spent fuel pools were approved 
by STUK in 2015. The installation will be done in 
2017. Flood protection for NPPs was already im-
proved in 2012 from +2.1 m to + 2.45 m, but plans 
for further improvements were submitted to STUK 
in 2015. The aim is to implement the plans in 2018 
to increase the design water level to +2.95 m.
Article 8 Assessment of safety 
of facilities
Each Contracting Party shall take the appropriate 
steps to ensure that:
(a) before construction of a spent fuel management 
facility, a systematic safety assessment and an 
environmental assessment appropriate to the 
hazard presented by the facility and covering 
its operating lifetime shall be carried out;
(b) before the operation of a spent fuel manage-
ment facility, updated and detailed versions of 
the safety assessment and of the environmental 
assessment shall be prepared when deemed 
necessary to complement the assessments re-
ferred to in paragraph (a).
Regulatory approach
The licence applications for a new licence or 
for the renewal of an existing licence include 
the documents required by the Nuclear Energy 
Decree: Preliminary or Final Safety Analysis 
Reports; Probabilistic Risk Analysis Reports; 
Quality Assurance Programmes for Construction 
and Operation; Safety Classification Document, 
Operational Limits and Conditions Document 
(Technical Specifications); Programmes for Periodic 
Inspections; Plans for Physical Protection and 
Emergency Preparedness; Plans for Accounting 
and Control of Nuclear Materials; Administrative 
Rules for the Facilities; Programmes for the radio-
logical baseline survey or the results of the radio-
logical baseline survey; Programmes for Radiation 
Monitoring in the Environment of the Facilities; 
and Decommissioning plans.
The design of the facility is described in the 
Preliminary Safety Analysis Report (PSAR) and in 
the Final Safety Analysis Report (FSAR). These 
reports are submitted to STUK for approval in con-
nection respectively with the applications for con-
struction and the operating licences. According to 
the Nuclear Energy Decree, the FSAR must be kept 
continuously up-to-date.
The requirements for performing the initial safety 
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assessment and environmental impact assessment 
for nuclear facilities are discussed in the context of 
Article 6. A description of the safety principles that 
will be observed needs to be included in the Decision-
in-Principle application.
The STUK Regulation (Y/1/2016) requires that 
the nuclear power plant safety and the technical 
solutions of its safety systems, including systems 
for spent fuel interim storage, must be assessed and 
substantiated analytically and, if necessary, experi-
mentally. Analyses should be maintained and revised 
if necessary, taking into account operating experi-
ence, the results of experimental research, plant 
modifications and the advancement of computational 
methods.
The safety assessments are reviewed by STUK 
with support of independent safety analyses and/or 
by external experts. The licences and related safety 
documents of the on-site spent fuel storages are 
attached to those of the respective NPPs and the 
renewal review processes take place simultaneously.
Implementation
As discussed under Article 7, an assessment of 
the design of the facility and related technologies 
is made by STUK for the first time when assess-
ing the application for a Decision-in Principle. 
Later on, the evaluation is continued when the 
Construction Licence application is reviewed. 
Finally, the detailed evaluation of systems, struc-
tures and components is carried out through their 
design approval process. The design of the Loviisa 
plant units was reassessed by STUK in connection 
with the Periodic Safety Review of the plant in 
2014–2016 and the design of the Olkiluoto plant 
units in 2008–2009.
The preliminary safety analysis report and the 
other safety related documents for the extension 
of the Olkiluoto spent fuel interim storage facil-
ity were reviewed in 2010 before the construction 
work. The Final safety analysis report and the 
other safety related documents were reviewed in 
2015 when STUK finalised the safety assessment 
on commissioning of the extension. The extension 
has been designed to withstand a large aeroplane 
crash and the design of the existing part of storage 
has been updated likewise.
Article 9 Operation of facilities
Each Contracting Party shall take the appropriate 
steps to ensure that:
(a) the licence to operate a spent fuel management 
facility is based upon appropriate assessments 
as specified in Article 8 and is conditional on 
the completion of a commissioning programme 
demonstrating that the facility, as constructed, 
is consistent with design and safety require-
ments;
(b) operational limits and conditions derived from 
tests, operational experience and the assess-
ments, as specified in Article 8, are defined and 
revised as necessary;
(c) operation, maintenance, monitoring, inspection 
and testing of a spent fuel management facility 
are conducted in accordance with established 
procedures;
(d) engineering and technical support in all safe-
ty-related fields are available throughout the 
operating lifetime of a spent fuel management 
facility;
(e) incidents significant to safety are reported in 
a timely manner by the holder of the licence to 
the regulatory body;
(f) programmes to collect and analyse relevant 
operating experience are established and that 
the results are acted upon, where appropriate;
(g) decommissioning plans for a spent fuel man-
agement facility are prepared and updated, as 
necessary, using information obtained during 
the operating lifetime of that facility, and are 
reviewed by the regulatory body.
Initial authorisation
According to the Nuclear Energy Decree (Section 
36), a number of documents, including the Final 
Safety Analysis Report must be submitted to STUK 
when applying for an operating licence. More de-
tailed requirements are given in Guides YVL A.1 
and B.1. The requirements for safety assessment 
are discussed in detail under Article 8.
Requirements for the commissioning pro-
gramme for the NPPs and the associated spent 
fuel storage facilities are set out in Guide YVL 
A.5. According to the Guide, the purpose of the 
commissioning programme is to give evidence that 
the plant has been constructed and will function 
according to the design requirements. Through the 
programme potential deficiencies in design and 
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construction can also be identified. The commis-
sioning programme is described in the preliminary 
and final safety analysis reports, which are submit-
ted to STUK for review and approval.
Operational limits and conditions
According to the Nuclear Energy Decree 
(Section 36), the applicant for an operating licence 
has to provide STUK with the operational limits 
According to the Nuclear Energy Decree (Section 
36), the applicant for an operating licence has to 
provide STUK with the operational limits and con-
ditions. These should set out the technical and ad-
ministrative requirements for ensuring the plant’s 
operation in compliance with the design bases and 
safety analyses. The operational limits and condi-
tions include the requirements for ensuring the 
operability of systems, structures and components 
important to safety; and also the limitations that 
must be observed in the event of component fail-
ure.
The STUK Regulation (STUK Y/1/2016) re-
quires a nuclear power plant to have a condi-
tion monitoring and maintenance programme for 
ensuring the integrity and reliable operation of 
all systems, structures and components. This pro-
gramme must define inspections, testing, main-
tenance, replacements and other procedures for 
controlling operability and the impacts on the 
operating environment.
The operational limits and conditions are sub-
ject to the approval of STUK prior to the com-
missioning of the facility. Strict observance of the 
operational limits and conditions is verified by 
STUK through a regular inspection programme. 
Operational limits and conditions are updated 
based on operational experience, tests, analyses 
and plant modifications.
Established procedures
According to Guide YVL A.3 on management sys-
tems for nuclear facilities, document management 
must cover all procedures required in the operation 
of the facility. The document management proce-
dures must be described as a part of the licensee’s 
management system. These include, among other 
things, the specification, preparation, drawing up, 
review, approval, implementation, revision, dis-
semination, archiving and disposal of documents. 
The responsibilities and administrative procedures 
indicating how to take care of these actions must 
be described in the licensee’s management system. 
The procedures for operation must be approved by 
the licensee itself, and procedures important for 
safety are required to be submitted to STUK for 
review. Detailed requirements are presented in the 
appropriate YVL Guides. STUK verifies that the 
approved procedures are in use and are followed in 
the operation of the facility by means of resident 
inspectors, inspections and reviews.
Engineering and technical support
The staffing, training and qualifications of the per-
sonnel are discussed in general in Section F, Article 
22. STUK Regulation (STUK Y/1/2016) Section 25 
requires that the organization shall have access to 
professional expertise and technical knowledge re-
quired for the safe operation of the plant, the main-
tenance of equipment important to safety and the 
management of accidents.The licensee of a nuclear 
facility has the primary responsibility for ensuring 
that the employees of the facility are qualified and 
authorised to their jobs and that the continuity of 
expertise is secured for the operational lifetime of 
the facility. Guide YVL A.4 specifies the expertise 
requirements for the positions which are impor-
tant for safety. The requirements in Guide YVL A.4 
also cover technical support.
TVO has longstanding expertise in nuclear op-
erations. TVO and Posiva uses external expertise 
regularly when needed in various design and modi-
fication activities. FPH has under corporate struc-
ture own unit for technical support to the Loviisa 
NPP among other projects. There are also on-site 
experts at the Loviisa NPP for various engineering 
and technical support functions.
Fennovoima has presented its latest organisa-
tion development plans with competences to cover 
all engineering tasks during the life-cycle of the 
plant including nuclear waste management in 
the construction licence application submitted to 
MEAE in June 2015.
The competence of the engineering and techni-
cal support is supervised by the licensee. In addi-
tion, STUK carries out inspections by which the 
competence of the support staff is also evaluated.
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Operating experiences, incident 
reports and evaluation
The STUK Regulation (STUK Y/1/2016) requires 
that feedback on operational experience is collect-
ed and safety research results are monitored, and 
both must be assessed for the purpose of enhancing 
safety. Safety-significant operational events must 
be investigated for the purpose of identifying the 
root causes as well as defining and implementing 
the corrective measures. Improvements in techni-
cal safety, resulting from safety research, shall be 
taken into account to the extent justified on the 
basis of the safety principles stated in the Nuclear 
Energy Act Section 7 a.
According to Guide YVL D.3, a spent fuel condi-
tion surveillance programme, subject to STUK’s 
approval, must be drawn up to monitor the effects 
of long-term storage on spent fuel.
Guides YVL A.9 and A.10 provide the reporting 
requirements in detail on incidents, operational 
disturbances, and events which must be reported 
to STUK. They also define requirements for the 
contents of the reports and the administrative 
procedures for reporting, including time limits for 
submitting various reports.
STUK’s Annual Report on nuclear safety sum-
marizes the operational events from the whole 
year and is available to the general public in 
Finnish and in English.
Operational events in spent fuel interim stor-
age facilities have been rare in recent years. Some 
minor events have been reported by the licensee to 
the regulatory body. These events have, for exam-
ple, been events that took place in the construction 
site of the enlargement for interim spent fuel stor-
age in Olkiluoto. Other types of events have been 
those related to complying with administrative 
instructions.
Decommissioning plans
The Nuclear Energy Act (Section 28) describes the 
requirements for the preparation and updating of 
the decommissioning plans. Decommissioning is-
sues are discussed in Chapter F.26.
Article 10 Disposal of spent fuel
If, pursuant to its own legislative and regulatory 
framework, a Contracting Party has designated 
spent fuel for disposal, the disposal of such spent 
fuel shall be in accordance with the obligations of 
Chapter 3 relating to the disposal of radioactive 
waste.
According to the Finnish waste management pol-
icy, spent fuel is regarded as waste and must be 
permanently disposed of in Finland. Therefore, the 
encapsulation and disposal of spent fuel are dis-
cussed in Section H, in the context of the safety of 
radioactive waste management.
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Article 11 General safety requirements
Each Contracting Party shall take the appropri-
ate steps to ensure that at all stages of radioactive 
waste management individuals, society and the 
environment are adequately protected against ra-
diological and other hazards.
In so doing, each Contracting Party shall take 
the appropriate steps to:
(a) ensure that criticality and removal of residual 
heat generated during radioactive waste man-
agement are adequately addressed;
(b) ensure that the generation of radioactive waste 
is kept to the minimum practicable;
(c) take into account interdependencies among the 
different steps in radioactive waste manage-
ment
(d) provide for effective protection of individuals, 
society and the environment, by applying at 
the national level suitable protective methods 
as approved by the regulatory body, in the 
framework of its national legislation which 
has due regard to internationally endorsed 
criteria and standards;
(e) take into account the biological, chemical and 
other hazards that may be associated with ra-
dioactive waste management;
(f) strive to avoid actions that impose reason-
ably predictable impacts on future generations 
greater than those permitted for the current 
generation;
(g) aim to avoid imposing undue burdens on fu-
ture generations.
Scope and general regulations
In this Section, the management of LILW from the 
nuclear facilities and from the research reactor, 
including disposal, the management of non-nuclear 
radioactive waste and plans for spent fuel disposal 
are discussed. The relevant general regulations 
are, the Nuclear Energy Act (990/1987) and Decree 
(161/1988), STUK’s Regulation (Y/4/2016) on the 
safety of the disposal of nuclear waste including 
the disposal of low and intermediate level opera-
tional and decommissioning waste and spent nu-
clear fuel. The STUK regulation Y/1/2016 regulates 
the safe handling and storage of spent nuclear 
fuel in spent nuclear fuel storage facilities and nu-
clear waste handling in nuclear facilities attached 
to a nuclear power plant. More detailed technical 
requirements on the management and safety, in-
cluding disposal, of LILW and spent fuel are given 
in the YVL Guides D.3, D.4 and D.5. Radioactive 
waste subject to the Radiation Act is regulated by 
Guide ST 6.2.
Criticality and removal of residual heat
Regulatory requirements
STUK’s Regulation (Y/4/2016) requires that in the 
handling of spent nuclear fuel, the occurrence of a 
self-sustaining chain reaction of fissions must be 
prevented to a high degree of certainty and that the 
disposal package containing spent nuclear fuel must 
be designed so that no self-sustaining chain reaction 
of fissions can occur, even in the disposal conditions.
Guide YVL D.3 further specifies that subcriti-
cality of spent nuclear fuel must be ensured by 
means of structural design solutions. The transfer 
casks, storage racks and handling equipment as 
well as the disposal canisters must be designed 
so that subcriticality of the fuel is ensured in any 
planned operational conditions, including antici-
pated operational occurrences and postulated ac-
cidents. These requirements are stated in Guide 
YVL D.3 which also refers to the Guide YVL B.4.
In addition, Guide YVL D.5 requires that the 
canisters disposed of in the disposal facility must 
remain subcritical in the long term. The design 
of the spent fuel disposal canisters must also ac-
commodate conditions where the leak-tightness of 
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the container has been lost and the container has 
sustained mechanical or corrosion-induced defor-
mations.
The residual heat generation of spent fuel must 
be considered in the design of the encapsulation 
and disposal facilities. The requirements for the 
cooling of spent fuel during the encapsulation are 
presented in Guide YVL D.3.
Criticality and removal of residual 
heat in encapsulation and disposal 
facility of spent nuclear fuel
Criticality safety
Criticality safety analyses have been performed 
by Posiva in the construction licence application. 
Posiva has confirmed in analyses that the spent 
fuel will remain subcritical when handled, stored 
or disposed of in a disposal canister. Subcriticality 
of spent fuel is ensured by the structural design of 
the fuel drying station and the disposal canister. To 
ensure the subcriticality the design of encapsula-
tion facility prevents water entering the structures 
containing spent fuel. The analyses proved that 
even if structures containing spent fuel were filled 
with water, subcriticality was ensured by taking 
the burnup credit into account.
The subcriticality of spent fuel during trans-
portation will be analysed separately during fuel 
transport cask licensing in early 2020s.
Posiva has analysed the criticality safety of cop-
per/iron canisters and the analyses were provided 
to STUK for review in the construction licence ap-
plication. To prove the subcriticality of the spent 
fuel disposed in canisters, burnup credit has been 
applied in the criticality safety analyses.
In the post-closure criticality safety analyses 
the criticality of the disposal canister must be 
ruled out with very high certainty over the long 
term. In this respect, however, the analyses contain 
extremely conservative assumptions regarding the 
long-term evolution of the disposal canister geom-
etry, indicating that re-criticality of the disposed 
fuel is highly unlikely.
Residual heat removal
Heat transfer analyses for spent fuel in encapsu-
lation was performed by Posiva and the analyses 
were sent to STUK for review in the construc-
tion licence application. The analyses showed that 
spent fuel and the surrounding rooms will remain 
at their design basis temperature even without ac-
tive cooling using a ventilation system. The spent 
nuclear fuel transported to the encapsulation plant 
from the spent fuel interim storages will have been 
cooled in storage pools for a minimum of 20 years.
In the encapsulation plant, the cooling of spent 
fuel is provided by the ventilation system. If the 
ventilation system is not available for long time, 
passive cooling is provided by natural circulation 
by opening the ventilation dampers. In a natural 
circulation mode, the filtering of the ventilated air 
from the encapsulation plant can be provided. The 
residual heat of the spent fuel is also considered 
in the design of disposal canister and surrounding 
bentonite buffer in the disposal facility. The tem-
perature of the canister-bentonite clay interface 
has been analysed and an appropriate safety mar-
gin has been used in the disposal facility dimen-
sioning calculations. The maximum temperature 
of the disposal canister surface should be reached 
within 10 to 15 years after the disposal.
Thermal dimensioning including the detailed 
heat transfer phenomena in the near field of the 
deposition holes and optimisation of the disposal 
facility has been analysed. To ensure the function-
ality of engineered barriers, the minimum distanc-
es between deposition holes and deposition tunnels 
have been defined.
Waste minimization
Regulatory requirements
According to the Nuclear Energy Act (Section 27 
a), the waste produced as a result of the use of 
nuclear energy must be kept as low as reasonable 
by practical means both in terms of its activity 
and the amount of waste. The requirements for 
waste minimization are presented in Guide YVL 
D.4. This guideline emphasizes that the generation 
of waste must be decreased, i.e. by proper planning 
of repair and maintenance work and by means of 
decontamination, clearance and volume reduction 
practices. The Guide also refers to sound working 
methods for waste minimization, e.g. volume re-
duction of waste, avoiding the transfer of unneces-
sary objects and materials in the controlled areas 
and by adoption of working processes which either 
create only small amounts of waste or in which the 
created waste is easily manageable.
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The release of waste from regulatory control 
(clearance) is regulated by Guide YVL D.4. Both 
conditional and unconditional clearances are ef-
fectively used for waste minimization by the NPPs. 
Clearance criteria, levels and procedures are dis-
cussed in Section B.32.1.
According to the Radiation Act (Section 49 a), 
the radioactive waste produced in the use of radia-
tion or in non-nuclear radioactive instances must 
be kept as low as reasonable by practical means.
Waste minimization of LILW in NPP’s
The accumulation of LILW in the Loviisa and the 
Olkiluoto NPPs is depicted in Figure 13. The aver-
age annual accumulation of LILW has been fairly 
low: about 100 m³ per plant (each having two op-
erational reactor units) during 2014–2016. The ac-
cumulation of waste has in some years even been 
reduced by effective waste minimization and vol-
ume reduction measures, such as the radiochemi-
cal treatment of liquid waste, campaigns for re-
moval of very low-level waste from control, and 
compaction of maintenance waste. Large metallic 
waste components have been transported for treat-
ment at the Studsvik facility in Sweden which 
reduces the volume of treated waste significant-
ly. Activation products or parts containing exter-
nal contamination or components that have been 
separated from the metal are transported back to 
Finland for disposal.
In the 1990s FPH, together with the Laboratory 
of Radiochemistry at the University of Helsinki, 
developed sophisticated selective ion exchange 
methods for the purification of liquid waste (espe-
cially the removal of Cs, Sr and Co). The benefits of 
these methods, now in use at the Loviisa NPP, can 
be seen in Figure 12 and also in the decrease of the 
doses to the most exposed persons in the vicinity of 
the Finnish NPPs shown in Figure 11.
TVO has made a modification in both power 
plant units in the condensate polishing system 
to reduce the temperature and thus increase the 
lifetime of pre-coat resins. Consequently, the gen-
eration of spent ion exchange resins has decreased 
considerably.
Disposal containers can be filled more effectively, 
when crushed metal is placed in the unused spaces 
of containers. Surface contaminated metal scrap 
is decontaminated in a new facility by blasting 
with glass marbles. Decontaminated metals are 
released from regulatory control, if activity levels 
below those for clearance are reached. The average 
accumulation of low and intermediate level waste 
at the Olkiluoto NPP (OL1 and OL2) has been 
about 60 m³ per reactor year during the reporting 
period. Part of the metal waste (large components) 
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Figure 12. Accumulation of LILW in Loviisa and Olkiluoto NPPs.
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has been transported for treatment in Sweden.
At the new NPP unit Olkiluoto 3 an in-drum 
drying facility is planned to be used for the con-
ditioning of liquid wastes. The drying facility is 
expected to provide an effective volume reduction. 
This new waste type is planned to be stored in the 
interim at the site before disposal in the Olkiluoto 
LILW disposal facility. An extension of the disposal 
facility for the needs of Olkiluoto 3 reactor unit is 
expected in the 2030s.
Waste minimization in the 
decommissioning of research reactor
During the operation of the research reactor, the 
produced waste amounts have been small, only 
about 6 m³ have been produced since 1962. The 
waste is packed and currently stored in Otaniemi. 
VTT has evaluated that the amount of decommis-
sioning waste will be about 75 m³. VTT is currently 
planning the decommissioning in detail and also 
waste management procedures are under develop-
ment. Waste minimization will be taken into ac-
count by careful planning and implementing ef-
ficient waste sorting and packaging methods and 
also by decontamination and clearance.
Waste minimization of non-
nuclear radioactive wastes
The laboratories using radioactive sources in medi-
cal and research applications usually store their 
short-lived radioactive waste on their premises un-
til it has decayed below the limits set for discharg-
es in Guide ST 6.2. Only small amounts of waste 
need to be conditioned for disposal.
Interdependencies
Regulatory requirements
Guide YVL D.4 on the treatment and storage of 
LILW from NPPs requires that waste is treated, 
e.g. segregated, categorised and conditioned, in an 
appropriate way with regard to its further manage-
ment. The Guide also provides for the considera-
tion of the requirements of waste packages related 
to their disposal. These requirements may concern, 
e.g., the structure of the waste packages, their 
physical and chemical compositions, their resist-
ance to external and internal loads and the amount 
and structural and chemical stability of radioactive 
substances in the waste packages.
Interdependencies in encapsulation 
and the disposal of spent nuclear fuel
Interdependencies in the context of spent fuel 
management are discussed in Chapter G.
Interdependencies in nuclear waste 
management activities in NPP’s
Both operating nuclear power plants have their 
own LILW disposal facilities, thus the premises for 
considering interdependencies in the waste man-
agement chain are excellent. Interdependencies of 
the various steps in waste management are taken 
into account in the NPPs’ Operational Manuals. 
At the Loviisa NPP all the waste treatment, con-
ditioning, handling, storing, transport and disposal 
operations are carried out at the NPP site by the 
operators of the Loviisa NPP. Only the spent nu-
clear fuel will be transported for disposal from 
the Loviisa NPP site to Posiva’s disposal facility 
at Olkiluoto. In case of the Olkiluoto NPP, all the 
waste management steps take place at Olkiluoto. 
The Decision in Principle concerning Fennovoima 
also includes an LILW disposal facility on the NPP 
site. Fennovoima has performed preliminary site 
characterizations for proposed sites and STUK has 
reviewed these results.
Interdependencies in nuclear 
waste management activities in the 
decommissioning of the research reactor
The time schedule for the decommissioning and 
waste management activities of the research re-
actor are planned so that the interdependencies 
between different steps are taken into account. The 
spent fuel will be removed from the reactor before 
the actual dismantling is started. The spent fuel 
will most likely be sent back to the USA according 
to the existing agreement. Decommissioning waste 
is packed at the reactor site and then stored for 20 
30 years before disposal.
The waste produced during the decommission-
ing of the research reactor will be packed in a 
similar way to how the power plants have packed 
their operational waste to ensure that the stor-
age and disposal at NPP sites are possible. VTT 
is currently negotiating the possibility to store 
radioactive wastes in Olkiluoto. The required 
storage time is a few tens of years before disposal. 
The possibility for the disposal of waste at the 
Olkiluoto LILW disposal facility has been very 
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preliminarily discussed with TVO, but there is not 
yet an agreement on this.
Interdependencies in non-nuclear 
radioactive waste management
Non-nuclear radioactive waste is packed into bar-
rels to enable it to be stored in a similar way as the 
operational waste from the nuclear power plants are 
stored. The non-nuclear wasteswaste is currently 
stored on the premises of Suomen Nukliditekniikka 
in Helsinki and in the Government’s storage facility 
inside the Olkiluoto LILW disposal facility. There 
is also an agreement to dispose of these wastes in 
the Olkiluoto LILW disposal facility and the final 
disposal has started in 2016.
Protection of individuals, society 
and the environment
Regulatory requirements
STUK’s Regulation (Y/4/2016) refers to Section 2 
and Chapter 9 of the Radiation Act (592/1991) con-
cerning the radiation exposure of workers and the 
population in the vicinity of a nuclear waste facility.
The disposal facility is a nuclear waste facility 
and Nuclear Energy Decree (161/1988) section 22 d 
is applied regardingto this regarding the maximum 
values for radiation exposure caused to the popula-
tion in the vicinity of a nuclear waste facility due 
to its operation as well as anticipated operational 
occurrences or accidents. The decree requires that 
as a consequence of the normal operation of the fa-
cility, the annual effective dose to the most exposed 
members of the public must remain insignificantly 
low. As a consequence of anticipated operational 
occurrences, the annual effective dose to the most 
exposed members of the public must remain below 
0.1 mSv. As a consequence of a postulated accident, 
the annual effective dose must remain below 1 
mSv. A postulated accident can be assumed to oc-
cur with a frequency of at least 10-3 per year. For 
a postulated accident assumed to occur with a fre-
quency of less than 10-3 per year, the annual dose 
to the most exposed members of the public must 
remain below 5 mSv. Under the design extension 
conditions, the limit of the annual dose to the most 
exposed members of the public is 20 mSv.
The Nuclear Energy Decree (161/1988) requires 
(section 22 d) that the disposal of nuclear waste 
shall be designed and implemented in a manner 
where the radiation exposure caused by nuclear 
waste as a result of its expected evolution will not 
exceed the constraints set in the Nuclear Energy 
Decree. This requires that the annual effective 
dose to the most exposed members of the public 
remains below 0.1 mSv for a period of the first sev-
eral thousand years. The average annual effective 
doses to other members of the public must remain 
insignificantly low.
Beyond that period, the average quantities of 
radioactive substances over long time periods, 
released from the disposed waste and migrating 
further into the environment, must remain below 
the nuclide specific constraints defined by STUK. 
These constraints are given in Guide YVL D.5 as 
limits for annual activity releases into the environ-
ment. They are defined so that, at their maximum, 
the radiation impacts arising from disposal are 
comparable to those arising from natural radioac-
tive substances and on a large scale; the radiation 
impacts remain insignificantly low.
STUK Regulation Y/4/2016 states that the ra-
diation exposure caused by rare events impairing 
long-term safety must be assessed neverwhenever 
possible. The probability of events causing signifi-
cant radiation exposure must be very low, and the 
widespread impacts of the release of radioactive 
substances caused by them must also be low.
In addition, Guide YVL D.5 pays attention to 
the protection of living nature requiring that the 
disposal of nuclear waste must not detrimentally 
affect any species of fauna or flora. This must be 
demonstrated in the safety assessment by consid-
ering typical radiation exposures of terrestrial and 
aquatic populations in the disposal site environ-
ment, assuming the present time kinds of living 
populations. These exposures must remain clearly 
below the levels which, on the basis of the best 
available scientific knowledge, would cause a de-
cline in biodiversity or other significant detriment 
to any living population of fauna or flora.
Protection of individuals, the society and 
the environment in spent fuel management
The design of Posiva’s nuclear waste facilities takes 
account of limiting the radiation doses received by 
the personnel, population and the environment by 
all practical means. Fuel handling is designed so 
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that the releases of radioactive substances in the 
facilities and their spread to the environment is 
limited as far as possible. The radiation exposure 
of the personnel is reduced by implementing the 
handling of spent fuel and the disposal canisters 
via remote control.
The radioactive releases and potential radiation 
doses to humans, plants and animals during the 
operation of the encapsulation plant and disposal 
facility have been analysed in the Preliminary 
Safety Analysis Report (PSAR). The PSAR was a 
part of the construction licence application docu-
mentation. The radioactive releases and possible 
radiation doses have been analysed for normal op-
erations, operational occurrences and for accident 
conditions.
The handling of fuel bundles that contain a 
leaking fuel pin has been considered in the de-
sign of the encapsulation plant. The handling of 
fuel bundles is performed in a hot cell, which is 
designed to limit the release of radioactive sub-
stances inside the encapsulation plant and further 
into the environment. The limitation of radiation is 
based on the structures and leak tightness of the 
hot cell. Additionally, the air conditioning of the 
hot cell is provided with filtering for radioactive 
substances.
The limiting operational occurrences that may 
occur include the mishandling of a fuel bundle fol-
lowed by a possible radioactive release from broken 
fuel pins. These releases are assumed to occur in 
the hot cell or in controlled area of the encapsula-
tion plant. Both of these are equipped with filtered 
air-conditioning.
The limiting accident conditions include the 
dropping of a fuel bundle in the hot cell or the 
dropping of a disposal canister in the canister lift 
shaft. In both conditions, the filtration of the hot 
cell air-conditioning or the filtration of the con-
trolled area air conditioning would limit possible 
radioactive releases.
The analysed radiation dose for the operational 
occurrence is 2·10-5 mSv, which is the equivalent 
of a dose from normal ingestion for one year. This 
dose is far below the limit of 0.1 mSv specified in 
the regulations. For the worst-case accident condi-
tion, the radiation dose was analysed to be 0…01 
mSv, which is below the limit of 1 mSv specified in 
the regulations.
Protection of individuals, the society and 
the environment in LILW management
According to the Nuclear Energy Decree section 22 
d the average annual dose to the most exposed in-
dividuals of the population arising from the normal 
use of the LILW facility must be insignificantly low.
The radioactive releases and possible radiation 
doses to humans, plants and animals during the 
operation of LILW repositories are analysed in the 
Final Safety Analysis Reports (FSAR). The FSAR 
is a part of the original operation licencelicence 
application documentation and the report has been 
kept up-to-date since. The radioactive releases and 
possible radiation doses are analysed for normal 
operation, operational occurrences and in accident 
conditions. The analysed operational occurrences 
included, e.g., failures during the lifting of waste 
packages, failures in the groundwater pumping 
system or ventilation and power supply failures. 
The analysed accidents included, e.g., fires, earth-
quakes, flooding, intentional damage and traffic 
accidents during transportation.
During normal operation, the doses of workers 
are clearly below the limits set in the regulations. 
The possibility of operational occurrences and ac-
cidents that might affect radiation safety were 
deemed to be very unlikely in LILW repositories 
after analyses. The doses to the most exposed indi-
viduals were analysed for operational occurrences 
and accidents and with a high degree of certainty 
the exposures would be below the annual dose lim-
its set for individuals. Under accident conditions, 
the annual doses of the workers would also remain 
below the annual dose limits set in the regulations 
with the proper education and instructions for 
workers and protective clothing and equipment.
The total discharges from Finnish NPPs have 
been very low and the total annual calculated ra-
diation doses of the most exposed individual in the 
vicinity of both NPPs was less than 0.1 % of the 
limit of 100 micro Sieverts that is established in 
the Nuclear Energy Degree. The discharges from 
waste management activities are very small com-
pared to the total releases from NPPs and so are 
the annual doses to the most exposed individuals 
of the population.
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Protection of individuals, the society and 
the environment in decommissioning 
of the research reactor
According to the operational limits and conditions 
of the research reactor FiR 1, the radioactive dis-
charges into the air and water during operation 
will not be more than one tenth of the limits set 
for NPPs. In 2012 radioactive releases from the re-
search reactor into the air were 0…21 TBq. Yearly 
releases into the air have at maximum been 17% 
of the release limit (3…7 TBq Ar-41 per year) set 
by STUK for the operation of the research reactor.
During the dismantling of the reactor and 
concrete structures, small amounts of radioactive 
substances (e.g. Co-60) may be released into the 
reactor building. The spread of the radioactiv-
ity will be prevented by choosing methods that 
prevent dust and particle formation. Additionally, 
some radioactivity (e.g. gaseous xenon and kryp-
ton) may be released into the reactor building dur-
ing the handling of the damaged fuel assemblies. 
During dismantling, the reactor building will be 
kept under-pressurized, which efficiently prevents 
releases from the building. The ventilation system 
will be equipped with continuous radioactivity 
monitoring, and if needed, the air can be filtered 
before releasing it from the reactor building. All 
water produced during decommissioning will be 
collected into tanks and will not be released until 
it has been measured and found to be clean from 
radioactivity.
Protection of individuals, the society 
and the environment in non-nuclear 
radioactive waste management
According to Section 49a of the Radiation Act 
(592/1991), the amount of radioactive waste gen-
erated by the use of radiation and other radia-
tion practices must be kept as low as reasonably 
achievable without endangering the implementa-
tion of the general provisions of Section 2 (justifica-
tion, optimization, limitation).
The radiation doses received from non-nuclear 
radioactive waste are very low. The dose received 
from the use of unsealed sources must be under 
10 µSv per year for a representative person. The 
dose limits and activity limits for discharges are 
given in the guide ST 6.2 Radioactive waste and 
emissions from the use of unsealed sources.
Disused radioactive sources are stored in the 
Government waste facility in connection to the 
Olkiluoto LILW disposal facility and are disposed 
of in the same way as nuclear waste according to 
the operating licence of the Olkiluoto LILW dis-
posal facility.
Biological, chemical and other hazards
Regulatory requirements
According the Act on the Environmental Impact 
Assessment procedure (EIA) (252/2017), the en-
vironmental impacts must already be evaluated 
in the planning and decision-making phase of the 
project. The other important aim of the EIA proce-
dure is to increase the information available about 
the project to citizens and provide the opportu-
nity to participate in the project planning phase. 
During the EIA-procedure, all types of environ-
mental impacts (e.g. noise, dust, traffic, releases to 
air and water etc.) of the project are investigated 
and evaluated. In nuclear facility projects, other 
hazards than those posed by radiation are also con-
sidered during the EIA procedure.
Biological, chemical and other 
hazards in spent fuel management
During the construction and operation of the dis-
posal facility for spent nuclear fuel small amounts 
of hazardous waste, such as waste oil, solvents and 
batteries will be generated. Hazardous waste is 
collected and sent to a hazardous waste treatment 
plant.
The disposal concept for spent nuclear fuel does 
not include any hazardous or harmful materials 
except nuclear waste. The outer shell of the dispos-
al container is made from copper, but the release of 
copper from the disposal facility is limited by the 
slow corrosion rate of copper.
Biological, chemical and other hazards 
in LILW management in NPPs
Disposed LILW consists of the NPP’s trash waste, 
scrap metal, filter elements and liquids and sludge. 
These materials and their immobilisation matrices 
are not harmful to the environment as such, but may 
contain harmful residues, such as heavy metals.
Some studies on radioactive nickel releases 
from the disposal facility have been carried out in 
Finland. The results show that the potential an-
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nual releases are small. In the same way, it can 
be argued that the release rate of chromium and 
poorly soluble lead and cadmium will also be small. 
The chemical effects of the Swedish LILW disposal 
facility (SFR) in Forsmark have been studied more 
thoroughly. SFR and the Finnish LILW facilities 
are similar regarding the structure and the type 
and the content of the disposed waste. The Swedish 
studies indicate that the increase of heavy metal 
concentrations in seawater would be negligible, 
mostly owing to the release barriers at the disposal 
facility.
When the waste is isolated properly, the dis-
charges to the environment are small, when com-
pared to other forms of industry or other sources of 
hazardous waste. At least as long as the engineered 
barriers isolate the radioactive waste, other harm-
ful substances are effectively isolated from the 
environment. Furthermore, the LILW repositories 
are located in areas which do not presently contain 
exploitable groundwater reserves for communities.
Biological, chemical and other hazards in 
decommissioning of research reactor
The reactor building was constructed in 1950s 
when it was quite common to use asbestos, e.g. 
in fire shielding, pipe insulation, tiles and in mor-
tar. In addition to asbestos, many other materials 
hazardous to health were used until the 1980s. In 
the 1990s the reactor building was renovated and 
materials containing asbestos, for example, were 
removed. There may still be some old plastic tiles 
and tile glue left in the building, which will be 
investigated for asbestos and other harmful mate-
rials before dismantling. If asbestos or other harm-
fully materials are found, they will be handled and 
disposed of according to current legislation before 
dismantling the reactor is started.
The research reactor still contains some chemi-
cals used in the research. These are planned to be 
packed and disposed of duly before dismantling 
starts.
Biological, chemical and other hazards in 
non-nuclear radioactive waste management
Biological, chemical and other hazards may be 
related to some waste arising from medical and 
research applications. The requirements of the rel-
evant non-radiation related regulations, including 
those related to general occupational health, are 
applied in these cases as appropriate.
Protection of future generations 
and avoidance of undue burdens 
on future generations
Regulatory requirements
Section 7 h of the Nuclear Energy Act states that 
nuclear waste must be managed so that no radia-
tion exposure will occur after disposal that would 
exceed the levels considered acceptable during the 
implementation of the disposal.
The Nuclear Energy Act (Section 7 h) requires 
that the disposal of nuclear waste in a permanent 
manner is planned with due regard to safety and 
that ensuring long-term safety does not depend on 
the surveillance of the disposal site. Section 8 of 
STUK Regulation Y/4/2016 adds that planning of 
the construction, operation and closure of a dispos-
al facility must account for the reduction of the ac-
tivity of nuclear waste through interim storage, the 
utilisation of high-quality technology and research 
data, and the need to develop an understanding 
of the performance of the barriers and long-term 
safety through investigations and monitoring.
Section 30 of STUK Regulation Y/4/2016 states 
that the long-term disposal safety must be based on 
long-term safety functions achieved through mutu-
ally complementary barriers so that the degrada-
tion of one or more long-term safety functions or a 
foreseeable change in the bedrock or climate would 
not jeopardise the long-term safety.
The Nuclear Energy Act (Section 9) requires 
that a licensee whose operations generate or have 
generated nuclear waste must be responsible for all 
nuclear waste management measures and their ap-
propriate preparation, as well as for their costs (See 
Section B, Article 32: Costs and funding).
Spent nuclear fuel
Preparations for spent fuel disposal have pro-
gressed in accordance with the objectives set by 
the Government Decision in 1983.
Radiation protection of the public is discussed 
earlier in “Protection of individuals, the society and 
the environment”. The same principles protect fu-
ture generations from the unwanted consequences 
of nuclear waste disposal.
The costs of the disposal of spent fuel are cov-
ered by assets collected in the Nuclear Waste 
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Management Fund. The obligation for financial 
provision starts when the MEAE grants a licence 
for operations that produce nuclear waste.
LILW
The Finnish nuclear waste management policy is 
based on the ethical principle of avoiding transfer-
ring undue burdens to future generations. Disposal 
facilities for LILW are operational at both existing 
NPP sites and are planned to also host decommis-
sioning waste.
The costs of the disposal of LILW are covered by 
assets collected in the Nuclear Waste Management 
Fund (See Section B, Article 32: Costs and funding).
Decommissioning of the research reactor
The decommissioning planning of the research re-
actor started immediately after the decision to end 
its operation was made by VTT in spring 2012. The 
aim is to decommission the research reactor as 
soon as VTT has the technical and organizational 
readiness for the work and the required licence for 
decommissioning is granted by the Government. 
The decommissioning will beperformed under the 
supervision of the personnel who have been operat-
ing the reactor and who have the best knowledge 
of the facility.
The future waste management and disposal 
costs of the FiR 1 research reactor are covered by 
assets collected in the Nuclear Waste Management 
Fund (See Section B, Article 32: Costs and funding).
Non-nuclear radioactive waste
In 2012 TVO was granted a renewed operating li-
cence for the Olkiluoto LILW disposal facility that 
also includes the disposal of Government owned 
non-nuclear radioactive waste. Active institutional 
controls are not needed to ensure the safety of 
these disposal facilities in the post-closure period.
Article 12 Existing facilities and 
past practices
Each Contracting Party shall in due course take the 
appropriate steps to review:
(a) the safety of any radioactive waste manage-
ment facility existing at the time the Conven-
tion enters into force for that Contracting Party 
and to ensure that, if necessary, all reasonably 
practicable improvements are made to up-
grade the safety of such a facility;
(b) the results of past practices in order to de-
termine whether any intervention is needed 
for reasons of radiation protection bearing in 
mind that the reduction in detriment resulting 
from the reduction in dose should be sufficient 
to justify the harm and the costs, including the 
social costs, of the intervention..
Existing facilities
Regulatory requirements
According to the Nuclear Energy Act (Section 7 
a), the safety regarding the use of nuclear energy 
must be maintained at as high a level as practical-
ly possible. For the further development of safety, 
measures must be implemented that can be con-
sidered justified considering operating experience, 
safety research and advances in science and tech-
nology. In practice, this means that the existing 
facilities need to be improved based on the latest 
operational experience from Finland and abroad, 
and the latest technical developments should also 
be taken into account.
Existing facilities for spent fuel management
There is not yet any existing facility for spent 
fuel management. The construction licence for the 
spent fuel disposal facility was granted to Posiva at 
the end of November 2015 and the construction of 
the facility started in December 2016.
Existing facilities for LILW management
The predisposal management facilities for low and 
intermediate level radioactive waste at the Loviisa 
and the Olkiluoto NPPs are covered by the respec-
tive operating licences for the reactors. The LILW 
disposal facilities have separate operating licences 
both in Olkiluoto and in Loviisa. The requirements 
for their safety review are described in Chapter 
G and the conclusions drawn are valid for LILW 
management as well.
Thorough assessments of the safety of the facili-
ties were carried out by the licensees and reviewed 
by STUK in connection with the construction and 
operating licence applications. A periodic safety 
review of the LILW disposal facilities is made at 
15 year intervals. The Olkiluoto LILW disposal 
facility started operation in 1992 and consequently 
its safety assessment was submitted for review in 
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2007. In the same context, the suitability of the 
waste packages from the Olkiluoto 3 NPP unit 
for disposal in the facility were evaluated. The 
operating licence granted in 1992 covered the dis-
posal of operational waste from Olkiluoto 1 and 
2. The amendment of the operating licence of the 
Olkiluoto LLIW disposal facility approved by the 
Government in November 2012 also covers OL3 
and State owned non-nuclear radioactive waste 
stored in underground facilities in Olkiluoto.
The LLW disposal halls of the Loviisa LILW 
disposal facility started operation in 1998. The 
construction of the ILW disposal cavern was com-
pleted in 2007 and the FSAR of the facility was 
accordingly updated and reviewed by STUK. 
Correspondingly, the safety related documenta-
tion for the construction of the connecting tunnel 
and the third LLW disposal hall, was reviewed 
by STUK in 2010. FPH submitted its periodic 
safety review of the LILW facility to STUK in 
2013. STUK’s safety review and decision dated 15 
December 2014 stated that the safety level of the 
Loviisa low- and intermediate-level operational 
waste disposal facility is good in terms of opera-
tional safety and long-term safety, and that the 
licensee had implemented the procedures needed 
to continue its safe operation.
In conclusion, the safety reviews regarding the 
predisposal management of LILW at NPPs and the 
research reactor required by Article 12 were car-
ried out at the time of licensing, the safety analysis 
reports are continuously up-to-date. In addition, 
periodical safety reviews are made. Safety im-
provements have been continuously implemented 
at the Loviisa and the Olkiluoto plants, including 
the facilities for waste management, since their 
commissioning.
Existing facilities for decommissioning 
the research reactor
The predisposal management facilities for low and 
intermediate level radioactive waste in the FiR 
1 research reactor are covered by the operating 
licences of the respective NPP reactors. For the 
decommissioning, VTT has dupdated its radioac-
tive waste management plan and submitted it to 
STUK for approval as part of the operating licence 
application for decommissioning submitted to the 
Government in June 2017.
Existing facilities for non-nuclear 
radioactive waste management
Non-nuclear radioactive waste, e.g. from research, 
industry and hospitals is stored at existing facili-
ties in the Suomen Nukliditekniikka storage facil-
ity in Helsinki and in the Olkiluoto LILW disposal 
facility.
Outokumpu Stainless is a steel manufacturer 
in northern Finland. The company receives scrap 
metal as a raw material for its production. On av-
erage once a year the company accidentally melts 
an Am-241-source. The nuclide is almost impos-
sible to detect with radiation ports due to its low 
gamma energy. The company has radiation moni-
tors for its end product and slag, as well and this 
is how Am-241 is detected. The low-level contami-
nated slag is stored by the company and finally the 
slag is sited at an industrial dumping ground for 
disposal according plans approved by STUK.
Terrafame Oy (formerly Talvivaara Sotkamo 
Oy) operates a nickel and zinc mine in Sotkamo. 
The ore in the mine contains small amounts of 
uranium which is extracted from the ore in the 
mine’s bioheap leaching process. Uranium is not 
recovered in the metal production process of the 
mine, but is recirculated in the process and is fi-
nally precipitated in waste gypsum ponds. At the 
end of 2016 the amount of uranium in the gypsum 
pond is estimated to be 400–500 tonnes. The mine 
had gypsum waste pond leakages in 2012 and 
2013, resulting in contamination of small nearby 
lakes with sulphide and heavy metals. The amount 
of released uranium outside the mining area was 
estimated to be relatively small and amounting to 
about 500–1000 kg. Environmental remediation of 
the lakes is being planned. As this waste does not 
originate from the nuclear fuel cycle and it con-
tains only naturally occurring radioactive materi-
als (NORM), this convention does not apply to it.
Article 13 Siting of proposed facilities
Each Contracting Party shall take the appropriate 
steps to ensure that procedures are established and 
implemented for a proposed radioactive waste man-
agement facility:
(a) to evaluate all relevant site-related factors 
likely to affect the safety of such a facility dur-
ing its operating lifetime as well as that of a 
disposal facility after closure;
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(b) to evaluate the likely safety impact of such a 
facility on individuals, society and the environ-
ment, taking into account possible evolution of 
the site conditions of disposal facilities after 
closure;
(c) to make information on the safety of such a 
facility available to members of the public;
(d) to consult Contracting Parties in the vicinity 
of such a facility, insofar as they are likely to 
be affected by that facility, and provide them, 
upon their request, with general data relating 
to the facility to enable them to evaluate the 
likely safety impact of the facility upon their 
territory.
In so doing, each Contracting Party shall take the 
appropriate steps to ensure that such facilities shall 
not have unacceptable effects on other Contracting 
Parties by being sited in accordance with the gen-
eral safety requirements of Article 11.
Regulatory requirements
The description of siting procedures, provided un-
der Article 6 (Chapters G.6.1–G.6.4) for NPPs (in-
cluding spent fuel storage facilities), is also ap-
plicable for facilities intended for the predisposal 
management of LILW at the NPPs and for the 
disposal of LILW or spent fuel, and is not repeated 
here.
Concerning the siting of a disposal facility for 
spent nuclear fuel, STUK Regulation Y/4/2016 
Section 12 includes the statement: the effect of local 
conditions on operational safety and the feasibility 
to implement the arrangements for security and 
emergency preparedness shall be considered when 
selecting the site of a nuclear waste facility. The 
site shall be such that the detriments and threats 
posed by the facility to its vicinity remain very low. 
Section 31 states that the host rock at the disposal 
site must, as a whole, be favourable to the isolation 
of radioactive substances from the living environ-
ment. Any area with a feature that is substantially 
adverse to long-term safety must not be selected as 
the disposal site.
Guide YVL D.5 specifies the generic site suit-
ability criteria.
Siting of nuclear and non-nuclear 
radioactive waste management facilities
Disposal facility for spent nuclear fuel
Spent fuel disposal facility site investigations at 
the Olkiluoto site have been going on since the ear-
ly 1980s. These have included many investigations 
of the air, surface and bedrock, and finally they in-
cluded in situ investigations in the bedrock at the 
disposal depth at the ONKALO underground rock 
characterization facility to confirm the suitability 
of the bedrock for disposal.
In the context of the Decision-in-Principle pro-
cess in 1999 2001 for TVO’s and FPH’s spent 
nuclear fuel disposal, Olkiluoto was selected as the 
site for a spent nuclear fuel disposal facility. Based 
on the Decision-in-Principle, the project received 
permission to proceed with the construction of 
the underground rock characterisation facility and 
the more detailed site-specific studies. Knowledge 
of the site has increased significantly since the 
Decision-in-Principle stage. At the end of 2012 
Posiva submitted a construction licence applica-
tion for a spent fuel encapsulation and disposal 
facility. The licence application documentation also 
addresses the site related analysis concerning, for 
example, the design of facilities and the suitability 
of the disposal facility host rock. The studies of 
the disposal site and the analyses of the evolution 
scenarios of the site reaching far into the future 
are sufficient for the construction licence, and they 
have not introduced any matters which would not 
be favourable for the post-closure safety of the 
selected disposal site. Based on the studies and 
analyses, the conclusion can be drawn that the 
bedrock’s characteristics are suitable for imple-
menting the disposal as proposed.
Concerning the siting, design, construction and 
assessment of safety, the details of the regulatory 
approach to Posiva’s spent fuel disposal project in 
Olkiluoto are described in Annex L.2.
The condition of the DiP on the NPP for 
Fennovoima required that it should have a co-
operation agreement with shareholders of Posiva 
for spent fuel disposal in the Olkiluoto disposal 
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facility or alternatively an EIA programme for 
a separate disposal facility should be submitted 
within six years from the date of the DiP ratifica-
tion (2010) by Parliament. Fennovoima submitted 
an EIA programme for the disposal facility to the 
MEAE in June 2016. The EIA programme contains 
both environmental studies and geological inves-
tigations to confirm the suitability of the sites for 
spent fuel disposal. The investigation phase will 
last about 20 years, based on current estimates. 
Fennovoima is aiming to select the site for final 
disposal in the 2040s at the earliest. At the same 
time, Fennovoima signed a contract with Posiva 
Solutions Oy about the use of Posiva’s competence 
in developing a spent fuel disposal solution for 
Fennovoima.
LILW disposal facilities
In Finland, the siting decisions for the LILW re-
positories at the NPP sites were made in 1983. The 
Decision-in-Principle for Fennovoima Oy’s NPP in 
2010 also includes an LILW disposal facility at the 
NPP site.
Waste management facilities 
for decommissioning waste 
from the research reactor
VTT is negotiating with TVO about the possibility 
to store their decommissioning waste in Olkiluoto 
for the next few tens of years. VTT also plans to ne-
gotiate a contract on the disposal of decommission-
ing waste with TVO. If these negotiations result 
in an agreement, a separate site for the storage or 
disposal facilities for the decommissioning wastes 
from the FiR 1 reactor will not be required, but 
licensing for the suitability of the existing facilities 
for the decommissioning waste of VTT is required.
Waste management facilities for 
non-nuclear radioactive waste
Currently, non-nuclear radioactive waste is stored 
in Helsinki at the Suomen Nukliditekniikka stor-
age facility and in Olkiluoto. Additionally, the dis-
posal of State owned non-nuclear waste has start-
ed in Olkiluoto. Therefore a siting is currently no 
longer an issue.
Article 14 Design and construction 
of facilities
Each Contracting Party shall take the appropriate 
steps to ensure that:
(a) the design and construction of a radioactive 
waste management facility provide for suit-
able measures to limit possible radiological 
impacts on individuals, society and the envi-
ronment, including those from discharges or 
uncontrolled releases;
(b) at the design stage, conceptual plans and, as 
necessary, technical provisions for the decom-
missioning of a radioactive waste management 
facility other than a disposal facility are taken 
into account;
(c) at the design stage, technical provisions for the 
closure of a disposal facility are prepared; the 
technologies incorporated in the design and 
construction of a radioactive waste manage-
ment facility are supported by experience, test-
ing or analysis.
Regulatory requirements
The discussion under Article 7 (Chapter G) is rel-
evant for the predisposal management facilities for 
LILW, which are covered by the operating licences 
of the NPPs and STUK Regulation Y/1/2016.
Safety requirements for the spent fuel encap-
sulation facility, which is planned to be situated in 
connection with the spent fuel disposal facility, are 
described in STUK Regulation Y/4/2016. Guides 
YVL A.5, YVL B.1 and YVL D.3 provide detailed 
safety requirements for the encapsulation facility 
design and construction.
The design requirements for LILW and spent 
fuel disposal facilities and the measures to limit 
radiological impacts from these facilities are dis-
cussed in Chapter G. An illustration for the dis-
posal facility of spent fuel at Olkiluoto is shown in 
Figure 5. The design of Loviisa and Olkiluoto LILW 
disposal facilities are illustrated in Figures 6 and 
7, respectively.
According to section 8 of STUK Regulation 
Y/4/2016, disposal must be implemented in stages, 
with particular attention paid to aspects affecting 
long-term safety. The planning of the construc-
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tion, operation and closure of a disposal facility 
must account for the reduction of the activity of 
nuclear waste through interim storage, the utilisa-
tion of high-quality technology and research data, 
and the need to develop an understanding of the 
performance of the barriers and long-term safety 
through investigations and monitoring.
More detailed requirements on the design prin-
ciples are given in Guide YVL D.5.
Design and construction of disposal 
facility for spent nuclear fuel
In connection with the construction licence ap-
plication, Posiva delivered a Preliminary Safety 
Analysis Report (PSAR), which described the de-
sign bases of the disposal facility at a sufficient 
level. Based on the design documentation, it can 
be stated that the facility can be implemented in 
a way that makes it possible to fulfil the safety 
requirements that were originally laid down in 
Government Decree 736/2008, which has now been 
replaced by STUK Requirement Y/4/2016 in 2016.
Posiva has submitted a sufficient description 
of the decommissioning of the encapsulation plant 
for the construction licence and has taken decom-
missioning into account in the facility’s design 
requirements. In the construction licence applica-
tion documentation, Posiva has presented the prin-
ciples of closure in a way that is sufficient for the 
construction licence and has planned the closure 
to be implemented in such a way that the bedrock 
maintains the characteristics important to post-
closure safety as effectively as possible.
Conceptual plans for the closure of the dis-
posal facilities have been included in their initial 
designs (e.g. the PSAR designs of the LILW re-
positories and the construction licence application 
documentation of the spent fuel disposal facility in 
Olkiluoto). These closure plans will be reconsidered 
in the context of later licensing stages or periodic 
safety assessments.
Concerning siting, design, construction and as-
sessment of safety, a more detailed description 
of the regulatory approach to Posiva’s spent fuel 
disposal project in Olkiluoto is presented in Annex 
L.2.
Article 15 Assessment of safety 
of facilities
Each Contracting Party shall take the appropriate 
steps to ensure that:
(a) before construction of a radioactive waste 
management facility, a systematic safety as-
sessment and an environmental assessment 
appropriate to the hazard presented by the fa-
cility and covering its operating lifetime shall 
be carried out;
(b) in addition, before construction of a disposal 
facility, a systematic safety assessment and an 
environmental assessment for the period fol-
lowing closure shall be carried out and the re-
sults evaluated against the criteria established 
by the regulatory body;
(c) before the operation of a radioactive waste 
management facility, updated and detailed 
versions of the safety assessment and of the 
environmental assessment shall be prepared 
when deemed necessary to complement the as-
sessments referred to in paragraph (a).
Regulatory requirements
Regarding the disposal of spent fuel and LILW, 
compliance with long-term radiation protection 
objectives as well as the suitability of the dis-
posal concept and site must, according to STUK’s 
Regulation (STUK Y/4/2016), be justified by means 
of compliance with the long-term radiation pro-
tection objectives. Equally the suitability of the 
disposal concept and site must be justified through 
a safety case that addresses both the expected evo-
lutions and unlikely disruptive events possibly im-
pairing part of the multi-barrier long-term safety 
features. The requirements and analysis related 
to the operational safety of the waste management 
facilities are presented in Article 11.
According to Guide YVL D.5 a safety analysis 
must include:
•	 a	 description	 of	 the	 disposal	 system	 and	 the	
definition of barriers and safety functions;
•	 the	specification	of	performance	targets	for	the	
safety functions;
•	 a	definition	of	the	scenarios	(scenario	analysis);
•	 a	functional	description	of	the	disposal	system	
and a description of the conditions prevailing 
at the disposal site by means of conceptual and 
mathematical modelling, and the determination 
of necessary model parameters;
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•	 an	 analysis	 of	 the	 quantities	 of	 radioactive	
substances that could be released from the dis-
posed waste, penetrate the barriers and enter 
the biosphere, and an analysis of the resulting 
radiation doses;
•	 whenever	possible,	an	estimation	of	the	proba-
bilities for activity releases and radiation doses 
arising from unlikely events impairing long-
term safety;
•	 uncertainty	and	 sensitivity	analyses	and	 com-
plementary qualitative considerations; and
•	 a	 comparison	 of	 the	 outcome	 of	 the	 analyses	
against the safety requirements.
The licensee shall carry out a periodic safety re-
view for the disposal of nuclear waste at least once 
every 15 years, unless otherwise stated in the con-
ditions of the operating licence. The periodic safety 
review must be conducted in compliance with the 
requirements of Guide YVL A.1, Regulatory control 
of the use of nuclear energy, where applicable.
Detailed requirements for the contents of the 
post-closure safety case are provided in Guide YVL 
D.5 Annex A. The post-closure safety case must 
include a description of the disposal system: quan-
tities of radioactive substances; waste packages; 
buffer materials; backfill materials; structures for 
isolation and closure; excavated rooms; the geologi-
cal, hydrogeological, hydrochemical, thermal and 
rock mechanical characteristics of the host rock; 
and the natural environment at the disposal site. 
The post-closure safety case shall define the safety 
concept, barriers and safety functions together 
with their performance targets.
The discussion under Article 8 on the safety as-
sessment of spent fuel interim storage is valid for 
the predisposal management of LILW because both 
activities are covered by the operating licences 
of the reactor units at the present NPPs and by 
STUK’s Regulation (Y/1/2016).
The predisposal management of waste subject 
to the Radiation Act generally involves operations 
which may not cause any extensive hazards: han-
dling of sealed sources, segregation and packaging 
of small amounts of LLW. Thus, no comprehensive 
safety or Environmental Impact Assessments are 
needed, but the safety of the required operations 
needsneeds to be evaluated in the context of the 
licensing process.
Implementation
Safety assessments performed for 
disposal of spent nuclear fuel
Concerning post-closure safety, Posiva updated the 
safety assessment work presented in the Decision-
in-Principle for the construction licence application 
for the Olkiluoto encapsulation plant and disposal 
facility in 2012. A framework for the development 
of the post-closure safety case was first reported 
in 2005 and updated in 2008. Posiva developed 
the safety case portfolio to meet the regulatory 
requirements and to show the safety assessment 
methodology. Posiva submitted the construction li-
cence application at the end of 2012.
During 2013–2015 STUK carried out an over-
all assessment of the post-closure Safety Case 
(TURVA 2012) submitted to STUK in connection 
with filing the application for a construction li-
cence, establishing the sufficiency and adequacy of 
the information provided, and issuing a decision on 
accepting the document for a more detailed review 
process. Based on STUK’s review and assessment 
of the safety case documentation, the post-closure 
safety of the facility has been analysed sufficiently 
for the purposes of the construction licence. The 
results demonstrated that, after the closure, the 
facility would be safe to people and other living 
nature in the surroundings as was required by 
the Government Decree (736/2008) on the safety 
of disposal of nuclear waste. Furthermore, Posiva 
has indicated the suitability of the disposal method 
and disposal site in a sufficient manner for the pur-
poses of the construction licence stage. The review 
showed, however, that there is a need to further 
improve the post-closure safety case by clarifying 
the safety arguments and the related methods and 
by reducing the uncertainties concerning the per-
formance of barriers. Posiva has prepared a plan to 
produce a post-closure Safety Case (TURVA 2020) 
in support of the operating clicence application. 
The present post-closure safety case plan is based 
on the following:
•	 Follow-up	 of	 further	 developments	 of	 STUK’s	
regulations on the safe use of nuclear energy 
and safety of nuclear waste management and 
disposal
•	 STUK’s	 official	 feedback	 on	 the	 post-closure	
safety case presented in 2012
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•	 Lessons	 learned	 from	 the	 post-closure	 safety	
case work
•	 Recommendations	and	guidelines	on	the	meth-
odology for the development of post-closure 
safety by international bodies.
STUK has implemented a regulatory inspection 
programme for the oversight of the construction 
of the encapsulation plant and disposal facility, 
feasibility of the disposal concept and post-closure 
safety case development. These activities are de-
scribed in more detail in Annex L.2.
Safety assessments performed 
for LILW repositories
On 21 September 2011, TVO submitted an applica-
tion to the Government for an amendment to the 
operating licence of the LILW disposal facility to 
allow the disposal of low and intermediate level 
nuclear waste also from the Olkiluoto 3 plant unit 
and the disposal of radioactive sources created by 
the use of radiation. According to the Radiation 
Act and the Radiation Decree, such waste is the 
responsibility of the State and the practical man-
agement of these wastes is carried out by STUK.
STUK prepared a safety assessment for the 
modification of the operating licence for the LILW 
disposal facility in Olkiluoto and used the assess-
ment as the basis for a favourable statement issued 
to the MEAE on 28 June 2012 on the modification 
of the operating licence conditions of the Olkiluoto 
LILW disposal facility. The Government made a de-
cision on the modification of the operating licence 
conditions of the Olkiluoto LILW disposal facility 
on 22 November 2012.
The operational waste (LILW) generated during 
the operation of the Loviisa NPP is disposed of into 
geological disposal facility located in the immedi-
ate vicinity of the NPP. The Government granted 
Fortum permission to use the LILW disposal facil-
ity until 31 December 2055 in April 1998. Fortum 
submitted the first periodic safety review of the 
LILW disposal facility to STUK for approval on 
December 2013. The update of the safety review 
must be submitted to STUK for approval after 
every 15 years.
STUK’s safety review and decision dated 15 
December 2014 stated that the safety level of the 
Loviisa low- and intermediate-level operational 
waste disposal facility is good in terms of opera-
tional safety and long-term safety, and that the 
licensee has implemented the procedures needed 
to continue safe operation. STUK approved the 
periodic safety review of the Loviisa low- and in-
termediate level operational waste disposal facility 
carried out by Fortum.
Safety assessment performed for 
decommissioning of research reactor
The safety of the FiR 1 research reactor was re-
viewed in the context of the renewal of its operat-
ing licence in 2011. The present licence is valid un-
til the end of 2023. During the presently on-going 
licensing efforts for the decommissioning phase, 
the safety of the research reactor will be reviewed 
focusing on the safety of the decommissioning in 
particular.
Article 16 Operation of facilities
Each Contracting Party shall take the appropriate 
steps to ensure that:
(a) the licence to operate a radioactive waste man-
agement facility is based upon appropriate as-
sessments as specified in Article 15 and is con-
ditional on the completion of a commissioning 
programme demonstrating that the facility, 
as constructed, is consistent with design and 
safety requirements;
(b) operational limits and conditions, derived 
from tests, operational experience and the as-
sessments as specified in Article 15 are defined 
and revised as necessary;
(c) operation, maintenance, monitoring, inspection 
and testing of a radioactive waste manage-
ment facility are conducted in accordance with 
established procedures. For a disposal facility 
the results thus obtained shall be used to ver-
ify and to review the validity of assumptions 
made and to update the assessments as speci-
fied in Article 15 for the period after closure;
(d) engineering and technical support in all safe-
ty-related fields are available throughout the 
operating lifetime of a radioactive waste man-
agement facility;
(e) procedures for characterization and segrega-
tion of radioactive waste are applied; incidents 
significant to safety are reported in a timely 
manner by the holder of the licence to the regu-
latory body;
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(f) programmes to collect and analyse relevant 
operating experience are established and that 
the results are acted upon, where appropriate;
(g) decommissioning plans for a radioactive waste 
management facility other than a disposal fa-
cility are prepared and updated, as necessary, 
using information obtained during the operat-
ing lifetime of that facility, and are reviewed by 
the regulatory body;
(h) plans for the closure of a disposal facility are 
prepared and updated, as necessary, using 
information obtained during the operating 
lifetime of that facility and are reviewed by the 
regulatory body.
The legislative and regulatory requirements dis-
cussed under Article 9 are also valid for the pre-
disposal management of LILW from the NPPs for 
the operational period of an LILW disposal facility, 
spent fuel encapsulation plant and spent fuel dis-
posal facility. Therefore, only some specific features 
related to the disposal of LILW or spent fuel, as 
well as those related to radioactive waste from 
small operators, are presented here.
Initial authorization
The Nuclear Energy Decree (Section 36) requires 
that a number of documents, including the Final 
Safety Analysis Report, are submitted to STUK 
when applying for an operating licence for a nu-
clear facility. More detailed requirements are given 
in Guide YVL A.1, including STUK’s review and 
inspection of the commissioning of a nuclear facil-
ity. The requirements for the safety assessment are 
discussed in detail above under Article 15.
In the context of the commissioning of a nuclear 
waste facility, the licensee must ensure that the sys-
tems, structures and components, as well as the en-
tire facility function as planned. The licensee must 
ensure that an appropriate organization, adequate-
ly skilled workforce and applicable instructions ex-
ist for the future safe operation of the facility.
Operational limits and conditions
The requirements concerning operational limits 
and conditions are discussed in Article 9 and they 
are also valid for LILW facilities, including dispos-
al, management of non-nuclear radioactive waste 
and for spent fuel encapsulation plant and disposal 
facilities.
Established procedures
According to the STUK Regulation on the Safety 
of Disposal of Nuclear Waste (STUK Y/4/2016) ap-
propriate instructions must exist for the operation, 
maintenance, regular in-service inspections and 
periodic tests, as well as for transient and accident 
conditions. The reliable functioning of systems and 
components must be ensured by adequate main-
tenance and by regular in-service inspections and 
periodic tests. Detailed requirements are given in 
YVL A.3. This topic is also discussed in Chapter G.
Updated assessment for post closure period
For the LILW disposal facilities, both in Loviisa 
and Olkiluoto, the operating licence conditions re-
quire a periodic update of the safety assessment. 
The STUK Regulation (STUK Y/4/2016), concern-
ing nuclear waste disposal, requires that a safety 
case must be presented when applying for a con-
struction licence and operating licence for the dis-
posal facility and when making substantial plant 
modifications. The safety case must be updated at 
regular intervals unless otherwise required in the 
licence conditions. The need for updating the safety 
case must be assessed before making modifications 
that concern the disposal system. Furthermore, the 
safety case must be updated prior to the closure of 
the disposal facility.
Engineering and technical support
The STUK Regulation (Y/4/2016) requires that 
the licensee employ adequate and competent per-
sonnel for ensuring the safety of the nuclear waste 
facility. The licensee must have access to the 
professional expertise and technical knowledge 
required for the safe construction and operation 
of the facility, the maintenance of equipment im-
portant to safety, the management of accidents 
and the long-term safety of disposal. The LILW 
repositories operate under the NPP organizations 
and the requirement for adequate engineering and 
technical support presented in Guide YVL A.4 ap-
plies.
Posiva has expertise on planning for the safe 
disposal operation. Posiva’s own expertise is sup-
ported by the technical expertise of Posiva’s own-
ers, TVO and FPH, and also by external experts.
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Characterization and segregation 
of waste, incident reports
The guidance and requirements for LILW char-
acterization and segregation is provided in Guide 
YVL D.4. STUK reviews plant procedures, the 
FSAR, and performs inspections on waste man-
agement at the NPPs and the disposal facilities to 
ensure compliance with all requirements.
Guide YVL D.3 provides requirements concern-
ing the characterization of spent fuel to be dis-
posed of and the characterization of the spent fuel 
disposal canisters. The properties that have a bear-
ing on operational or long-term safety of disposal 
must be defined and characterized.
Incident reporting requirements are given in 
Guide YVL A.10.
Decommissioning plans
The Nuclear Energy Act (Section 7 g) states that 
the design of a nuclear facility must provide for the 
facility’s decommissioning and the related decom-
missioning plan should already be presented dur-
ing licensing and operation phases. During opera-
tion, the licensee is obligated to prepare decommis-
sioning plans for regulatory review every six years 
(Section 28 in Nuclear Energy Act). Guide YVL D.4 
requires that provisions for the decommissioning of 
the nuclear facilities should be made already dur-
ing the design phase.
The plans for the decommissioning of the fa-
cilities for LILW and spent fuel management, other 
than repositories, are part of the decommissioning 
plans of the NPPs.
The decommissioning plan of the encapsulation 
plant was presented in the construction licence 
application in 2012. The encapsulation plant will 
be decommissioned according to its immediate 
dismantling strategy. The decommissioning plan 
for the encapsulation plant contains a prepara-
tion phase for decommissioning. The length of the 
preparation phase is about one year. The actual 
dismantling of the encapsulation plant and dispos-
al of decommissioning waste is estimated to take 
about two years.
Decommissioning is discussed in more detail 
under Article 26.
Closure plans
According to STUK Y/4/2016 (Section 21) the de-
sign of the disposal facility must consider the safe-
ty of the closure of the facility after its operation 
has ended. The disposal facility must be designed, 
constructed and operated in a manner that al-
lows it to be closed without jeopardizing long-term 
safety. In addition, the siting, excavation, construc-
tion and closure of underground rooms must be 
implemented so that the characteristics of the rock 
deemed important in terms of long-term safety are 
retained, as far as possible (Section 31).
The closure plans of the LILW repositories are 
presented in the Final Safety Assessment Reports 
of the facilities.
The closure plan for the spent nuclear fuel 
disposal facility was presented in the construction 
licence application and in its technical appendices 
in 2012. The main closure principles, preliminary 
design requirements, implementation plan and 
materials to be used were presented. The main 
aim is that the closure of the disposal facility is 
planned and implemented so that the favourable 
bedrock conditions for disposal are maintained. 
After closure of the disposal facility the conditions 
in the bedrock should be as close to the natural 
bedrock conditions as possible. Posiva will continue 
the detailed closure planning over the forthcoming 
years.
Article 17 Institutional measures 
after closure
Each Contracting Party shall take the appropriate 
steps to ensure that after closure of a disposal facil-
ity:
(a) records of the location, design and inventory 
of that facility required by the regulatory body 
are preserved;
(b) active or passive institutional controls such as 
monitoring or access restrictions are carried 
out, if required; and
(c) if, during any period of active institutional 
control, an unplanned release of radioactive 
materials into the environment is detected, in-
tervention measures are implemented, if neces-
sary.
Regulatory requirements
According to STUK’s Regulation on the Safety of 
the Disposal of Nuclear Waste (Y/4/2016), records 
must be kept of the disposed waste, which includes 
waste package specific information about the waste 
type, radioactive substances, location in the waste 
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emplacement rooms and other necessary data. 
STUK maintains a database, where the nuclear 
waste data reported annually by the operators 
of the NPPs are stored. Guide YVL A.9 provides 
general requirements for reporting to STUK and 
includes provisions for waste management report-
ing. More detailed requirements for waste manage-
ment records are given in Regulatory Guides YVL 
D.4 and YVL D.5. During the operational period, 
the records referred to above must be annually 
complemented and submitted to STUK. STUK will 
organise the long-term archiving of the informa-
tion about the disposal facility and the disposed 
waste (Y/4/2016 29 §).
Institutional control
Two types of institutional control can be imple-
mented: restrictions on land use (passive control) 
and technical post-closure surveillance (active con-
trol).
According to the Nuclear Energy Act, Section 
63, STUK’s regulatory oversight rights include is-
suing land use restrictions after the closure of the 
disposal facility when deemed necessary. STUK’s 
Regulation (Y/4/2016) on nuclear waste disposal 
further stipulates that an adequate protection zone 
should be reserved around the disposal facility as a 
provision for the prohibitions of measures referred 
to in Section 63 of the Nuclear Energy Act.
According to Guide YVL D.5 it can be assumed 
that human activities affecting the disposal facility 
or the nearby host rock should be precluded for 200 
years at the most by means of land use restrictions 
and other passive controls. YVL D.5 also requires 
that before closure the facility operator should 
submit a closure plan to STUK including a plan for 
possible institutional control measures and a pro-
posal for a protection zone. It should also be noted 
that the Finnish repositories for LILW are located 
at a depth of 60–100 m in the bedrock and the 
spent fuel disposal facility is planned to be located 
at least 400 m below the surface.
Potential intervention measures
After approval of the final closure of a disposal 
facility, the State bears the responsibility for the 
waste facility and of all intervention measures that 
may be needed (the Nuclear Energy Act, Section 
34). Such measures are unlikely, because the dis-
posal concepts are based on passive safety; mul-
tiple engineered barriers ensuring effective long-
term containment of the disposed waste.
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Article 27 Transboundary movement
Each Contracting Party involved in transboundary 
movement shall take the appropriate steps to ensure 
that such movement is undertaken in a manner 
consistent with the provisions of this Convention 
and relevant binding international instruments.
In so doing:
(a) a Contracting Party which is a State of origin 
shall take the appropriate steps to ensure that 
transboundary movement is authorized and 
takes place only with the prior notification and 
consent of the State of destination;
(b) transboundary movement through States of 
transit shall be subject to those international 
obligations which are relevant to the particu-
lar modes of transport utilized;
(c) a Contracting Party which is a State of desti-
nation shall consent to a transboundary move-
ment only if it has the administrative and 
technical capacity, as well as the regulatory 
structure, needed to manage the spent fuel or 
the radioactive waste in a manner consistent 
with this Convention;
(d) a Contracting Party which is a State of origin 
shall authorize a accordance with the consent 
of the State of destination that the require-
ments of subparagraph (c) are met prior to 
transboundary movement;
(e) a Contracting Party which is a State of ori-
gin shall take the appropriate steps to permit 
re-entry into its territory, if a transboundary 
movement is not or cannot be completed in con-
formity with this Article, unless an alternative 
safe arrangement can be made.
A Contracting Party shall not licence the shipment 
of its spent fuel or radioactive waste to a destina-
tion south of latitude 60 degrees South for storage 
or disposal.
Nothing in this Convention prejudices or af-
fects:
(a) the exercise, by ships and aircraft of all States, 
of maritime, river and air navigation rights 
and freedoms, as provided for in international 
law;
(b) rights of a Contracting Party to which radioac-
tive waste is exported for processing to return, 
or provide for the return of, the radioactive 
waste and other products after treatment to the 
State of origin;
(c) the right of a Contracting Party to export its 
spent fuel for reprocessing;
(d) rights of a Contracting Party to which spent 
fuel is exported for reprocessing to return, or 
provide for the return of, radioactive waste and 
other products resulting from reprocessing op-
erations to the State of origin.
Regulatory requirements
Regulations on transport of all kinds of danger-
ous goods are laid down in Act on the Transport of 
Dangerous Goods (719/1994). In addition, several 
Decrees define more detailed requirements on the 
transport of dangerous goods. As far as radioac-
tive material is of concern, additional requirements 
are given also in the Radiation Act (592/1991) 
and Decree (1512/1991), as well as in the Nuclear 
Energy Act (990/1987) and Decree (161/1988). 
Further guidance is given in Regulatory Guides 
YVL D.2 and ST 5.7 by STUK.
Concerning the transboundary movement of 
radioactive material, the Regulation 93/1493/
Euratom on shipments of radioactive substances 
between Member States must be applied. The 
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requirements are also in accordance with the 
European Council Directive 2006/117/EURATOM 
on the supervision and control of shipments of ra-
dioactive waste and spent fuel.
State border control concerning nuclear 
and non-nuclear radioactive materials
With respect to illicit trafficking, regulatory and 
detection measures were taken in the mid of 1990s 
to address and prevent the illicit trafficking of nu-
clear and non-nuclear radioactive materials across 
Finland’s borders. The measures included install-
ing fixed monitors for vehicles and railway traffic 
at all major crossing points along the Finnish–
Russian border and at Helsinki harbour, and port-
able monitors at all crossing points. The radiation 
control at the borders was revised in a co-operation 
project between the Finnish Customs office and 
STUK during 2008–2015 (the RADAR project). All 
measuring systems at the Finnish border cross-
ing points were upgraded, including upgrading all 
systems with neutron detection capability, allow-
ing better detection of special nuclear materials. 
STUK was responsible for the procurement of the 
equipment and also for radiation protection train-
ing of the Custom’s personnel in co-operation with 
the Customs school. The trainings of the Customs 
personnel responsible for radiation protection con-
tinues on an annual basis. From 2016 onwards 
the Customs is the main operator of the radiation 
control measuring systems at the border crossing 
points. STUK owns the measuring equipment and 
is responsible for its maintenance.
Experiences
Spent fuel from the VVER type Loviisa NPP was 
shipped to the Soviet Union for the first time in 
1981according to an agreement between Finland 
and the Soviet Union and later on to Russia be-
tween 1992 and 1996. Altogether about a total 
amount of 330 tU of spent fuel was returned. The 
shipments were denied by the Nuclear Energy Act 
approved by Finnish parliament in 1994 and the 
amendment regarding this change came into force 
in 1996 as part of the national nuclear waste man-
agement policy.
Nowadays, transboundary movements take 
place very seldom in Finland. During 2008–2016 
two spent fuel rods were shipped out of Finland 
for research purposes and some large metal com-
ponents were shipped for scrapping. Radioactive 
waste was shipped back to Finland after the treat-
ment. In addition, two shipments through Finland 
have been reported.
Regarding illicit trafficking, the systematic bor-
der control for monitoring radioactive materials 
has produced substantial results over the years. 
In 1997, the top year, 23 shipments were stopped 
at the border. After a number of turned-back ship-
ments and enhanced co-operation with Russian 
counterparts, the number of cases has fallen dras-
tically.
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Article 28 Disused sealed sources
Each Contracting Party shall, in the framework 
of its national law, take the appropriate steps to 
ensure that the possession, remanufacturing or 
disposal of disused sealed sources takes place in a 
safe manner.
A Contracting Party shall allow for re-entry 
into its territory of disused sealed sources if, in the 
framework of its national law, it has accepted that 
they be returned to a manufacturer qualified to re-
ceive and possess the disused sealed sources.
Regulatory requirements
Regulatory control of radioactive sources is based 
on the Radiation Act and regulations issued pur-
suant thereto, into which the provisions of the 
European Union radiation protection directives 
(Council Directive 96/42 Euratom, and Council 
Directive 97/43 EURATOM etc.) have been imple-
mented. Other EU regulations are applicable as 
well, e.g. the Council Regulation 1494/93/Euratom 
on shipments of radioactive substances between 
Member States.
According to the Radiation Act (Section 16) pri-
or authorization is required for all activities involv-
ing radioactive sources, e.g. for the use, manufac-
ture, trade in, holding and disposal of such sources. 
A safety licence is granted by STUK upon written 
application. The general conditions for granting 
a licence are laid down in the Radiation Act and 
the licensing procedure is prescribed in more de-
tail in the Radiation Decree (Sections 14–18). All 
premises where radioactive sources are employed 
are inspected by STUK regularly, every 2–8 years, 
depending on the type and extent of the practice. 
For sealed sources, the inspection frequency is nor-
mally once every 3, 5 or 8 years depending on the 
activity and number of sources. The main objective 
of an inspection is to validate that the radioactive 
sources are used and stored safely and other condi-
tions set in the safety licence are preserved. The in-
spector must identify each sealed source. However, 
the premises where several tens or more sources 
are employed (such as a large industrial facility) 
the licensee must provide written evidence of its 
own regular checks on all the sources and then the 
inspector will randomly select about 10–20% of the 
sources for identification. Any discrepancies with 
the licensing information concerning the placing of 
the sources, new sources and sources taken out of 
use are recorded for amending the licence accord-
ingly.
The Radiation Decree (Section 17) provides 
that STUK has to be notified immediately, if a 
radiation source has disappeared, been stolen, lost 
or otherwise ceased to be in the licensee’s posses-
sion. Licensing information is stored in a database 
maintained by STUK, also including source-specific 
information on each sealed source in the licensee’s 
possession. Source-specific information is updated 
continuously according to the licensees’ notifica-
tions and observations made during the inspec-
tions. Some low-activity radioactive sources, such 
as calibration sources employed in laboratories, as 
well as sources in the storages of dealers (e.g. im-
porters of radioactive sources) are not individually 
registered in STUK’s database. However, records 
of transfers of sources maintained by dealers are 
reported to STUK monthly or annually and they 
are also subject to inspection by STUK at any time.
Finland has pledged to the apply the IAEA 
Code of Conduct on the Safety and Security of 
Radioactive Sources and its supplementary 
Guidance on the Import and Export of Radioactive 
Sources. The Code and the Guidance have been 
implemented into national requirements. Finland 
also actively participates on IAEA activities re-
garding this subject. However, as a member of the 
European Union and bound by its law, Finland 
only applies the Code with import or export from or 
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to outside the EU. Source transfers within the EU 
are only regulated according to Council Regulation 
1493/93/Euratom. Each import or export of a high-
activity sealed source requires a separate authori-
zation by STUK. Procedures of the Guidance are 
followed for IAEA category 1 and 2 sealed sources.
Handling of disused sealed sources
The Radiation Act (Section 10) states that radio-
active sources which have no further use must 
be rendered harmless. Guide ST 5.1 dealing with 
sealed sources specifies that disused sources may 
not be stored unnecessarily. In practice, howev-
er, it is sometimes difficult to define whether a 
stored source might have some use in the future. 
The annual fee for holding a licence depends on 
the number of sources in the licensee’s possession 
and, therefore, there is some financial incentive 
to transfer disused sources back to the provider 
(and therefrom to the manufacturer) or to a recog-
nised installation (a facility authorised for the han-
dling, long-term-storage, or disposal of sources). 
The number of devices containing unused sealed 
sources stored in the premises of various licensees 
is currently (2.3.2017) 365, i.e. about 5% of the 
total number of such devices in use (the total num-
ber is about 6515).
TVO has leased a storage cavern to the State in 
the LILW disposal facility at Olkiluoto for the in-
terim storage of non-nuclear radioactive waste. The 
safety of the operations at the Olkiluoto storage is 
independently regulated by STUK’s Department of 
Nuclear Waste and Materials Regulation. The most 
of this waste, including sealed sources, can also be 
disposed of in the disposal facility based on the re-
vised (in 2012) operation conditions of the Olkiluoto 
LILW disposal facility. The disposal of non-nuclear 
radioactive waste in the Olkiluoto LILW disposal 
facility started at the end of 2016 after the approval 
of the changes in the Olkiluoto LILW disposal facil-
ity’s operating licence conditions. A few high activity 
sealed sources will need a different disposal route, 
which is not yet determined.
Disused sources have been collected by a pri-
vate entrepreneur (Suomen Nukliditekniikka), 
by whom they are repacked, as necessary, and 
then transferred to storage at Olkiluoto. STUK’s 
Radiation Practices Regulation Department has 
issued an authorisation based on the Radiation 
Act to a private entrepreneur for its operations 
as a recognised installation. Due to an incident 
with a broken source and resulting contamina-
tion in early 2016, STUK forbade the company to 
receive any new sources in March 2016. In June 
2017 STUK approved the application by Suomen 
Nukliditekniikka for the continuation of its op-
eration in new premises, which were inspected and 
approved by STUK as suitable for receiving, han-
dling and storing non-nuclear radioactive waste.
When new sources are authorized for use, STUK 
requires the applicant to present a plan on meas-
ures to be taken when it becomes a disused source. 
Essentially there are two main options; either to 
have an agreement with the provider on returning 
the source or to transfer the source to the central 
storage facility at the cost of the licensee. The first 
option is preferred and it is foreseen that in the 
future an agreement on returning the source to the 
provider will be required for all sources.
Sources manufactured in Finland can be re-
turned to Finland once they have become disused 
sources. Sealed sources that have not been manu-
factured in Finland cannot be imported to Finland 
as radioactive waste. Currently there is no on-
going manufacturing of sources in Finland.
Orphan sources
According to the Radiation Act (Section 50), the 
licensee is required to take all measures needed 
to render radioactive waste arising from its op-
erations harmless. If the origin of the waste is 
unknown, as in the case of orphan sources, the 
State has the obligation to render the radioactive 
waste harmless (Section 51). In such cases, the 
licensee – if identified later – must compensate the 
State for the costs incurred in such an action. With 
respect to orphan sources and border controls, see 
Section I.
All-important users of scrap metal have fixed 
radiation monitors installed at the entrances to 
their facilities. STUK co-operates with the Finnish 
Customs office and the metal industry in questions 
such as measurement arrangements and personnel 
training. STUK also provides expert help in cases 
where exceptional radiation is detected.
On an average, about 1–2 sealed radioactive 
sources have been found annually in imported 
scrap metal. Orphan sources, whose owners can-
not be identified, are delivered to the State interim 
storage at Olkiluoto.
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Incident with sealed source
According to the Radiation Act (592/1991), a recog-
nized installation, which is licenced by STUK, can 
receive non-nuclear radioactive waste and sealed 
sources for handling and storage. The only recognized 
installation in Finland is Suomen Nukliditekniikka 
which has been operating since 2009. In March 2016, 
there was a contamination event on the premises of 
Suomen Nukliditekniikka. The contamination result-
ed from a leaking Cs-137 sealed source (original activ-
ity 925 MBq). Because STUK’s radiochemistry labo-
ratory operates in the same building with Suomen 
Nukliditekniikka, the event caused a significant risk 
to sensitive activity measurements as minute amounts 
of contamination could have spread in the building.
The cleaning of the facilities from the contami-
nation started immediately. The cleaning work was 
finalised in spring 2017. The resulting waste includes 
water, cleaning material and contaminated goods. 
The handling and disposal of this waste is yet to be 
resolved and the case has revealed a deficiency in the 
Finnish system for handling non-nuclear radioactive 
waste. As a result, the Ministry of Social Affairs and 
Health as well as Ministry of Economic Affairs and 
Employment have set up a working group to further 
develop the national strategy for radioactive waste 
and to find a permanent national solution. One of the 
problems is that nuclear power plants have the equip-
ment to treat the kind of waste produced (e.g. contami-
nated material) but their licence conditions forbid 
using it for non-nuclear radioactive waste.
After the incident STUK issued an order for-
bidding Suomen Nukliditekniikka to receive new 
disposed sources before it can meet the full safety 
requirements. Disused sources are currently stored by 
the users or dealers/importers. STUK has a responsi-
bility based on Section 24 b of the Radiation Decree 
1512/1991 to act as a recognized installation if none 
exists. Suomen Nukliditekniikka applied for a license 
to continue its operation in new premises in spring 
2017. STUK inspected the premises and the company 
itself and stated that it now fulfils safety require-
ments. STUK thus granted licence for the company to 
resume its operations again at the end of June 2017.
To capture all lessons learned from the incident, 
STUK requested the Finnish Safety Investigation 
Authority (http://www.otkes.fi/en/) to investigate the 
incident. The Authority concluded its investigation in 
early 2017 and published a report that included sev-
eral safety recommendations such as:
•	 All	 parties	 involved	with	 treatment	 of	minor	 ra-
dioactive waste are to follow the established meas-
ures for ensuring the integrity of radiation sources 
as described in the radiation safety instructions 
for the reception, transport, treatment and packag-
ing for final disposal of radiation sources.
•	 The	Ministry	of	Social	Affairs	and	Health	and	the	
Ministry of Economic Affairs and Employment 
should jointly establish procedures for granting 
licences for and managing radioactive waste in or-
der to ensure that all radioactive waste generated 
in Finland can be handled, stored and disposed of 
safely in our country in the event that returning 
it to the manufacturing country via the importers 
proves inappropriate or impossible.
After the incident STUK has also reviewed its own 
operating procedures and made improvements to 
regulatory control, communications and emergency 
preparedness processes.
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The 5th Review Meeting in 2015 identified chal-
lenges and recorded some planned measures to im-
prove the safety of nuclear waste management in 
Finland. The status of the findings made in the 5th 
review meeting is summarized in this chapter. The 
major developments in the nuclear and non-nucle-
ar radioactive waste management in Finland since 
the 5th Review Meeting are include the following:
•	 concrete	progress	in	spent	nuclear	fuel	disposal
•	 enhancement	of	spent	fuel	interim	storage	safe-
ty
•	 improvements	in	NPP	LILW	management	and	
non-nuclear radioactive waste disposal
•	 planning	of	the	research	reactor	decommission-
ing and dismantling started.
Furthermore, the legislative and regulatory 
framework was enhanced, national compe-
tences for future needs were evaluated and de-
veloped, and an IRRS follow-up mission (IAEA’s 
Integrated Regulatory Review Service) was car-
ried out in Finland. More detailed information on 
developments concerning the various topics of the 
Convention are described in connection with the 
relevant articles.
Aspects of nuclear and non-nuclear radioactive 
waste management have been developing well 
in Finland, but there are still challenges which 
Finland has to face in the forthcoming years. The 
challenges are related to the overall radioactive 
waste management framework, competences, and 
the regulatory framework for decommissioning 
and communication.
The status of the challenges from 
the 5th Review Meeting
The 5th Review Meeting in 2015 identified chal-
lenges concerning nuclear and non-nuclear radio-
active waste management in Finland. On request 
of the Review Meeting these issues are included 
and the responses are outlined in this 6th National 
Report of Finland. The status of the challenges 
are listed here with the related Articles given in 
brackets.
Construction and oversight of 
the SF disposal facility (Section 
H, Annexes L.2 and L.3)
During the reporting period STUK finalised the 
safety evaluation of Posiva’s construction licence 
application for the encapsulation plant and dispos-
al facility. In addition to a documentary review, the 
regulatory oversight contained several inspections 
in different areas (e.g. management systems, re-
source management, design, construction, research 
and monitoring activities). The statement and a 
safety evaluation report were submitted to the 
Government in February 2015. In the assessment 
STUK highlighted several issues that required fur-
ther action. The Government granted the construc-
tion licence to Posiva in November 2015. At the end 
of November 2016, after several inspections, STUK 
approved Posiva’s application to start the construc-
tion of the disposal facility. The construction com-
menced on the 1st of December 2016. At same 
time, the regulatory oversight of the construction 
of the encapsulation plant and disposal facility has 
been planned and the oversight of disposal facil-
ity construction has started. Finland has met the 
challenges identified for the reporting period in 
the 5th review meeting concerning the regulatory 
oversight of the disposal of spent nuclear fuel and 
the construction of the disposal facility. Progress in 
spent nuclear fuel disposal has been identified as 
a continuous challenge as the proceeding project 
leads to the need to further develop regulatory 
requirements. Additionally, regulatory oversight 
needs to be developed and adjusted to the different 
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project phases. STUK has procedures in place to re-
view and update plans and regulations as the dis-
posal project proceeds to each new phase and needs 
for development are identified. Further, Posiva is 
well prepared for the construction phase of the 
disposal project and preparations are ongoing for 
the forthcoming operation phase. The development 
of national competences and regulatory framework 
have also been identified as a continuous challenge 
as the nuclear field in Finland is currently very ac-
tive and competent resources are required both for 
the regulatory oversight and for the licensees and 
license applicants. The procedures for the manage-
ment of resource needs are addressed below.
Decommissioning and waste management 
of the FiR 1 research reactor 
(Article 9, Article 26, Annex L.5)
The first decommissioning project in Finland is the 
decommissioning of the research reactor (FiR  1), 
and this is in the licensing phase. STUK will start 
the review of the licence application in autumn 
2017 aiming to finalise it in 2018. The Government 
will consider the licence application in early 2019. 
As the project is the first decommissioning project 
in Finland, STUK has identified following chal-
lenges during the preparation and licensing phase 
of the project: 1) The legislation and YVL guides 
concerning decommissioning need to be reviewed 
and updated. Renewal of the nuclear energy law is 
ongoing and during the update the decommission-
ing license, among other things, will be added to the 
legislation. YVL guides will be updated later based 
on the experience gained from isthe decommission-
ing project. 2) The regulatory oversight along with 
competent resources must be ensured for the de-
commissioning project. ProjectProject organization 
has been established for the regulatory oversight 
and will be supported by a range of experts with 
varying areas of required competence. The regula-
tory oversight of the project should still be planned 
separately for the decommissioning project so that 
it will be adequate but not exaggeratedexaggerat-
ed. 3) The waste management plans of the licensee 
must be developed further. Currently there are still 
several alternatives for the waste management of 
spent fuel and decommissioning wastes. The plans 
should be fixed before entering into the disman-
tling phase.
Ensuring adequate resources and 
competence (STUK, utilities, research 
organizations, waste management 
organizations and the Government) 
(Article 20, Article 22)
The Ministry of Economic Affairs and Employment, 
STUK, licensees, VTT and universities all share 
this challenge. To ensure sufficient induction train-
ing in the nuclear field, courses on nuclear safety 
(YK course) and nuclear waste management (YJH 
course) for new staff have been arranged yearly 
in co-operation with the above-mentioned organiza-
tions and with some consultancy companies. The 
plan is to continue these courses in one common 
or separate course yearly in the future to ensure 
that basic courses in the area exists for newcomers. 
Interest has also been emerged into a tailor-made, 
common course by directors and board members 
of the nuclear power industry. In addition, a doc-
toral programme (YTERA – Doctoral programme 
for Nuclear Engineering and Radiochemistry) was 
established as a collaborative effort between the 
universities and other stakeholders in nuclear en-
ergyon going in 2012–2015 to educate people in 
the nuclear field. Furthermore, The programme 
was successful and educated 44 students in total of 
which 21 earned a doctoral degree. YTERA partners 
are currently planning a new DEN-NST-project 
(Doctoral Education Network in Nuclear Science 
and Technology) to continue to educate peole in the 
field. Also the national research programme (KYT 
research programme) plays a very important role 
in the development of new competent human re-
sources in the field of radioactive waste manage-
ment. The Finnish VTT Technical Research Centre 
of Finland Ltd has built the new VTT Centre for 
Nuclear Safety Research to Otaniemi with 150 re-
searchers and six hot cells. Ensuring adequate and 
competent resources remains a continuous chal-
lenge as Finland has an active nuclear energy sec-
tor. The Finnish national framework has procedures 
in place for addressing this challenge.
Communication with the public and 
stakeholders to maintain confidence 
in safe waste management and the 
regulatory framework (Article 20)
STUK aims to communicate proactively, openly, 
promptly and clearly. STUK is well-known to the 
public and the media. The communication strategy 
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is based on the mostmost trustworthy informa-
tion available and responds to the expectations of 
the public. STUK communicates on its own web 
site and on social media platforms. Communication 
with the public and stakeholders remains highly 
important for STUK to share understandable and 
reliable information promptly as it arises. This will 
be a challenge in the future in the changing com-
munications environment.
Disposal of a few High-Activity 
Sealed Sources (HASS) which are 
not suitable for disposal in existing 
LILW repositories (Section J)
The disposal plans for HASS have not proceeded 
during the reporting period. The few HASS sourc-
es that do exist will be addressed as part of the 
Finnish national waste management plan and 
currently there is no operating facility that could 
dispose of these sources. On a more general level, 
the management of non-nuclear radioactive waste 
remains a national challenge for Finland and will 
remain so for the next reporting period and will 
be taken into account when developing Finland’s 
national framework.
The major developments in Finland 
since the 5th Review Meeting
The legislative and regulatory 
system was enhanced
The current Finnish nuclear legislation is based on 
the Nuclear Energy Act from 1987, together with 
a supporting Nuclear Energy Decree from 1988. A 
significant amendment to the Nuclear Energy Act 
was passed in 1994 to reflect a new policy which 
emphasises the national responsibility to manage 
nuclear waste generated in Finland. In general, 
the import and export of nuclear waste, including 
spent fuel, is prohibited in the revised Act. Since 
1994, the Nuclear Energy act has been revised 
several times, e.g. to implement the Nuclear Safety 
Directive (Council Directive 2009/71/EURATOM) 
and the European Council Directive on the man-
agement of spent fuel and radioactive waste 
(Council Directive 2011/70/EURATOM). In 2015, a 
revision to the Nuclear Energy Act enabled STUK 
to issue legally binding regulations. Based on the 
Nuclear Energy Act, STUK issued four regulations 
in 2016 to replace the earlier Government Decrees 
and one new regulation on the safety of uranium 
and thorium production:
•	 Radiation	and	Nuclear	Safety	Authority	Regu-
lation on the Safety of Nuclear Power Plants 
(Y/1/2016)
•	 Radiation	and	Nuclear	Safety	Authority	Regu-
lation on the Security in the Use of Nuclear 
Energy (Y/2/2016)
•	 Radiation	and	Nuclear	Safety	Authority	Regu-
lation on Emergency Response Arrangements 
at Nuclear Power Plants (Y/3/2016)
•	 Radiation	and	Nuclear	Safety	Authority	Regu-
lation on the Safety of Disposal of Nuclear 
Waste (Y/4/2016).
•	 Radiation	and	Nuclear	Safety	Authority	Regu-
lation on the Safety of Mining and Milling 
Operations Aimed at Producing Uranium or 
Thorium (Y/5/2016).
At the end of 2016, both the Nuclear Energy Act 
and the Radiation Act were being revised due to 
the Basic Safety Standards directive and because 
of the amended Nuclear Safety Directive. The revi-
sion of the Nuclear Energy Act will include also 
amendments related to changes in the Pressure 
Equipment Act and licensing of nuclear facilities. 
The proposed new Nuclear Energy Act and Decree 
will introduce a decommissioning licence step. The 
decommissioning licence will be granted by the 
Government if the changes in law are approved 
by the end of 2017 as planned. This would clarify 
the terms for the decommissioning of the nuclear 
facilities in the future.
STUK’s role and responsibilities were assessed 
in a peer review, as part of the IRRS mission 
(IAEA’s Integrated Regulatory Review Service), 
in October 2012. In the follow-up mission in June 
2015 regulatory activities in Finland were re-
viewed on the basis of IAEA Safety Standards and 
international best practices. The results are that 
the recommendations and suggestions from the 
2012 IRRS missions have been taken into account 
by STUK systematically in a comprehensive ac-
tion plan. Significant progress has been made in 
most areas and many improvements have been 
implemented in accordance with the action plan. 
The IRRS team determined that 7 out of 8 recom-
mendations and 19 of 21 suggestions made in 2012 
could be closed. The recommendation left open 
deals with STUK’s position under the Ministry of 
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Social Affairs and Health, which will be discussed 
further in Finland. Two new recommendations 
were raised to amend legislation so that decom-
missioning a nuclear installation and the closure of 
a disposal facility would require a licence amend-
ment; and to address arrangements for research 
in radiation safety. STUK has updated its action 
plan to take these recommendations into account 
in future development actions. One of the open 
suggestions is related to STUK’s management 
system. Although STUK had initiated many im-
provements to its management system, the IRRS 
team felt that there is still work that needs to be 
undertaken for further enhancing STUK’s man-
agement system. The implementation of the IRRS 
recommendations has proceeded as planned in the 
5th review meeting (Planned Measures to Improve 
Safety: Implementation of recommendations from 
the IRSS review).
Development of national 
competences for future needs
Ensuring adequate and competent resources is 
a continuous challenge in a small country like 
Finland, where the nuclear energy sector is very 
active: four reactors (OL1, OL2, LO1 and LO2) are 
in operation, one nuclear power reactor (OL3) will 
soon be commissioned, one is in the construction 
licencing phase (Hanhikivi 1), a disposal project is 
ongoing and the decommissioning of the research 
reactor FiR 1 is going to start in the near fu-
ture. Basic training in nuclear science is provided 
by the Lappeenranta University of Technology as 
well asasAalto and Helsinki universities. MEAE, 
STUK, licensees, VTT and the universities share 
the challenge of ensuring adequate and competent 
resources and have jointly arranged yearly nuclear 
safety (YK course) and nuclear waste management 
(YJH course) courses for new staff in several or-
ganizations. The plan is to continue these courses 
in the future. In addition, the availability of com-
petent human resources has been be ensured by 
training young experts in the nuclear safety field 
in different ways, e.g. on a doctoral programme 
(YTERA – Doctoral Programme for Nuclear 
Engineering and Radiochemistry and DEN-NST 
– Doctoral Education Network in Nuclear Science 
and Technology). Additionally, the national re-
search programme (KYT-program) plays a very im-
portant role by providing education to guarantee 
competent new human resources in thenuclear and 
radioactive waste management areas.
During 2010–2012 a committee set up by the 
Ministry of Economic Affairs and Employment 
(MEAE) worked on a report to provide recommen-
dations and steps to be taken until the 2020s for 
ensuring the competence and resources needed for 
the nuclear sector. One of the recommendations of 
the committee was that the future needs and focus 
areas of the Finnish nuclear energy sector research 
must be accurately defined and a long-term strat-
egy should be drawn up for further development 
of research activities. This calls for a joint project 
between research organisations and other stake-
holders in the field. The update of the competence 
review is planned to be continued in 2017 to reflect 
the current changes in the operating environment.
At the end of January 2013, the MEAE set up 
a working group to prepare a research and de-
velopment strategy. The report “Nuclear Energy 
Research Strategy”, published at the end of April 
2014, emphasizes the importance of research in 
competence building with seven recommendations. 
The implementation of the recommendations is 
on-going by the MEAE. As an example of the on-
going implementation, the Nuclear Energy Act 
was updated in 2015 to ensure the financing for 
the enhancement of the nuclear safety research 
infrastructure.
The two main ongoing R&D programs in 
Finland concerning nuclear waste and spent nu-
clear fuel management and disposal are:
•	 The	 joint	 R&D-programme	 between	 TVO	 and	
Fortum (compiled by Posiva); the programme is 
mainly aimed at planning and implementing a 
spent fuel disposal project but also includes an 
R&D-programme for LILW management;
•	 The	 national	 research	 programme	 (KYT-2018)	
for 2015–2018, administered by MEAE; the 
programme aims at supporting the creation 
and maintenance of overall competence and the 
basic skills needed regarding the management 
and disposal of nuclear waste (mainly spent 
fuel).
The Government reduced STUK’s budget over the 
past years mostly due to reorganisation of funding 
and research in the governmental organisations. 
Oversight activities are charged in full from the 
licensees, and nuclear and waste safety research 
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programmes are funded via the waste manage-
ment fund, so budget cuts have not impacted nu-
clear safety research or resources needed for regu-
lated activities. However, due to budget cuts, STUK 
has partly terminated and significantly reduced its 
radiation safety research (e.g. research into the bi-
ological effects of radiation, or biodosimetry). Since 
radiation safety research activities contributed to 
the maintenance and development of expertise in 
Finland, STUK has established a national radia-
tion safety research programme in co-operation 
with all universities in Finland to ensure that radi-
ation safety research will be continued in Finland.
Spent nuclear fuel disposal project 
progressed to the construction phase
The Finnish nuclear fuel cycle policy is based on 
the once-through principle. After removal from re-
actors, spent fuel is stored in pool type interim stor-
age facilities at the power plant sites. Two interim 
storages have been in operation in Loviisa and 
Olkiluoto already for over 30 years. Fennovoima is 
also planning to construct a pool type interim stor-
age facility in Pyhäjoki. After a storage period of 
some tens of years, the spent fuel will be disposed 
of in the Finnish bedrock.
In 1999, in a Decision-in-Principle (DiP) ap-
plication, Posiva proposed, to site a disposal facil-
ity for spent nuclear fuel at Olkiluoto in Eurajoki. 
The application was reviewed from a safety view-
point by STUK and accepted by the municipal-
ity of Eurajoki in January 2000. The Finnish 
Government made the DiP in December 2000 and 
Parliament ratified it in May 2001. The DiP au-
thorized Posiva to continue the planned disposal 
project and also to construct an underground rock 
characterization facility “ONKALO” at the actual 
disposal depth. ONKALO is intended to be used as 
part of the disposal facility and it was constructed 
under pertinent regulatory control. Posiva submit-
ted the construction licence application and its 
supporting safety documentation to the authori-
ties at the end of 2012. STUK’s safety review and 
assessment of the application was submitted to 
the MEAE in February 2015. The construction 
licence was granted by the Government to Posiva 
in November 2015. The construction of the disposal 
facility started in December 2016. Posiva is respon-
sible for the preparations and later implementa-
tion of spent fuel disposal for its owners TVO and 
FPH. The disposal project and granted licence cov-
ers spent fuel from five reactors: Loviisa 1 and 2, 
Olkiluoto 1, 2 and 3. The licensing of the encapsu-
lation plant and disposal facility has proceeded as 
planned and presented in the 5th review meeting. 
(Planned Measures to Improve Safety: Licensing of 
encapsulation plant and disposal facility for encap-
sulated spent fuel).
In the Decision-in-Principle for a new NPP, 
Fennovoima was required to define its plans for 
future spent nuclear fuel disposal. As required, 
Fennovoima submitted an environmental impact 
assessment programme for spent fuel disposal in 
June 2016 to the MEAE. Fennovoima and Posiva 
Solutions Oy, Posiva’s subsidiary that focuses on 
supplying services, have signed a co-operation 
agreement to ensure that Posiva’s expertise will be 
available for Fennovoima’s spent nuclear fuel man-
agement. Full co-operation started in 2016.
Spent fuel interim storage 
safety was enhanced
The Olkiluoto spent fuel interim storage facility 
has undergone many improvements during its ex-
tension, which commenced operations in summer 
2015. Protection against a large airplane crash 
has been included in the design of the extension 
and the protection has also been improved for the 
original part of the facility. Additionally, the cooling 
water systems for the spent fuel storage pools have 
been improved to enable a water feed from outside 
the facility. The monitoring of the storage pool wa-
ter level and temperature has been improved to 
take earthquake resistance and the potential loss 
of the facility power supply into account to address 
lessons learned from the Fukushima Dai-ichi ac-
cident.
Furthermore, the Loviisa spent fuel storage 
has been improved since the Fukushima Dai-ichi 
accident. The main changes are aimed at reducing 
the dependency on the plant’s normal electric-
ity supply and distribution system, as well as on 
seawater cooled systems for residual heat removal 
from the reactor, as well as containment and spent 
fuel pools. Two air-cooled cooling units were con-
structed and commissioned in 2014-2015 to ensure 
long-term decay heat removal in case of the loss 
of seawater for cooling. The design plans for the 
installation of a diverse water supply to the spent 
fuel pools have also been approved by STUK in 
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2015 and the installation is planned to be carried 
out during 2017. Finally, the flood protection of the 
NPP has been improved.
Operation in low and intermediate 
level waste management has 
proceeded as previously
The predisposal management of LILW takes place 
at the NPPs under their operating licences and 
other provisions and there have not been any ma-
jor changes in the procedures during the reporting 
period. In the Loviisa NPP the solidification plant 
was authorized for full operation in 2016 and was 
the main development in the predisposal manage-
ment of LILW. The Loviisa NPP has now been able 
to start the solidification of historical liquid radio-
active waste, which has been stored in tanks from 
the start of NPP’s operation from late 1970s. The 
aim is to solidify and dispose of all existing liquid 
waste during the forthcoming years.
At both operating NPPs, solid LLW is trans-
ferred after conditioning to the disposal facilities 
located on the power plant sites. At Olkiluoto the 
operation of the LILW disposal facility started in 
1992 and in Loviisa in 1998. Fennovoima is plan-
ning to construct a similar LILW disposal facility 
on the Pyhäjoki site.
The disposal of non-nuclear 
radioactive waste has started
TVO has leased a cavern in the LILW disposal 
facility at Olkiluoto to the State for the interim 
storage of non-nuclear radioactive waste. The re-
vised (in 2012) licence conditions of the Olkiluoto 
LILW disposal facility have enabled the disposal 
of non- nuclear waste, including sealed sources at 
the Olkiluoto LILW disposal facility. The started at 
the end of 2016. Sealed sources containing nuclides 
causing the highest doses (C-14, Ra-226 and Am-
241) are packed separately and are still stored in 
the interim storage.
Planning for decommissioning of Finland’s 
first nuclear reactor commenced
The research reactor FiR1 (TRIGA Mark II, 
250  kW) has been in operation since 1962. The 
operation of the FiR1 reactor has been carried out 
by VTT Technical Research Centre of Finland Ltd. 
since 1971. In 2012, VTT decided to shut the reac-
tor down due to insufficient funding for its contin-
ued operation. VTT submitted an EIA programme 
for decommissioning the FiR1 reactor to the MEAE 
in autumn 2013, followed byby the submission of 
the EIA report in October 2014. The FiR1 reactor 
will be the first nuclear reactor to be decommis-
sioned in Finland. VTT has submitted an applica-
tion to the Government for a licence for decommis-
sioning in June 2017 (formally a new operating 
licence, as the present Finnish legislation does not 
yet define a decommissioning licence, and a sepa-
rate decommissioning licence will be included in 
a new act). The dismantling is scheduled to start 
in early 2019 and to last about two years. The dis-
mantling will be regulated by STUK concerning 
radiation and nuclear safety aspects.
As the licensing and dismantling activities of 
the research reactor have not started during the 
reporting period, the identified measures to im-
prove safety concerning decommissioning are still 
underway and remains future tasks. (Planned 
Measures to Improve Safety: Licensing of research 
reactor decommissioning and start of dismantling 
activities.)
Challenges for future work in spent nuclear 
fuel and radioactive waste management
Finland has identified three main challenges for 
the future work and these are summarized below.
Improvement of the national plan for 
radioactive waste management
Finland has a well-functioning system and techni-
cal solutions for the management of nuclear waste 
arising from NPPs and also for the major part of 
non-nuclear radioactive waste. However, as a con-
sequence of the sealed source incident and its re-
lated clean-up work, as well the planning of the re-
search reactor decommissioning waste storage and 
disposal, and the continuing challenge of disposal 
of a few HASS sources, it has been identified that 
our national radioactive waste management plan 
and licensing system needs to be evaluated and 
improved to address all possible waste streams. 
The MEAE has invited an ad-hoc expert group to 
address these issues. The group will also address 
recommendations made by the Finnish Safety 
Investigation Authority about the sealed source 
incident in autumn 2016. This group will start its 
work in autumn 2017.
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Developing competences and the regulatory 
framework for decommissioning
The research reactor, FiR 1, will be the first nu-
clear reactor to be decommissioned in Finland. As 
this is the country’s first decommissioning project, 
Finland has limited experience in this area. VTT 
and STUK are both co-operating internationally 
with their peers, gathering knowledge and experi-
ence regarding decommission. The decommission-
ing project of the research reactor is an impor-
tant learning process for STUK as the experiences 
gained will be used in updating regulations and 
YVL guides, and later on also for planning the 
regulatory oversight for decommissioning NPPs.
Communication to improve the general 
public’s understanding of disposal safety
The Finnish public has a high degree of trust in the 
radiation and nuclear safety regulator, STUK, and 
good level of trust towards the safety of nuclear 
waste disposal in the country. However, the inter-
est of the general public towards disposal related 
information seems to be decreasing. Additionally, 
the latest results of polls (conducted by e.g. Finnish 
Energy in 2016) evaluating public opinion show an 
indication of a slight decrease in trust towards dis-
posal safety. The development of this trend needs 
to be followed in the up-coming polls. The regula-
tory work and decisions made by the regulator 
need to be clear and understandable to the public. 
The general public should also have the correct 
understanding of disposal safety and the related 
risks. Due to these challenges, STUK initiated a 
strategic communication development project in 
spring 2016 to address both the changing commu-
nication environment and the use of modern com-
munication tools.
A candidate for good practice
Finland has identified granting the construction 
licencelicence for a spent fuel disposal facility as 
a candidate for a good practice. Finland is the first 
country that has granted a construction licence 
for a final repository for spent fuel. Construction 
of the facility is on-going. The development and 
evaluation of safe disposal has been a long-lasting 
systematic process conducted in good co-operation 
between the Government, ministries the regula-
tor, Posiva, nuclear power companies as well as 
research organisations while acknowledging the 
roles and universitiesresponsibilities of the differ-
ent parties. The approach taken in Finland has 
enabled the timely progress of the disposal project 
with political and public support and resulted in 
approval of the construction licencelicence appli-
cation in 2015. This is a concrete step towards 
improving safety in a unique and proven manner.
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L.1 List of main national regulations
Legislation (as of 30.12.2016)
•	 Nuclear	Energy	Act	(990/1987)
•	 Nuclear	Energy	Decree	(161/1988)
•	 Government	Decree	on	the	State	Nuclear	Waste	
Management Fund (161/2004)
•	 Act	on	Third	Party	Liability	(484/1972)
•	 Decree	 on	 the	 Implementation	 of	Third	 Party	
Liability (486/1972)
•	 Radiation	Act	(592/1991)
•	 Radiation	Decree	(1512/1991)
•	 Act	 on	 the	 Finnish	 Centre	 for	 Radiation	 and	
Nuclear Safety (1069/1983)
•	 Decree	 on	 the	 Radiation	 and	 Nuclear	 Safety	
Authority (618/1997)
•	 Decree	 on	 Advisory	 Commission	 on	 Nuclear	
Safety (164/1988)
•	 Act	 on	 the	Environmental	 Impact	Assessment	
Procedure (252/2017)
•	 Government	Decree	 on	Environmental	 Impact	
Assessment Procedure (277/2017)
•	 Act	on	the	Openness	of	Government	Activities	
(621/1999)
•	 Decision	of	the	Government	on	Financial	Provi-
sion for the Costs of Nuclear Waste Manage-
ment (165/1988) (to be replaced by a Govern-
ment Decree in spring 2017)
STUK Regulations
•	 STUK	 Regulation	 on	 the	 Safety	 of	 Nuclear	
Power Plants (STUK Y/1/2016)
•	 STUK	Regulation	on	Emergency	Response	Ar-
rangements at Nuclear Power Plants (STUK 
Y/2/2016)
•	 STUK	Regulation	on	Security	in	the	Use	of	Nu-
clear Energy (STUK Y/3/2016)
•	 STUK	Regulation	on	the	Safety	of	the	Disposal	
of Nuclear Waste (STUK Y/4/2016)
•	 STUK	Regulation	on	the	Safety	of	Mining	and	
Milling Operations Aimed at Producing Ura-
nium and Thorium (STUK Y/5/2016)
The Regulations are available on the Internet at: 
http://www.finlex.fi/fi/viranomaiset/normi/555001 
(in English).
Regulatory Guides on nuclear safety 
(YVL Guides) (as of 31.12.2016, only Guides 
relevant to this report are included)
Group A: Safety management 
of a nuclear facility
•	 Guide	YVL	A.1	Regulatory	control	of	safety	 in	
the use of nuclear energy, 22 November 2013
•	 Guide	YVL	A.2	Site	for	a	nuclear	facility,	15	No-
vember 2013
•	 Guide	YVL	A.3	Management	 systems	of	a	nu-
clear facility, 15 November 2013
•	 Guide	YVL	A.4	Organisation	and	personnel	of	a	
nuclear facility, 15 November 2013
•	 Guide	YVL	A.5	Construction	 and	 commission-
ing of a nuclear facility, 15 November 2013
•	 Guide	 YVL	A.8	 Ageing	 management	 of	 a	 nu-
clear facility, 15 November 2013
•	 YVL	A.9	Regular	reporting	on	the	operation	of	a	
nuclear facility, 15 August 2014
•	 Guide	YVL	A.10	Operating	experience	feedback	
of a nuclear facility, 15 November 2013
•	 Guide	YVL	A.11	Security	of	a	nuclear	facility,	15	
November 2013
•	 Guide	YVL	A.12	 Information	security	of	a	nu-
clear facility, 15 November 2013
Group B: Plant and System Design
•	 Guide	YVL	B.1	Safety	design	of	a	nuclear	power	
plant, 15 November 2013
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•	 Guide	YVL	B.2	Classification	of	systems,	struc-
tures and components of a nuclear facility, 15 
November 2013
•	 Guide	 YVL	 B.3	 Deterministic	 safety	 analyses	
for a nuclear power plant, 15 November 2013
•	 Guide	YVL	B.4	Nuclear	fuel	and	reactor,	15	No-
vember 2013
•	 Guide	YVL	B.7	Provisions	for	 internal	and	ex-
ternal hazards at a nuclear facility, 15 Novem-
ber 2013
•	 Guide	YVL	B.8	Fire	protection	at	a	nuclear	fa-
cility, 15 November 2013
Group C: Radiation safety of a 
nuclear facility and environment
•	 Guide	YVL	C.1	Structural	radiation	safety	at	a	
nuclear facility,15 November 2013
•	 Guide	YVL	C.2	Radiation	protection	and	expo-
sure monitoring of nuclear power plant work-
ers, 15 November 2013
•	 Guide	 YVL	 C.3	 Limitation	 and	 monitoring	 of	
radioactive releases from a nuclear facility, 15 
November 2013
•	 YVL	C.4	Radiological	monitoring	of	the	environ-
ment of a nuclear facility (17 March 2015)
•	 Guide	YVL	 C.5	 Emergency	 preparedness	 of	 a	
nuclear power plant, 15 November 2013
•	 Guide	YVL	C.6	Radiation	monitoring	at	 a	nu-
clear facility, 15 November 2013
•	 Guide	YVL	C.7	Radiological	monitoring	 of	 the	
environment of a nuclear facility, 19 December 
2016
Group D: Nuclear materials and waste
•	 Guide	 YVL	 D.1	 Regulatory	 control	 of	 nuclear	
safeguards, 15 November 2013
•	 Guide	YVL	D.2	Transport	 of	 nuclear	material	
and nuclear waste, 15 November 2013
•	 Guide	YVL	D.3	Handling	and	storage	of	nuclear	
fuel, 15 November 2013
•	 Guide	YVL	D.4	Predisposal	management	of	low	
and intermediate level waste and decommis-
sioning of a nuclear facility, 15 November 2013
•	 Guide	YVL	 D.5	 Disposal	 of	 nuclear	 waste,	 15	
November 2013
ST Guides for non-nuclear radioactive waste
•	 Guide	ST	1.1	Safety	fundamentals	in	radiation	
practices, 23 May 2013
•	 Guide	 ST	 1.4	 Radiation	 user’s	 organization,	 2	
November 2011
•	 Guide	ST	1.5	Exemption	of	the	use	of	radiation	
from the safety licence, 12 September 2013
•	 Guide	ST	1.8.	Qualifications	and	radiation	pro-
tection training of persons working in a radia-
tion user’s organization, 25 January 2016
•	 Guide	ST	5.1	Radiation	safety	of	sealed	sources	
and equipment containing them, 13 September 
2016
•	 Guide	 ST	 5.7	 Shipments	 of	 radioactive	 waste	
and spent fuel, 6 June 2011
•	 Guide	ST	6.2	Radioactive	wastes	and	discharg-
es, 1 July 1999
•	 Guide	ST	12.2	Radioactivity	of	building	materi-
als and ash, 17 December 2010
L.2 Regulatory control of the Olkiluoto 
spent fuel disposal project
From a regulatory viewpoint, the Olkiluoto spent 
fuel disposal project can be divided into the follow-
ing main phases (approximate years):
1. Research phase from the late 1970s to the De-
cision-in-Principle licensing phase (DiP), 1978–
2001
2. Design, research and development phase in-
cluding construction of an underground rock 
characterization facility (from DiP to Construc-
tion licence (CL)), 2001–2014
3. Construction and commissioning phase (from 
CL to operating licence (OL)), 2015–2022
4. Operating phase (2023–2120, if no new NPPs)
5. Decommissioning and closure phase (2120–
2125, assuming no new NPPs).
The first step in the licensing process was reached 
at the end of 1999, when Posiva Oy submitted the 
application for a DiP for an SNF disposal facility 
at Olkiluoto for the spent fuel from the four oper-
ating reactors. The DiP was given by the Finnish 
Government in late 2000, and was accepted by the 
host municipality (veto right holder), Eurajoki, and 
ratified by the Finnish Parliament in early 2001. 
Later on, the DiP was expanded with two separate 
DiPs to also cover the spent fuel from reactor units 
OL3 and OL4. The DiP for OL4 expired when TVO 
decided not to apply for a construction licence for 
the Olkiluoto 4 unit in June 2015.
The initial DiP also authorized Posiva to start 
the construction of an underground rock charac-
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terization facility (URCF) at the Olkiluoto site to 
the depth of the planned underground disposal 
facility. The DiP also requested the continuation 
of the research, development and design work to 
further elaborate the safety justifications in the 
disposal project for the purposes of the construc-
tion licensing stage.
Posiva has followed the Government strategy 
set out in 1983 and accordingly submitted a con-
struction licence application and its supporting 
documentation to the authorities at the end of 
2012. The Government granted Posiva the con-
struction licence at the end of 2015. This was the 
start of the construction phase.
Regulatory approach to the 
construction of ONKALO
Nuclear waste regulations require that the rock at 
the disposal site must be characterized at the dis-
posal depth. This requirement is further developed 
in the present STUK safety regulation (Guide YVL 
D.5), which states that the characterization may 
involve construction of a research or characteriza-
tion facility on the site. ONKALO has functioned 
as an underground rock characterization facility 
to ensure the suitability of the Olkiluoto site for a 
disposal facility and has been proposed also to be 
access route to the actual disposal facility in the 
future. STUK has implemented regulatory control 
of the ONKALO construction project and regulated 
it as if it would be an access route to a nuclear 
facility. However, a construction licence was need-
ed before starting the construction of the disposal 
rooms.
Regulatory approach for Posiva’s 
Research, Development and Technical 
Design (RD&D) activities
Every three years Posiva publishes an RD&D plan 
for nuclear waste management on behalf of TVO 
and FPH, who are liable for the nuclear waste 
generated at their nuclear power plants, and sub-
mits it to the Ministry of Economic Affairs and 
Employment (MEAE) for regulatory review. STUK 
reviews the plan and provides its own statement to 
the MEAE. The most recent plan was submitted to 
the MEAE in September 2015 and it covers the pe-
riod 2016-2018. STUK is responsible for regulating 
the safety related implementation of the RD&D 
work. During the period in concern, after Posiva 
had submitted the construction licence application, 
STUK’s regulatory control of Posiva’s RD&D activi-
ties has focussed on demonstrating the feasibility 
and performance of the final disposal concept.
The focus of STUK’s regulatory control has 
changed from the overall safety case develop-
ment to the demonstration of the disposal system 
processes and the emplacements of the disposal 
canisters. The experiences from the review and 
assessment of Posiva’s safety case supporting the 
construction licence application will also steer the 
future focus of the RD&D supervision. In addition 
to issues which Posiva has raised in the safety 
case, STUK’s review has identified some other ar-
eas, where further RD&D work is needed to reduce 
existing uncertainties.
Regulatory review and assessment of 
the construction licence application 
for Olkiluoto spent nuclear fuel 
encapsulation plant and disposal facility
The MEAE required Posiva to submit a prelimi-
nary (draft) of the licence documentation by the 
end of 2009. The reasoning was to conduct a regu-
latory review of the status and maturity of the de-
velopment of the construction licence application. 
STUK reviewed the draft safety case and the pro-
cess was used as an exercise for the actual licence 
application review.
STUK established an internal project for the 
licence application review. The assessment of the 
fulfilment of the safety requirements and of the 
implementing organization’s preparedness for con-
struction were supported by STUK’s inspection 
programme for the pre-construction phase. The in-
spection programme continued later as a construc-
tion inspection programme (CIP) for construction 
control of the disposal facility.
Posiva submitted the construction licence ap-
plication and its supporting documentation to the 
authorities at the end of 2012. STUK performed a 
review and assessed the fulfilment of all the appli-
cable radiation and nuclear safety requirements. 
STUK prepared a statement and a safety evalua-
tion report and submitted them to the Government 
in February 2015. In the assessment, STUK high-
lighted issues that needed further attention.
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Regulatory control for the construction 
of the disposal facility
After the construction licence phase, STUK has 
continued comprehensive regulatory control over 
the subsequent detailed design, construction, man-
ufacturing and pre-operational testing, which will 
then be followed by the review and assessment of 
the forthcoming operating licence application.
STUK controls the implementation of the facil-
ity project in detail. The purpose of the control is 
to ensure that the conditions of the construction 
licence and the approved plans required in Section 
35 of the Nuclear Energy Decree are complied 
with and that the nuclear facility is also in other 
respects constructed in accordance with regula-
tions issued on the basis of the Nuclear Energy 
Act. The following chapters provide an overall view 
of the implementation of the regulatory control in 
Posiva’s case.
Verification of the readiness 
to start the construction
According to section 108 of the Nuclear Energy 
Decree, various phases in the construction of a nu-
clear facility cannot be commenced until STUK has 
ascertained for each phase that all safety-related 
factors and safety regulations have been given suf-
ficient consideration.
STUK performed inspections related to Posiva’s 
readiness during October and November 2016 and 
stated in its decision given at the end of November 
2016 that Posiva had achieved readiness for the 
construction project. Posiva started the construc-
tion of the first part of disposal facility which was 
outside the scope of the Onkalo project (the un-
derground rock characterization facility) on 1st of 
December 2016.
The next main phase of the project will be start-
ing the construction of the encapsulation plant and 
as stated in the section 108 of the Nuclear Energy 
Decree, STUK will ascertain Posiva’s readiness 
also for this phase of construction. Based on the 
present time schedule this will be carried out in 
2018.
Oversight of the construction of the 
encapsulation plant and disposal facility
The Guide YVL A.5, Construction and 
Commissioning of a Nuclear Facility gives de-
tailed guidance for the licensee and also describes 
STUK’s procedures for regulatory oversight. It in-
cludes oversight of the design, manufacturing, con-
struction, installation, commissioning and report-
ing during the construction.
Overall, the regulatory oversight of the encap-
sulation plant will follow the same procedures as 
for the other nuclear facilities, taking into account 
a graded approach which focuses the oversight 
based on safety relevance. These procedures will be 
applied for the oversight of the construction of the 
encapsulation plant, because this is similar to the 
other nuclear waste processing facilities.
The Guide YVL A.5 cannot be directly applied 
for the regulatory oversight of the construction of 
the underground disposal facility. Excavating and 
drilling safety classified underground rooms with 
post-closure safety functions are specific to this 
facility and regulatory oversight procedures need 
to be adjusted for this purpose. The Guide YVL D.7 
Engineered and natural barriers in a spent nuclear 
fuel disposal facility, will describe the oversight of 
the underground disposal facility. This guide will 
be published during 2017.
In the disposal facility oversight concept, STUK 
has taken the experience into account from the 
oversight of the underground rock characteriza-
tion facility (Onkalo). The disposal facility design 
documentation will be reviewed and approved by 
STUK according to the document type and safety 
classification of the rooms to be excavated.
After approval of the design documentation, 
STUK will perform an inspection concerning the 
readiness to commence the excavations. During 
the construction, STUK will perform inspections of 
the rock surface based on mapping documentation 
before the surfaces are covered by shotcrete and 
perform similar inspections for the technical docu-
mentation of the excavated rooms.
During the construction, the commissioning 
inspection will be the final regulatory oversight 
procedure for the excavated rooms. It will conclude 
all the previous findings from earlier reviews, in-
spections, handling of non-conformances during 
the construction as well as quality control docu-
mentation.
Posiva is carrying out a comprehensive monitor-
ing program to monitor the effects of construction 
activities on the site properties, such as maintain-
ing the favourable properties of the site hydrol-
ogy, hydrogeology and rock mechanics during both 
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construction and operation of the disposal facility. 
STUK is closely following the results of the moni-
toring programme during the construction.
Oversight of feasibility of 
the disposal concept
Based on the construction licence review, Posiva 
has not yet fully demonstrated the feasibility of the 
emplacement of disposal components according to 
the latest design and some of the requirements for 
STUK’s decision on the PSAR concern this issue. 
These include demonstrating among other things:
•	 Posiva’s	capability	to	excavate	underground	dis-
posal rooms that fulfil the specifications
•	 the	manufacture	 of	 engineered	barrier	 compo-
nents
•	 the	 installation	 of	 engineered	 barrier	 compo-
nents.
The engineered barrier system (EBS) includes cop-
per canister, bentonite buffer, backfilling of the tun-
nels and isolation and closure structures. STUK’s 
oversight will cover the design, manufacturing and 
installation of the EBS components. During the 
construction period, the EBS oversight will focus 
mainly on Posiva’s R&D projects that aim to dem-
onstrate the manufacture of EBS components ful-
filling the requirement specifications set for them 
in the design documentation.
Oversight of post-closure safety case 
development during construction
The post-closure safety case has a clear interface 
with the construction of the disposal facility and 
the feasibility of the disposal concept. Changes in 
the post-closure safety case may influence the con-
struction of the disposal facility and the feasibility 
of the disposal concept and vice versa.
To monitor the development work performed for 
the post-closure safety case requirements, STUK 
and Posiva have agreed to have regular discus-
sions on the development work. The first step was 
to reach common understanding on the targets 
for the development work for each requirement. 
Secondly, Posiva developed project plans to address 
the requirements and delivered the plans to STUK 
for review. To have a clear overall view of Posiva’s 
development work, STUK required Posiva to in-
clude all the project plans in the existing disposal 
concept development plan or in some other similar 
plans. The discussion will continue in the future as 
needed and at least when Posiva achieves set mile-
stones in the development projects.
Regulatory approach for nuclear safeguards
As ONKALO was foreseen to become a part of the 
disposal facility for spent nuclear fuel, STUK start-
ed implementation of the safeguards for ONKALO 
in 2003. Subsequently, Posiva was obliged to imple-
ment safeguards from the beginning of ONKALO 
excavation up to the closure of the disposal facil-
ity. In accordance with STUK’s regulations, Posiva 
prepared and documented the necessary safeguard 
procedures and measures in a quality manual 
called “Nuclear Materials Handbook” which was 
approved by STUK in 2005. Since then Posiva has 
regularly updated the handbook and submitted the 
new versions to STUK for approval.
In 2013 Posiva submitted the preliminary Basic 
Technical Characteristics (BTC) of the geological 
disposal facility and the encapsulation plant to the 
European Commission (EC) as requested from new 
nuclear facility operators. The Commission has 
the assigned Material Balance Area (MBA) codes, 
W0LF, for the geological disposal facility and, 
W0LE, for the encapsulation plant. The two mate-
rial balance areas constitute a site according to the 
Additional Protocol. The Posiva site (SSFPOS1) 
covers the fenced area around the buildings sup-
porting the construction of the facilities. Based on 
the declarations, the IAEA and the EC perform 
regular inspections of the Posiva site and facilities.
STUK’s safeguarding activities consist of in-
specting and assessing Posiva’s implementation of 
safeguards, reviewing Posiva’s reports, and verifi-
cation through on-site inspections that the disposal 
facility is in full compliance with Posiva’s as-built 
documentation, also presented in the BTCs. STUK 
also verifies that the information in Posiva’s decla-
ration on the site is correct before the declaration 
is submitted to IAEA and the EC.
STUK approved the “plan for arranging the 
safeguards control necessary to prevent the pro-
liferation of nuclear weapons” which was included 
in Posiva’s construction licence application. In the 
approval of the plan STUK highlighted to Posiva 
the need to plan and construct the facilities in a 
way that enables efficient implementation of safe-
guards by STUK, the European Commission and 
the IAEA. The safeguards long-term challenge is 
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a good example of ongoing coordination with the 
IAEA and the EC in developing the concepts for 
new types of facilities, and to carry out the re-
quired safeguard activities for a period of hundred 
years. The task of accommodating the safeguards 
measures to be implemented at the encapsulation 
plant and geological disposal facility in the design 
of the facility is ongoing. Spent nuclear fuel, which 
has been emplaced in the disposal facility, cannot 
be re-verified later. A non-destructive assay instru-
ment for verifying spent nuclear fuel at the single 
pin level is under development and currently un-
der rigorous testing in nuclear power plants. The 
plans are to verify all spent fuel before packing 
into the spent fuel disposal casks.
STUK’s safeguard activities and findings 
are published annually in the safeguards re-
port “Implementing nuclear non-proliferation in 
Finland. Regulatory control, international co-op-
eration and the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban 
Treaty”.
L.3 Posiva’s programme for 
spent fuel disposal
Introduction
In Finland, each producer of nuclear power gener-
ated electricity is fully responsible for its own nu-
clear waste management and its costs. Teollisuuden 
Voima Oyj (TVO) and Fortum Power and Heat Oy 
have been managing their own nuclear waste since 
their nuclear power plants began operating in the 
late 1970s and early 1980s. Regarded as high-level 
waste, the spent fuel is currently kept in inter-
im water pool storage facilities at the plant sites. 
Later, it will be disposed of in the Olkiluoto bed-
rock. In 1995, TVO and Fortum established a joint 
company, Posiva Oy, to implement and manage the 
disposal of spent nuclear fuel produced in their nu-
clear power plants in Finland and to perform the 
associated research and development work. The 
disposal of spent nuclear fuel is scheduled to begin 
in the early 2020s.
Summary of spent fuel 
geological disposal history
The first study of the disposal of spent nuclear 
fuel appeared in a series of reports published by 
the Nuclear Waste Commission of Finnish Power 
Companies (YJT) in 1982. The study examined the 
safety and technical feasibility of the disposal in 
Finnish conditions under the multi-barrier princi-
ple. The existing information on the Finnish bed-
rock was compiled in respect to the long-term safe-
ty of disposal and the suitability of the rock for un-
derground construction. In 1993 TVO launched an 
R&D programme to develop the disposal solution 
for spent nuclear fuel. The programme contained 
geological screening of the possible final disposal 
sites in 1993-1995. Preliminary site characteriza-
tion started in 1987 at five sites. The site character-
ization programme included deep drilling, geologi-
cal mapping, hydrogeological, hydro geochemical 
and rock mechanical studies. After summarizing 
the results of the preliminary site investigations, a 
detailed site characterization programme was con-
ducted at four sites, Eurajoki, Loviisa, Äänekoski 
and Kivetty in 1992–1999. At the same time, the 
disposal concept was developed further in parallel 
to the site characterization. In 1999 Posiva applied 
for a Decision-in-Principle (DiP) for a spent nu-
clear fuel disposal facility at Olkiluoto in Eurajoki. 
The Finnish Government made a favourable DiP 
in December 2000 and the Parliament ratified the 
decision in May 2001.
After the DiP was ratified in 2001, Posiva con-
tinued detailed site confirmation studies at the 
Olkiluoto site and the development of the disposal 
concept. The excavation of the underground rock 
characterization facility (URFC) ONKALO was 
started in 2004. As ONKALO is constructed at 
the repository site and will be used as an access 
route to the disposal facility, the construction of 
ONKALO has been subject to the requirements 
applicable to nuclear facilities in general, and, in 
particular, to those addressing the construction of 
nuclear waste facilities. An extensive programme 
of site specific characterization, testing and ex-
periments was launched for ONKALO during con-
struction phase. The excavation of ONKALO was 
completed in 2016. The experience gained from the 
ONKALO project will be used in the construction 
of the disposal facility.
General layout of ONKALO and the KBS-3V 
concept of disposal is presented in the Figure L3-1.
Construction licence granted 
and construction started
According to the Government’s Decision-in-
Principle the spent fuel from the Loviisa and 
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Olkiluoto NPPs will be disposed of in a KBS-3TM 
type geological repository on the Olkiluoto island 
in the municipality of Eurajoki. At the end of 2012 
Posiva submitted a construction licence application 
for an encapsulation plant and disposal facility to 
the Government.
The Finnish Nuclear Safety Authority (STUK) 
gave a positive safety statement supported with 
a safety evaluation concerning the construction 
licence application on February 2015. In addition, 
STUK made a separate decision about the key 
safety documents, which were submitted to STUK 
for review together with the licence application. 
In these decisions STUK set requirements for 
Posiva that must be met during construction or 
in the operating licence application documenta-
tion. These requirements concern further work 
in safety demonstration for reducing some of the 
uncertainties related to the project. The Finnish 
Government granted the construction licence to 
Posiva on November 12, 2015 for the disposal 
of 6500 tU from NPP units Olkiluoto 1–3 and 
Loviisa 1 and 2. Posiva has continued research 
and detailed technical design of the nuclear waste 
facilities to fulfil the requirements set by STUK as 
a result of its safety evaluation.
The construction of the disposal facility trans-
portation and connecting tunnels was started in 
December 2016 after STUK had confirmed Posiva’s 
readiness to start the construction of the under-
ground disposal facility. The scope of the first exca-
vation phase also includes the first central tunnel 
into the disposal area. The construction of the dis-
posal facility will be conducted in phases to limit 
disturbances caused by open spaces and to enable 
continuous improvement of the disposal technology 
during operation.
Posiva is planning to apply for the operating 
licence by the end of 2020 and start operation of 
the encapsulation and disposal facilities by the end 
of 2023. The time schedule depends on the dura-
tion of the operating licence application review. 
The project plan and the schedule are presented in 
Figure L3-2.
Programme to address the 
open requirements
Posiva has established several development pro-
jects to address the requirements raised by STUK 
during the evaluation of the post-closure safety 
case for the construction licence. These projects 
have been included into Posiva’s programme sched-
ule (Figure L3-2) and their progress is tracked to 
assess the readiness of the disposal concept and 
the safety case before moving on to the next phase 
of the programme. Posiva and STUK engage in fre-
quent dialogue to evaluate Posiva’s plans related 
to addressing the remaining STUK requirements.
Figure L3-1. General layout of ONKALO research facility and KBS-3V concept of disposal.
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The development projects on site confirmation 
and rock characterization deal with the compli-
ance of various site models and respective site 
research data. they also deal with the reliability 
of the discrete fracture network modelling meth-
od, and address the interconnection between the 
safety functions, performance targets and design 
requirements of the host rock, and the reliabil-
ity of Posiva’s rock suitability classification (RSC) 
method. The aim of the work is to increase the 
reliability of the future safety case (TURVA-2020) 
by producing an integrated site model and by 
verifying its compliance with the data gathered 
from the site during the site investigations and 
during the construction of the ONKALO facil-
ity according to Posiva’s monitoring programme 
as reported in Posiva’s 2012-01 report. Further 
information will be produced in several different 
projects under the site programme that include 
all site description projects for the evaluation of 
the long-term evolution of the site properties and 
in some specific projects. The specific projects in-
clude studies into issues such as the salinity of the 
groundwater (Merireikä project), the penetration 
depth and evolution of the composition of glacial 
melt waters (Saimaa project), sulphide flux on can-
ister surfaces (Sulfidi project), and the evolution of 
mechanical properties of the host rock (POSE and 
Kalliomekaniikan paikankuvaus projects).
The integrated site model and the monitoring 
programme are in connection to the rock suit-
ability classification (RSC), which is a method 
developed by Posiva during the construction of the 
ONKALO facility for locating suitable rock vol-
umes for various rooms and which will be used for 
the same purpose in the construction of the final 
disposal facility. The reliability of the RSC method 
will be addressed and the method will be evaluated 
and further developed during the detailed design 
and construction of the tunnels for the commis-
sioning test. Detailed scale modelling of the site 
for the exact location of the rooms will be further 
developed in this connection.
Alternatives to the current model are being 
studied and modelling work is being carried out 
to evaluate the consequences of earth quakes and 
secondary movements on the final disposal facili-
ties (Seismologia project).
The post-closure evolution of the disposal sys-
tem is affected by the evolution of the climate both 
from the short- and long-term perspective. Posiva 
is extending the studies to include extreme lines of 
evolution, such as extremely thick glaciation and 
an extended temperate climate by modelling the 
evolution of CO2 contents for a period of 1 million 
years (Ilmastokehitys project). The results will be 
integrated into the safety case.
The projects regarding the disposal canisters 
 
Figure L3-2. Project progress model and schedule.
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concentrate on the industrialization of canister 
manufacturing methods, as well as evaluating and 
reducing the uncertainties of the long-term perfor-
mance of the canisters. Manufacturing processes 
for canister components are being developed to 
produce components that fulfil their requirements 
and can be produced in a cost-effective way. Grain 
size is one focus of the development work for cop-
per components and the effects of the casting pro-
cess on mechanical properties are another focus 
area for the cast-iron inserts.
The long-term integrity of the canisters re-
quires copper to resist corrosion. Various forms 
of corrosion have been studied for a few decades 
and according to current knowledge it has been 
stated that there are no forms of corrosion that can 
threaten the required lifetime of the canisters. To 
reduce the uncertainties related to assumptions 
made in the assessments, some further corrosion 
tests will be performed. To support the statement 
and the tests, modelling is being carried out (cop-
per sulphide modelling) in co-operation with the 
Swedish waste management organisation SKB.
Studies on the creep properties of the copper 
are being extended to include larger temperature 
and stress fields (lid weld) and to include the ef-
fects of sulphur and phosphorus (base material).
The clay components of the disposal concept 
include a buffer surrounding the canisters in the 
deposition holes and the backfill material of the 
deposition tunnels. Both the buffer and the back-
fill consist of blocks and pellets. The backfill also 
includes granules, according to the current design. 
When bentonite clay come into contact with water, 
it swells and limits the transport of water and 
other substances that might be harmful to the 
canister; the buffer also protects the canister me-
chanically in case of small rock shear movements. 
The development work addresses some remaining 
open issues for evaluating the evolution of the clay 
components, such as homogenization, mechanical 
and chemical erosion, alteration of the clay miner-
als, interaction between the clay and cement used 
in the underground construction. To study these 
processes, several projects have been established 
and are ongoing. The wetting behaviour of buffer 
and backfill components is being tested on various 
scales (1:6, 1:2) and modelled to support current 
knowledge (DoSub, DOST, FISST projects). The 
interaction of the various clay components is also 
being studied (HDD project) and the wetting be-
haviour and mass loss during the saturation of the 
components is being further studied and modelled 
(mechE project) to reduce the uncertainties related 
to early evolution until the full saturation of the 
disposal system.
In the long term, mass loss of the buffer and 
backfill components could also occur due to chemi-
cal erosion of the clay. The rate of chemical erosion 
depends on the ground water composition, frac-
tures conducting the ground water to the deposi-
tion tunnels and holes as well as on properties of 
the clay. To reduce the uncertainties related to the 
mass loss of buffer and backfill due to chemical ero-
sion, data on fractures is being gathered, further 
tests on clay performance are being done and mod-
elling is being carried out.
Performance of the bentonite buffer in the 
long-term is also affected by its mineralogical 
composition. Further knowledge to support the 
assumptions made about the buffer performance 
is being gathered via long-term laboratory tests 
(MAB project) performed in elevated temperatures 
and in selected ground water compositions.
The long-term interaction of the clay compo-
nents with the cement used in the construction of 
the final disposal facility is being studied with help 
of laboratory experiments, computer simulations 
and discrete fracture network modelling (CBI and 
DFN projects). The aim of the work is to set safe 
limits for the use of cement, under which the effect 
on the performance of the clay components can be 
disregarded.
Posiva has completed work during 2016 in two 
large EURATOM co-funded demonstration projects 
for disposal technologies LUCOEX (emplacement 
technologies) and DOPAS (plugs and seals) among 
several other 7th research framework projects. 
Currently, Posiva is participating in the Euratom 
Horizon 2020 projects: BEACON (bentonite ho-
mogenisation), MODERN2020 (monitoring strate-
gies of disposal facility), and, MIND (microbial 
activity in disposal), and is cooperating on the IGD-
TP (Implementing Geological Disposal Technology 
Platform) platform in the CAST project dealing with 
the release ratio of C-14 in spent nuclear fuel, and 
the DISCO project studying the dissolution of spent 
nuclear fuel in disposal conditions. The criticality 
safety of the spent nuclear fuel in disposal condi-
tions is also being further assessed.
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Evaluation of Posiva's preparedness 
for nuclear construction
According to Section 108 of the Nuclear Energy 
Decree, the various phases in the construction of 
a nuclear facility cannot be commenced until the 
Radiation and Nuclear Safety Authority (STUK) 
has ascertained for each phase that all safety-re-
lated factors and safety regulations have been giv-
en sufficient consideration on the basis of the docu-
ments mentioned in Section 35 of Nuclear Energy 
Degree and other detailed plans and documents.
In order to ensure Posiva’s preparedness to 
continue to the nuclear construction phase, Posiva 
established and implemented a verification pro-
gramme. The programme included verifications of 
several levels of documentation, requirements and 
activities. The general contents of the programme 
structure are presented in Figure L3-3. In addition 
to the documentation and review of requirements, 
Posiva conducted one independent review and 
carried out one self-evaluation related to organi-
zational preparedness, safety culture and manage-
ment of nuclear facilities.
Posiva’s verification was conducted during April 
– September 2016 and the evaluation report was 
sent to STUK. STUK conducted three inspections 
during October – November 2016 to verify Posiva’s 
readiness to commence the nuclear construction. 
No significant open issues were observed which 
would restrain underground nuclear construction 
activities, and on 25th November Posiva’s prepar-
edness for nuclear construction was confirmed by 
STUK. The MEAE was informed of the commence-
ment of the nuclear construction on the 9th of 
December 2016.
Disposal facility construction 
status and progress
Excavation works for the encapsulation plant foun-
dations started in June 2016. The underground 
excavation work package LTU1 (Final disposal fa-
cility, tunnel excavation contract no. 1) that start-
ed the nuclear construction phase in December 
2016, is continuing as planned and according to 
the schedule. The total amount of LTU1 excavation 
will be around 100 000 m³ and the contract is esti-
mated to be finished in June 2019.
The construction status in June 2017 is as fol-
lows:
•	 The	 LTU1	 work	 package	 progress	 stands	 at	
around 25 000 m³
•	 Canister	 shaft	 works	 commenced	 with	 rock	
injection in February 2017. The aim is to start 
canister shaft raise boring in February 2018 
and is planned to be ready in December 2018
•	 Canister	shaft	connections	at	-90	m	and	-180	m	
have been fully excavated. Canister shaft con-
nection excavation at -290 m has started.
•	 Canister	reception	station	excavation	at	-437	m	
has started
•	 Vehicle	connections	9	and	22	have	been	excavat-
ed. Connections 1, 5, 15, 17 and 23 are ongoing.
The constructon of the supporting structures of the 
personnel shaft has commenced and the work is 
planned for completion during June 2017 – March 
2018. Manufacture and installation of the steel 
structure for the personnel elevator and building 
services are scheduled for February 2018 – May 
2019. The air outlet shaft will be equipped and op-
erational in June 2017. The construction work for 
the supporting structures of the technical area at 
-437 m are planned to start in June 2018. The con-
struction work in general is progressing according 
to the planned schedule.Figure 3-3. General structure of Posiva’s preparedness 
program.
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Programme milestones 2017–2023 
to reach the operational phase
Posiva’s programme is divided into several phases. 
The main schedule of the programme contains all 
the relevant activities and time critical links be-
tween separate works. The main milestones are:
•	 Design	and	cost	optimization	phase	(Q1/2017)
•	 Freezing	 of	 encapsulation	 plant	 lay-out;	
(Q2/2017)
•	 Readiness	 for	 full	 scale	 in-situ	 system	 test	
(FISST); (Q1/2018)
•	 Start	 of	 construction	 of	 encapsulation	 plant;	
(Q1/2019)
•	 Qualification	of	canister	components;	(Q4/2019)
•	 Qualification	 of	 manufacturing	 methods	 for	
backfilling materials, (Q1/2020)
•	 Submission	 of	 operating	 licence	 application;	
(Q4/2020)
•	 Excavation	 of	 final	 disposal	 tunnels	 1-3	 fin-
ished; (Q3/2021)
•	 Encapsulation	 plant	 ready	 for	 commissioning	
tests; (Q1/2023)
•	 Operation	licence	and	start	of	nuclear	operation	
(Q4/2023).
Design and cost optimization phase
The basic concept and general technical design of 
the disposal facility were approved, when a posi-
tive safety statement concerning the construction 
licence was granted by STUK and the construc-
tion licence was granted by the GGovernment. 
According to the construction licence decision from 
the Government, technical modifications and im-
provements to the design and concepts can be au-
thorized by STUK, if they are within the terms of 
the construction licence.
In 2017 Posiva started a programme sub-phase 
to optimize the design and costs of disposal. The 
main objective is to become more cost effective in 
the implementation without reducing the level of 
safety and to establish an industrialized concept 
for the disposal operation. In practice, this means 
detailed investigations into making the disposal 
processes more simple and robust, developing the 
technical design so that standard industrial pro-
cesses, systems, equipment and structures can be 
utilized, and bringing overlapping design criteria 
into line. The ongoing concept and cost optimiza-
tion phase is focusing on design completion, clos-
ing open safety requirements, operation concept 
modelling, and supply chains for the backfill and 
canister components.
Posiva is also studying different alternatives 
to scheduling the emplacement priority disposal 
order of the owners’ spent fuel and to optimize the 
concept for simultaneous activities for both the dis-
posal of spent fuel and the excavation work at the 
disposal facility. Every significant design or con-
ceptual change will be reviewed and approved ac-
cording to the graded approach by its significance 
to nuclear or long-term safety. Posiva’s objective 
is to conclude this programme phase in late 2017 
with the aim of being able to present a more reli-
able and detailed estimate of the total costs and of 
the overall disposal schedule to Posiva’s owners for 
their next decision-making stage.
Preparation for operations
The operational activities are organised into a 
“preparation for operations” programme (TUVA), 
which incorporates the following activities organ-
ised as separate projects:
•	 Development	 of	 excavation	 and	 excavation	 re-
lated methods,
•	 Further	 development	 of	 prototype	 machinery	
for engineering barrier system installation such 
that they can be used effectively in operations,
•	 Planning	and	optimisation	of	operations,
•	 Planning	and	optimisation	of	maintenance,	and
•	 Commissioning	of	facilities.
Each activity produces outcomes that prepare the 
operational organisation for effective operations. 
Currently to date the outcomes produced include 
feasibility studies for excavation and excavation 
related methods. Additional functionalities and the 
increased operational reliability of prototype ma-
chinery are being further developed. Plans for po-
tential production schedules have been drawn up 
along with specifications for operational require-
ments with the maintenance requirements related 
to production schedules, and updates to the com-
missioning plan.
During the years preceding the Overall 
Commissioning Test without spent fuel (OCTw/o) 
the operational and maintenance procedures, sys-
tems, and machinery will be developed to achieve 
targeted operational schedules efficiently and will 
be commissioned. Moreover, activities to achieve 
organisational readiness for operations are in pro-
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gress. It is scheduled that the final readiness will 
be demonstrated in the OCTw/o in 2023.
Post-closure safety case
The post-closure safety case will be a portfolio of 
several reports described later in this document 
section. Long-term safety requirements and dis-
posal design requirements have been improved in 
line with the safety concept for clarifying the con-
nections between long-term safety and design solu-
tions. Posiva has been studying the materials of 
the components for the engineered barrier system 
to address factors affecting their long-term proper-
ties as described before. Posiva will also clarify the 
selection process for the relevant scenarios to be 
used in the safety case.
For the purpose of the operational licence ap-
plication, a safety case showing that the repository 
will satisfy the requirements for long-term safety is 
being produced. The main components of the safety 
case consist of a description of the design basis and 
initial state, an assessment of the performance of 
the disposal system in different future scenarios 
and an analysis of the likelihood and consequences 
of any potential releases of radioactive substances 
from the repository. The assessment starts from 
the initial state of the repository and then goes on 
to study the possible lines of evolution that the dis-
posal system could be subject to in the future. The 
assessment of the lines of evolution is based on the 
best available scientific knowledge and data gath-
ered both from Olkiluoto and from different labo-
ratory experiments and technical tests conducted 
over 30 years. The safety case consists of a portfolio 
of reports as shown in Figure L3 -4.
The main changes since the safety case for 
the construction licence application (TURVA-2012) 
reflect the integration of the LILW-repository for 
encapsulation process waste; a more transparent 
link between the long-term evolution, scenario 
formulation, and analysis of radiological conse-
quences; as well as enhancements in the produc-
tion, management and communication of the safety 
case contents.
Project for operating licence application
The Finnish Government granted the construction 
licence to Posiva on November 2015. Since then 
Posiva has started a project which aims to achieve 
a granted operating licence so that the operation of 
the disposal facility would be able to start around 
the end of the year 2023. The project aims to submit 
the operating licence application (Nuclear Energy 
Decree, section 20) by the end of 2020. The current 
plan is to apply for a 30-year operating licence 
with a periodic safety review every 15 years. The 
plan is also to supplement the application with the 
results of an “overall commissioning test without 
spent fuel” (OCTw/o) and with an as-built analysis 
in the summer of 2022. STUK will conduct a safety 
review of the operating licence application to be 
used as the basis for the Government’s decision on 
the licence application. The operating licence can 
be granted by the Government, if Posiva fulfils the 
requirements set out in the Nuclear Energy Act.
The operating licence project includes collect-
ing the information that Chapter 5 of the Finnish 
Nuclear Energy Decree under “Licensing” requires 
to be submitted with the operating licence applica-
Synthesis
Description of the overall methodology of analysis, bringing together 
all the lines of argument for safety, and the statement of confidence 
and the evaluation of compliance with long-term safety constraints
Design Basis (DB)
Safety functions, performance targets and design requirements, their 
basis and the links between them
Initial State (IS)
Initial state of the repository system and the present conditions of 
the surface environment
LILW Repository Assessment (LILW-RA)
Assessment of the long-term performance of the repository for LILW 
from the encapsulation plant and identification of interactions with 
the SNF repository
Performance Assessment and Formulation of Scenarios (PA-
FOS)
Assessment of fulfilment of performance targets taking into account 
the expected and alternative climate and surface environment 
evolutions. Scenarios formulation based on uncertainties/deviations 
identified in the assessment
Models and Data (M&D)
Models and data used in the performance assessment and in the 
transport, release and dose calculations for the disposal system
Analysis of Releases (AOR)
Overview of the main results from the radionuclide release and 
transport modelling from the repository system to the surface 
environment and evaluation of radiological consequences
Complementary Considerations (CC)
Supporting evidence for safety including natural and anthropogenic 
analogues
Figure L3-4. The present safety case portfolio (SNF, 
spent nuclear fuel; LILW, low and intermediate level 
waste).
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tion to the Government and to STUK for its safety 
review. Additionally, the Regulatory Guides on 
nuclear safety (YVL) define information require-
ments that must be included in the documenta-
tion submitted to STUK. Specifically, Guide YVL 
A.1 “Regulatory oversight of safety in the use of 
nuclear energy” (22 November 2013) defines many 
of these, but also other regulatory guides include 
complementary requirements. Producing and or 
assembling all of the required documentation is 
included in the licensing project. The licensing 
project acts as an interface with the MEAE and 
STUK.
During the construction phase, before the sub-
mittal of the operating licence application, the 
licensing of the engineering solutions and building 
of the facilities will be reviewed and approved step 
by step by STUK. The safety assessments of the 
built facilities, operations, accident eanalyses, as 
well as post-closure safety analysis of the spent 
nuclear fuel disposal will be submitted along with 
the operating licence application for STUK’s safety 
review.
Organizational activities
Posiva has established the necessary management 
processes for the disposal project and modified its 
organization to meet current and future needs. 
The disposal project has been divided into several 
development and design programmes, which are 
further divided into several projects. A steering 
group has been established to support and control 
the main programmes and projects under them. 
The previous organization has been adapted from 
a single line organization into a matrix format 
and from R&D into design and implementation. 
Furthermore, a dedicated project steering and fol-
low-up group for project progress and resourcing 
control has been set up.
Reviews and reports describing the status of 
the disposal project are provided on a monthly 
basis to the steering group, where programme and 
line organization managers form a consensus on 
the status of the activities and forward their draft 
resolutions for decision making and approval. The 
status and follow-up of the main objectives, in ad-
dition to open requirements and actions required 
to close them are permanent topics on the steering 
group’s agenda.
Specific groups and processes to monitor design 
modifications (design authority function) and pro-
vide safety oversight, configuration management, 
assessments of long-term safety, nuclear safety 
and safety culture have all been established and 
are in active use. STUK has carried out its annual 
programme of nuclear construction inspections 
(RTO). STUK’s programme covers all major and 
safety significant processes related to nuclear facil-
ity construction. During the evaluation of Posiva’s 
preparedness for nuclear construction and during 
the on-going construction time no significant obser-
vations have been raised.
L.4 Fennovoima’s nuclear waste 
management plans
Introduction
Fennovoima Oy plans to build the Hanhikivi 1 
(FH1) nuclear power plant (NPP) to produce elec-
tricity for its owners at production cost price. 
Provided that a construction licence is granted by 
the Government, the plant will be built in Pyhäjoki 
in Northern Finland (Figure L4-1). The thermal 
power of the reactor unit will be 3220 MW and the 
Figure L4-1. Hanhikivi 1 nuclear power plant will be 
built in Pyhäjoki in Northern Finland.
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electrical power output will be 1 200 MW. On-site 
there will also be other nuclear facilities as stated 
in the Decision-in-Principle (2009, supplemented 
in 2014) required for the construction and opera-
tion of the power plant unit.
The unit’s planned service life is 60 years 
(Figure L4-2). Fennovoima’s nuclear power plant 
unit will be supplied by RAOS Project Oy (RAOS), 
which is a part of the Rosatom Group. The plant 
type will consist of a Rosatom AES-2006 pressur-
ized water reactor.
Waste amount estimations
The waste inventory given in Table L4-1 is based 
on the estimates made by RAOS. The inventory is 
expected to be further elaborated when operation 
of the reactor unit FH1 starts.
In addition to the operational waste, the 
amount of decommissioning waste is estimated to 
be around 17.000 m³.
The estimated amount of spent fuel produced 
during 60 years’ operation is is expected to be 
around 1.200–1.800 tons, which according to 
Finnish legislation must be handled as waste and 
needs to be disposed of in Finland.
Figure 4-2. Overall nuclear waste management schedule of FH1.
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Spent fuel management
Interim storage of spent fuel
Fennovoima applied for the construction licence 
for an interim spent fuel storage facility in June 
2015 as part of the NPP construction licencelicence 
application. Both dry cask storage and wet pool 
storage concepts were included as alternatives in 
the construction licence application. In summer 
2016, Fennovoima chose a wet pool type storage 
solution for Hanhikivi 1. The differences between 
the dry and wet concepts in safety and economics 
were considered small thus making the compari-
son of the concepts very difficult. The decision was 
based on previous good experiences of operating 
pool storage facilities in Finland, as well as licens-
ing challenges seen in the dry cask storage concept. 
Currently Fennovoima is preparing the technical 
description of the wet storage facility to be submit-
ted to the nuclear safety authority in 2017.
Fennovoima’s plan is to start the construction 
of the interim spent fuel storage facility around 
the time of the start of the commercial operation of 
the FH1 in 2024. The storage facility needs to be in 
operation about 7 years after the start of the com-
mercial operation of the nuclear power plant unit, 
thus giving Fennovoima plenty of time to construct 
the facility and to obtain an operating licence for it.
The interim storage is planned to operate until 
2125, allowing the heat of the spent nuclear fuel to 
decrease to a sufficiently low level for its final dis-
posal. The interim storage will be first constructed 
for the amount of spent nuclear fuel from 30 years 
of NPP operation. At least two extensions are 
planned for the storage facilities. In the first exten-
sion, the pool capacity will be increased to house 
spent fuel arising from 60 years of NPP operation. 
In the second extension, it is planned to make the 
storage independent from the FH1 reactor unit, 
thus enabling the immediate dismantling of the 
reactor unit after the commercial operation has 
ended in approximately 2085.
Spent fuel disposal
Spent nuclear fuel (around 1.200–1.800 tons dur-
ing the sixty-year lifespan) from Fennovoima’s nu-
clear power plant will be disposed in the Finnish 
crystalline bedrock. In disposal solutions based-
based on the KBS-3 concept, the spent fuel will be 
inserted into copper canisters at an encapsulation 
plant, surrounded by bentonite clay, and placed in 
deposition holes drilled deep in the bedrock. The 
disposal schedule will be planned to allow the op-
timization of safety and the financial feasibility of 
the operations.
Fennovoima’s primary objective has been to 
negotiate an agreement concerning the disposal of 
spent nuclear fuel with Posiva Oy’s (responsible for 
the disposal of the spent nuclear fuel of its owners) 
owners, Teollisuuden Voima Oyj (TVO) and Fortum 
Power and Heat Oy (Fortum). In its condition of 
the Decision-in-Principle granted in May, 2010 con-
cerning the construction of Fennovoima’s nuclear 
power plant and the amendment to the decision 
of 18 September 2014, the Government of Finland 
required Fennovoima to present the Ministry of 
Economic Affairs and Employment (MEAE) with 
either a co operation agreement with the cur-
rent operators underunder a nuclear waste man-
agement obligation, i.e. TVO and Fortum, or an 
environmental impact assessment program (EIA 
programme) for its own disposal facility for spent 
nuclear fuel.
Fennovoima started co-operation with Posiva 
Oy by signing an agreement with Posiva Solutions 
Table L4-1. Estimated radioactive waste (packed for 
disposal) production from FH1 based on information 
provided by RAOS.
AES-2006
DRY WASTE
Compactable
 VLLW 4.9 m³/a
 LLW 8.4 m³/a
 ILW 4.0 m³/a
Non-compactable
 VLLW 4.8 m³/a
 LLW 10.5 m³/a
 ILW 3.6 m³/a
Dry waste total: 36 m³/a
WET WASTE1
 VLLW –
 LLW 25.7 m³/a
 ILW 27.1 m³/a
Wet waste total: 52.8 m³/a
ALL TOTAL: 89 m³/a
TOTAL 60 a 5 340 m³
1) Resins from the steam blowdown system (4 m³/a) are expected to be 
(conditionally) free-released.
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Oy, Posiva’s subsidiary that focuses on supplying 
services, at the end of June 2016. The co-operation 
started in autumn 2016 and it concerns research 
and development activities, and the objective is 
to support Fennovoima to achieve readiness for 
submitting its own application for a Decision-in-
Principle concerning the disposal of spent nuclear 
fuel. The co-operation agreement has been made for 
the next ten years. At the same time, Fennovoima 
submitted an environmental impact assessment 
programme (EIA program) to the MEAE. The 
programme suggests Eurajoki and Pyhäjoki as al-
ternative locations for the spent fuel encapsulation 
plant and disposal facility. Eurajoki by the Gulf of 
Bothnia (Figure L4-1) is the municipality, where 
Posiva Oy’s disposal facility is being constructed. 
On July 12, 2016, the Ministry considered that the 
assessment programme fulfilled the condition in 
the Decision-in-Principle and resumed processing 
the NPP construction licence application.
According to the current estimate, the dis-
posal operations will begin no earlier than in the 
2090s. The disposal of spent nuclear fuel from the 
Hanhikivi 1 nuclear power plant unit will be com-
pleted in the early 2100s, after which the disposal 
facility will be permanently closed. Fennovoima 
may carry out the disposal of spent nuclear fuel 
in co-operation with the parties currently under 
the nuclear waste management obligations, or in-
dependently by constructing its own final disposal 
facility, or as a combination of these two alterna-
tives. The disposal schedule presented above shall 
be further specified after the disposal solution is 
established in more detail.
Operational waste management
Waste classification
The main waste management objective is to mini-
mize the waste volume, while trying to keep the 
volumetric activity concentration of the waste as 
low as reasonably achievable. For this purpose, 
adequate waste sorting will already be organized 
at the point of waste generation.
The operational waste is divided into four cat-
egories based on its radioactivity concentration. 
These categories are: 1) Intermediate-level waste, 
2) Low-level waste, 3) Very low-level waste, and 4) 
exempt waste. The activity limits for the categories 
are defined in the STUKguide (Regulatory Guide 
YVL D.4) and STUK Regulation (STUK Y/4/2016). 
In addition to the radiological characterization, the 
chemical form must be taken into account in waste 
sorting and packing.
Solid waste management
According to the plans, the solid nuclear waste 
management process already starts before mate-
rial is brought to the NPP, by limiting certain ma-
terials from ending up in the nuclear waste, based 
on the possible harmful long-term safety effects 
caused by these materials.
The second stage is to carry out preliminary 
waste sorting at the waste generation location. 
Due to limitations in the measuring equipment, as 
well as available expertise, this will be very crude 
initial sorting. The actual sorting by activity will 
be done in the waste management building, where 
the packed waste will be cut and compacted to 
minimize the waste volume and will be character-
ized based on its activity. For the activity measure-
ments, certain special arrangements will be made 
to minimize the disturbance due to background 
radiation, thus increasing the measurement ac-
curacy.
Liquid waste management
Liquid radioactive waste generated in various pro-
cesses in the NPP will first be condensed by us-
ing filtering, ion exchange and evaporators. At the 
point when further condensing is no longer practi-
cal, the liquid as well as the filtering media will be 
solidified into a concrete matrix. The solidification 
plant will be in the NPP; thus, no transportation 
will be required for the liquid waste. Before solidi-
fication, the liquid waste can be aged in tanks for 
1–2 years depending on the radiological properties 
of the waste.
The solidification process will be planned to 
take into account the chemical properties of the 
waste as well as the radiological classification. 
Based on worker radiation protection the surface 
dose rate will be limited to 2 mSv/h during the 
transportation.
Waste clearance
Fennovoima is planning to use waste clearance as 
defined in YVL D.4 as much as practical. Due to 
municipal waste management limitations, there 
might be some non-radiological limiting factors 
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(e.g. bans on landfill disposal of burnable waste) 
making the clearance financially unfeasible and 
technically difficult.
Low and intermediate level waste disposal
Predisposal storage
Before disposal the LILW will be stored in the NPP. 
The NPP will have storage facilities for 10 years of 
waste production. The storage space will have 20% 
additional capacity for unseen waste generation.
Near surface repository
The introduction of the VLLW waste category has 
made it possible to use a near surface repository. 
VLLW is waste that has an average activity lower 
than 0.1 MBq/kg (Nuclear Energy Decree), and can 
be handled without special radiation protection 
equipment. The near surface repository will be con-
structed during the first years of NPP operations, 
and it will be used throughout lifetime of the NPP. 
Decommissioning waste with activity less than 0.1 
MBq/kg will be deposited in the same near surface 
repository as the operational VLLW. The total ac-
tivity of the planned disposal amount is less than 
1 TBq. The disposed waste will be isolated from 
the environment by preventing water reaching the 
waste with dense ground constructions and pro-
tective layers. Possible leakage waters will be col-
lected and monitored.
LILW disposal facility
A low and intermediate level waste repository will 
be built at an intermediate depth in the bedrock 
(around a hundred meters deep) for operational 
and decommissioning waste. The LILW-disposal 
facility is likely to be excavated around 2030, as 
it will need to be in operation for about ten years 
after the start of the NPP’s commercial produc-
tion. Additional disposal tunnels and other spaces 
required for decommissioning waste will be exca-
vated later, in approximately the 2070s. As shown 
in Figure L4-3, the grey areas are preliminary res-
ervations for the decommissioning waste. As the to-
tal activity of the planned disposed waste exceeds 
1 TBq, the intermediate depth disposal site is con-
sidered a large-scale waste disposal facility. Thus, 
it is a separate nuclear facility, requiring its own 
construction and operating licence. In the bedrock 
disposal facility,the waste packaging, as well as the 
concrete injected between waste packages and the 
bedrock will isolate the waste from the environ-
ment. If needed, (mainly for ILW) steel reinforced 
concrete lining and waterproof elements, such as 
bentonite clay, can be used to ensure safe long-term 
waste disposal.
Decommissioning plan
The decommissioning has been taken into account 
in the plant design. A preliminary decommission-
ing plan has already been prepared and submitted 
to STUK for approval. For the operating licence 
application, the decommissioning plan will be up-
dated and it will be made more detailed. During 
the operational phase, the decommissioning plan 
will be updated every six years, making it more 
detailed in every round.
L.5 Decommissioning of the Finland’s 
first nuclear reactor FiR1
VTT Technical Research Centre of Finland Ltd. 
shut down the Finnish Reactor 1 (FiR  1) in 
Otaniemi, Espoo, in June 2015 and started prepa-
rations for its decommissioning. FiR 1 is an open-
tank Triga Mk II type reactor of 250 kW nominal 
thermal power. General Atomics (US) has supplied 
more than 60 of this type of reactors to institutions 
around the world.
Licensing and funding for decommissioning
FiR  1 is the first nuclear reactor to be decom-
missioned in Finland. VTT has submitted an ap-
plication to the Government in June 20, 2017 to 
receive a licence for decommissioning (formally a 
new operating licence as the present Finnish legis-
lation does not separately define a decommission-
Figure 4-3. Bedrock repository for LLW and ILW with 
reservation for decommissioning waste (grey).
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ing licence). To cover the costs, there is a deposit 
of approximately EUR 12 million in the Finnish 
Nuclear Waste Management Fund for the decom-
missioning and waste management of FiR 1. The 
fund reimburses costs gradually to the licensees 
according to the completion of their decommission-
ing duties.
Dismantling of the reactor
The dismantling of the reactor can commence once 
the spent nuclear fuel has been removed from the 
reactor core. In 2017, VTT (supported by a num-
ber of contractors) completed a detailed disman-
tling plan and work instructions, including waste 
handling and packaging in compliance with the 
requirements for transport and interim storage. 
Additionally, the dismantling work will be carried 
out by external contractors, under VTT’s supervi-
sion. Dismantling the reactor is estimated to take 
1–2 years, including decontamination and release 
of the facility. The building can then be used for 
some other purpose.
Nuclear waste management
Inventory estimates
has completed detailed activity inventory cal-
culations and will complement them by taking 
samples before and during the dismantling opera-
tion. The estimated volumes and total radioactiv-
ity of the spent fuel and the waste generated by 
the decommissioning process are relatively small 
(estimates for spent fuel ~100 TBq / 15 kgU; for 
dismantling waste ~ a few TBq / less than 100 m³).
Figure L5-2. Plant engineer in the control room of the reactor during the last day of operation in June 2015.
Figure L5-1. The core of FiR 1 in operation.
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Spent fuel
The fuel is subject to the return programme of the 
US DOE running until May 2019. The primary 
scenario for the management of the nuclear fuel is 
to send it back to its country of origin, specifically 
to Idaho National Laboratory in the USA, where 
batches of nuclear fuel from TRIGA research reac-
tors have previously been returned from various 
countries. Presently the programme has howev-
er halted, as Idaho State has stopped all nuclear 
waste transports to Idaho National Laboratory 
(INL) due to breaches of the Idaho Settlement 
Agreement. VTT considers return to US as the 
primary option for the spent fuel, and is preparing 
licensing and contracts required for fuel’s return 
and transport while waiting for the issue to be 
resolved. The secondary option would be disposal 
in Finland. However, this would require special ad-
ditional licensing for the encapsulation and spent 
fuel disposal facilities currently under construction 
in Olkiluoto.
Low‑level and intermediate‑level 
nuclear waste resulting from the 
decommissioning project
The operating and dismantling waste will consist 
of low-level and intermediate-level nuclear waste. 
The disposal of the waste will be negotiated with 
existing LILW disposal facility licensees and the 
disposal needs to be coordinated with the decom-
missioning and waste disposal schedules of the 
nuclear power plants. This means that the waste 
will be placed in an interim storage facility for a 
period of nearly 20 years. The interim storage and 
disposal can be arranged in co-operation with nu-
clear power utilities in Finland.
There are a few materials in FiR  1 (graphite, 
aluminium and the Fluental™ moderator mate-
rial) that require specific attention. The waste gen-
erated by dismantling the Finnish nuclear power 
plants contains no reactor graphite and only a 
small amount of aluminium. VTT has conducted a 
literature survey on the chemical behavior of irra-
diated graphite and aluminium, and their impact 
on the long-term safety of existing repositories. 
VTT has also studied international practices for 
the disposal of graphite.
The later stages of the disposal process will de-
pend on decision by the nuclear power companies 
on whether to extend the current intermediate-lev-
el waste repositories, and on the decommissioning 
schedule of the nuclear power plants, and on the 
disposal of the resulting dismantling waste.
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L.6 List of spent fuel storages and inventory of spent fuel
Loviisa NPP
Storage Inventory (end of 2016)/ storage capacity
 Mass¹ (tHM) Fuel assemblies
Pool storage in Loviisa 1 reactor building 17.8/57 148/481
Pool storage in Loviisa 2 reactor building 23.0/58 191/485
Basket type pool storage at the NPP 57.7/57 480/480
Rack type pool storage at the NPP  523.1/635 4348/5286
Total inventory/storage capacity (gross) 621/809 5167/6732
Total effective² storage capacity 673 5601
Olkiluoto NPP
Storage Inventory (end of 2016)/ storage capacity
 Mass¹ (tHM)  Fuel assemblies
Pool storage in Olkiluoto 1 reactor building 86.2/260  540/1520
Pool storage in Olkiluoto 2 reactor building 89.7/266  546/1560
Separate storage facility at the NPP site 1302.0/1666  7663/9756
Total inventory/storage capacity (gross) 1477.9/2192   8749/12836
Total effective1 storage capacity 2021  11836
FiR1 research reactor
Storage Inventory (end of 2016)
 Mass (kgU)  Fuel elements
Wet storage 2.04  11
Dry storage 2.41  13
Total inventory  4.45  24
1 tHM means that the spent fuel inventory is presented in tonnes of heavy metals. 
2 In the effective capacity the reserve capacity for exceptional unloading of the entire reactor core to storage 
pool, for storage pool repairs and space for dummy elements are excluded (cf. Table 1 in Section D).
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L.7 List of radioactive waste management facilities 
and inventory of radioactive waste
Loviisa NPP
Storage Inventory (end of 2016)
 Volume (m³) Activity (TBq)
Buffer storage rooms inside the NPP 218.8 <1
On-site storages for operational waste 108.8 low for LLW 
  0.9 TBq for solidified resins
Tank storage for wet LILW 1408 15.4
Dry silos for ILW 43.5 high (not measured)
Olkiluoto NPP
Storage Inventory (end of 2016)
 Volume (m³) Activity (TBq)
Buffer storage rooms inside the NPP 190 16.6
On-site storages for operational waste 49.3 0.09
Pool storage for activated metal waste 53 high
Spent oil candidate for clearance 16 low
Interim storage for state owned waste 35.2 (in on site storage) not measured
FiR 1 research reactor
Storage Inventory (end of 2016)
 Volume (m³) Activity (TBq)
Waste storage in the laboratory building 6 0.001
Storage of non-nuclear radioactive waste
Storage Inventory (end of 2016)
 Volume (m³) Activity (TBq)
Roihupelto, Storage room in STUK’s building 2 3.8
Storage of non-nuclear radioactive waste
Storage Inventory (end of 2016)
 Volume
Roihupelto, Storage room in STUK’s building HEU 0.8 g
 LEU: 536 g
 UNat: 574 g
 DU: 369 kg
 Th: 199 g
Storage for state owned waste
Storage  Inventory (end of 2016)
 Volume (m³) Activity (TBq)
In on-site storage (KAJ-storage Olkiluoto)  35.2 m³  Not measured
Disposed in the Olkiluoto disposal facility 20.8 m³ Not measured
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L.8 Overview matrix of Finland
Type of Liability Long-term manage-
ment policy
Funding of 
Liabilities
Current practice / Facilities Planned facilities
Spent fuel Disposal of SF in 
bedrock
Licensees 
have full 
financial 
liability
Interim storage at the NPP sites and at 
FiR1 research reactor.
Construction Licence for an 
encapsulation plant and a disposal 
facility for SF from existing NPPs was 
granted in 2015.
Construction of the encapsulation 
plant and the disposal facility 
started in 2016.
Future NPP operators negotiate 
cooperation agreement with the 
owners of existing facilities or 
built their own.
Nuclear fuel cycle 
wastes
Disposal of LILW in 
intermediate depth 
bedrock (Loviisa & 
Olkiluoto)
Operating LILW disposal facilities at 
both NPP sites. (Loviisa & Olkiluoto).
Future NPP operators build own 
disposal facilities at NPP site.
Non-nuclear 
radioactive wastes
Disposal for most of the 
waste and storage for a 
small quantity of waste 
(Olkiluoto)
Handling, repacking and transport to 
storage by authorised private 
entrepreneur. Storage at Olkiluoto.
Disposal to LILW silos started in 2016 
in Olkiluoto.
Disposal in LILW silos.
Decommissioning 
liabilities
Preliminary plans 
required in construction 
licence phase
Decommissioning of FiR research 
reactor is in a licensing phase.
Decommissioning of FiR research 
reactor.
Decommissioning plans of NPPs 
updated every six years.
Disused Sealed 
Sources
Return to manufacturer 
or disposal
Licensees and 
state for 
orphan 
sources
See non-nuclear radioactive waste 
section.
Disposal in LILW silos.
